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ABSTRACT
Sartre’s claim in Being and Nothingness that consciousness is nothingness is
typically understood as meaning either that consciousness is not itself, that it is
not its objects, that it is not its past, or that it is some sort of state of affairs.
Although these interpretations of Sartre are often presented independently of
each other, I argue that one can combine several of them in order to arrive at the
best understanding of Sartre’s treatment of consciousness. Such an
understanding treats consciousness as the state of affairs that is its facticity
transcending itself toward its objects. One could also combine the four typical
interpretations of Sartre so that consciousness for him is a different state of
affairs, specifically the state of affairs that is the appearance of objects along with
their various indications. This second way of understanding Sartre’s treatment of
consciousness seems inferior to the first way, though, since the former can
account for what seemingly motivates the latter. In order to do so, one must
utilize certain aspects of Husserl’s description of consciousness, a description
that Sartre actually rejects.
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INTRODUCTION
In Being and Nothingness, Sartre claims that consciousness is
nothingness. Some examples of this claim are the following:
Nothingness is the putting into question of being by being- that is,
precisely consciousness or for-itself. It is an absolute event which
comes to being by means of being and which, without having being,
is perpetually sustained by being.1
The for-itself in its being is failure because it is the foundation only
of itself as nothingness.2
The For-itself can never be its Future except problematically, for it
is separated from it by a Nothingness which it is.3
The For-itself is nothing more than this translucent Nothingness
which is the negation of the thing perceived....Thus in the
perception of the object the For-itself acknowledges itself to itself as
not being the object, while in the unveiling of the Past, the For-itself
acknowledges itself as being the Past and is separated from it only
by its nature as For-itself, which can be nothing.4
But if the For-itself is to be the nothingness whereby ‘there is’
being, then being can exist originally only as totality.5
...in order for its determination as the nothingness of being to be
full, the for-itself must realize itself as a certain unique manner of
not being this being.6
There are many possible interpretations of what he means by the nothingness of
consciousness and of what leads him to say that, but four interpretations seem
most supported by the text and most frequently emphasized by commentators.

1Jean-Paul

Sartre, Being and Nothingness, Washington Square Press, New York, 1956, p. 126.
p. 139.
3Ibid, p. 186.
4Ibid, p. 200.
5Ibid, p. 251.
6Ibid,p. 260.
2Ibid,
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One of those interpretations centers on Sartre's claim that consciousness is not
itself, a second one on his claim that it is not its object, a third one on his
treatment of it as not its past, and a fourth one on Sartre’s description of
consciousness in a manner that can be put using such general ontological terms
as ‘relation,’ ‘state of affairs,’ and ‘event.’ It should be noted that the first three
interpretations explain the nothingness of consciousness by means of it not being
something while the fourth one explains it in terms of what it is. The type of thing
that the fourth interpretation treats consciousness as being, then, must be such
that it somehow is nothing.
It should also be noted that the first of these propositions- that
consciousness is not itself- is of course very different from the other three. For
one thing, presumably just about everyone agrees that consciousness-or, for that
matter, anything at all-is not (except in special cases) its own object and not its
own past, and most would at least be open to the suggestion that consciousness
is an event or a relation, whereas hardly anybody is inclined to agree that
consciousness-or, for that matter, anything at all-is not itself. Secondly, while
Sartre himself emphasizes the connection, it is hardly clear why anyone should
agree that, just because consciousness is not its past, or not its object, or is a
state of affairs, it is therefore nothingness. The question then naturally arises
whether either Sartre's insistence that consciousness is 'not itself' or his
insistence that it is 'nothingness,' or both, are not just melodramatic ways of
saying something to which one might more readily agree. For instance, one
might take the claim that consciousness is not its past simply to mean that

2

consciousness is free and not determined by anything in the past. Such a
reading of Sartre is found in the following;
A pederast is not a pederast, since, in his most intimate
consciousness, he knows that there is no compulsion for him to be
what he is. He is not what he is, for human nature escapes all
definition and refuses to see in its act any destiny whatsoever.7
Although an assertion of such freedom is hardly non-controversial, equating such
freedom with consciousness not being itself or with it being nothingness would
surely be melodramatic. But, alternatively, perhaps one should rather suppose
that Sartre draws the connections that he does precisely because he means to
assert two additional claims which are neither melodramatic nor ones with which
many would be inclined to agree, namely, that consciousness is in some sense
its object, and is its past, in addition to not being them.
As already noted, each of the four previously-mentioned interpretations of
Sartre’s treatment of consciousness as nothingness has support from
commentators. One can find acceptance of the first interpretation, that the
nothingness of consciousness signifies that consciousness is not itself, in the
following passage by Klaus Hartmann:
Consciousness is appearance-to-self, presence-to-self…Sartre’s
meaning is expressed once more in a pictorial account, in which
presence-to-self is interpreted as a being with a ‘fissure’…What is
meant…is a fissure within consciousness…, a fissure within a unity.
What separates is an ‘ideal distance,’ a ‘nothing’… Nothingness
regarded as a fissure is, first, separation-a relationship of otherness
between things. The separated entities, however, must make up a
unity if consciousness can be presupposed as a unity of
immanence. The separated entities are not each the "other" of the
other, their relationship is not one of otherness, because the other

7

Wilfrid Desan, The Tragic Finale, Harper and Row, New York, 1960, p. 26.
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maintains an identity with the one. Thus, this unity is, by its very
form, a whole negating something which is no Other for it.8
It seems clear that the nothingness of consciousness is being taken here as its
not being the very thing it is identical with-itself.
Some commentators have taken a more minimalist approach to the claim
that consciousness is not itself, treating that claim as simply making the
epistemological point that consciousness is necessarily aware of not being
whatever it is conscious of. This epistemological take on Sartre would entail that
consciousness ‘is not’ itself, since, as we shall see in Chapter Two,
consciousness is always necessarily consciousness of itself. An example of
such an epistemological reading of Sartre is the following:
Knowledge entails that the object known is held at a distance from
the person who knows it: he distinguishes the object from himself,
and he thereby forms the judgment, ‘I am not the object.’ This
distance at which the object is held is the gap or nothingness at the
heart of the For-itself.9
This epistemological reading of Sartre could also fit with the second
interpretation of the nothingness of consciousness, the interpretation that simply
emphasizes it not being its object. Another example of that interpretation is
presented by Hazel Barnes in the following:
There is Being-in-itself, which is all of non-conscious reality. Then
there is Being-for-itself, which is consciousness, but this, says
Sartre, is really only the revelation of the In-itself. In other words,
there occurred somehow a "hole in being," and the For-itself as this
hole or lack of Nothingness is thus able to stand back, as it were,
and so reveal the In-itself. Man recognizes himself as being what is

8Klaus Hartmann, Sartre's Ontology, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, Illinois, 1966, pp.
62-65.
9 Mary Warnock, The Philosophy of Sartre, Barnes and Noble, New York, 1965, p. 61.
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not the world. Using this same negating power he can recognize
objects.10
This 'same negating power' that enables humans to recognize objects is the
ability of humans to separate or ‘stand back’ from objects as they do from the
world in the revelation of the world. And just as such separation from the world is
the for-itself’s not being the world, similarly the just-mentioned separation from
objects is the for-itself's not being its objects. This negation of objects of
consciousness that is involved in the revelation of such objects is the
nothingness of consciousness, at least on Barnes’s reading.
It is important to note, however, that there is some unclarity in what
Barnes says. First, it is one thing to take Sartre’s claims about the nothingness
of consciousness to be a way of emphasizing consciousness as not being its
object. It is another and presumably stronger thing to say that consciousness is
not its objects, and also is nothing but, or “really only,” the revelation of its
objects. After all, the fact that consciousness seemingly acts would make it more
than mere revelation. Second, it is not clear what the latter might in any case
mean. For example, in saying that consciousness is only the revelation of its
objects, does Barnes mean that in some sense it actually is its objects (despite
also not being them)? And if so, just how are we to take such a claim? Or is
Barnes saying something else? The very unclarity may make one wonder
whether Barnes is after all not just emphasizing consciousness as not being its
object, and not really saying anything else. Regardless of how Barnes is
reading Sartre, though, I will argue in Chapter Three that consciousness both is
not and also is its object for Sartre, in a sense that goes beyond anything
clarified by Barnes.
10Hazel

Barnes, "Jean-Paul Sartre and the Haunted Self," The Western Humanities Review, 10,
1956, p. 120.
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Regarding consciousness in some sense both being and not being a
certain past, one can see such a treatment in the following passage:
The perpetual break in being is nothing other than the temporality
of the self. To exist temporally is to be wrenched from identity, from
a repose in oneself...The for-itself refracts into past, present, and
future. Sartre ontologizes these distinctions as disruptions by
negation, breakages of identity....The past is surpassed by the
present. While my past is my past, I am it in the mode of "was,"
secreting a distinction, and thus negation, between it and the
present.11
It seems plausible here to treat the ‘break in being’ as nothingness, and since
this nothingness is attributed to the for-itself, it seems plausible to assume that
this passage concerns the nothingness of consciousness. That nothingness is
thus apparently due to consciousness’s wrenching away, not simply from its past,
but from its own identity with that very past.
The final interpretation of the nothingness of consciousness, the
interpretation that focuses on Sartre’s description of consciousness using such
general ontological terms as ‘relation,’ ‘state of affairs,’ and ‘event,’ is
represented in the following:
…the for-itself, or noetic activity, is an irreducible sort of happening,
or ‘absolute event’…, incorporating a certain sort of material as its
ingredients. In a sense, we can then say that an instance of noesis
is in a way nothing over and above whatever material is in question.
This would simply recognize that an event (or, in more static terms,
any ‘state of affairs’), while it is surely something over and above its
ingredients, is in another respect nothing but them…Namely, it is
just those ingredients as incorporated into just that sort of
event….(However,) we would need to add that, as an ‘absolute,’
the event in question is not construable as a mere function of
11Thomas

W. Busch, The Power of Consciousness and the Force of Circumstances in Sartre's
Philosophy, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indiana, 1990, p. 22.
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relations among portions of the ‘matter’ in question. This is
presumably what Husserl meant to suggest by invoking the
Aristotelian notion of ‘form.’12
Here we see consciousness being described in terms that do not rely on Sartre’s
claims about consciousness’s objects or its past, but rather in a general way that
may or may not involve those matters.
Although I have presented these four interpretations of Sartre as
independent of each other, I will argue that they need not be mutually exclusive
but rather that they can actually work together to provide a possible
understanding of what Sartre has in mind in treating consciousness as
nothingness. Although I will argue that this possible understanding of Sartre is
problematic, each of the first three of those interpretations can be used as an
indispensable step in arriving at conclusions constituting a particular form of the
fourth interpretation. One might say that because consciousness is not itself that
consciousness is nothingness, but an adequate account of what is meant by it
not being itself requires it to be neither its object nor its past, the very things
which consciousness also is. And an adequate account of what is meant by
consciousness being the very objects and the very past it is not requires an
understanding of it as a special sort of event or state of affairs.
All of this would seem to follow, one might note, if Sartre is claiming that
consciousness is nothing other than the fact of or state of affairs that is the
appearance of phenomena. Or more particularly, as one might argue, it is just
the fact of the appearance of phenomena which are thereby at the same time
‘surpassed’ (and also indicative of still other phenomena either as themselves in
turn already surpassed or as potentially to be surpassed). I will argue that such a

12

Richard Aquila, “Sartre’s Other and The Field of Consciousness: A Husserlian Reading,”
European Journal of Philosophy, 6, 1998, pp. 265, 274.
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reading of Sartre provides a possible explanation of why consciousness of self
must also be consciousness of a transcendent object, and that it involves
Sartre’s reliance upon a notion of the self to reach conclusions that might be
incompatible with such a notion. Such a purely phenomenological understanding
of Sartre has much to recommend it, and it may even be the most plausible and
defensible take on much of what Sartre actually claims.
In any case, I will argue that Sartre need not take the above position.
Although Sartre makes many claims that seemingly justify such an understanding
of him, many other claims by him seem incompatible with it. More significantly,
he actually provides at least the basis for a more defensible alternative to that
position. This defensible alternative also describes consciousness as an event or
state of affairs, but it is the state of affairs that is the transcendence of
consciousness’s body and past to its objects. I will argue that, to a significant
extent, this defensible alternative resembles Husserl’s description of
consciousness. In particular, for example, it treats the appearance of
phenomena as a correlate of consciousness rather than as consciousness itself.
While this may seem to be just what Sartre denies, I will argue that it actually
makes more sense out of all that Sartre claims about consciousness.

8

CHAPTER ONE:
PHENOMENOLOGICAL ONTOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS
As mentioned in the Introduction, the purely phenomenological
interpretation of Sartre’s position on consciousness treats consciousness as
nothing but the appearance of phenomena along with their various indications,
whereas the correlational interpretation treats consciousness as in some way
something more, as something related to and beyond such appearance, and of
which such appearance is a mere ‘correlate.’ The purely phenomenological
interpretation of Sartre thus seems to differ from the correlational interpretation in
that the former, but not the latter, describes consciousness solely in terms of
what appears.

Both interpretations find support in Being and Nothingness. This

chapter will detail Sartre’s vacillation between a purely phenomenological
approach to consciousness and a desire to describe it on a deeper ontological
level.
Sartre’s phenomenological approach to consciousness in Being and
Nothingness is evidenced by the book’s subtitle, “An Essay in Phenomenological
Ontology.” The book is ontological because its work is to elucidate structures of
being in an attempt to answer questions about conscious and non-conscious
being,13 and it is phenomenological because “its method is to describe structures

13

Sartre, p. 30.
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of being that appear to consciousness, so that his readers can verify the truth of
Sartre’s descriptions in our own conscious experience.”14 This emphasis on
what appears is found in the opening line of Being and Nothingness, where
Sartre claims that “(m)odern thought has realized considerable progress by
reducing the existent to the series of appearances which manifest it.”15 He
further claims that instead of positing a being that exists behind and in support of
appearances, he embraces a notion of appearance that is “full positivity; its
essence is an ‘appearing’ which is no longer opposed to being but on the
contrary is the measure of it.”16
Sartre opposes this emphasis on appearance to Kant’s assertion of beings
that exist beyond the ken of possible experience. Sartre rejects Kant’s notion of
some sort of reference by a phenomenon to a noumenon, a referencing Sartre
describes as a phenomenon pointing “over its shoulder to a true being which
would be, for it, absolute.”17 Any Kantian ‘thing-in-itself,’ or seemingly anything
else one might assert to exist beyond possible appearance, is apparently
rejected by Sartre. As one commentator notes regarding Sartre, “minds as well
as physical objects are defined in terms of their overt appearances and all
references to a hidden event behind the appearances is ruled out.”18 A table, for
instance, is nothing but a series of appearances, with each appearance referring

14

Jeffrey Wilson, “Metaphysical Questions in Sartre’s Phenomenological Ontology,” Sartre
Studies Internations, 6, 2000, p. 47.
15 Sartre, p. 3.
16 Ibid, p. 4.
17 Ibid.
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to the total series to which it belongs rather than to some being beyond
appearance that affects the subject in such a way as to cause such a series of
appearances. For Sartre, “there is nothing behind the appearance.”19
Despite such claims, though, Sartre might seem to go beyond what
appears when he notes how the notion of the phenomenon, with its essence of
appearing, “supposes in essence somebody to whom to appear.”20 This might
sound similar to Berkeley’s position that, despite the fact that esse est percipi,
non-perceived minds exist that have perceptions.21 Although Sartre rejects
Berkeley’s equation of the existence of appearances with their being perceived
as well as Berkeley’s view of ‘minds,’22 it might seem that Sartre has committed
the same error one could attribute to Berkeley: criticizing the notion of something
that does not appear but then asserting the necessity of something nonappearing in order for there to be what appears.
However accurate such a criticism may be for Berkeley, this does not
seem problematic for Sartre. Although Sartre does assert the necessity of
someone to whom appearances appear, the ‘being’ to whom things appear also
‘appears’ itself. For Sartre, since “the law of being in the knowing subject is tobe-conscious,”23 consciousness of something, such as a table, is also always

18

John W. Yolton, “The Metaphysic of En-Soi and Pour-Soi,” The Journal of Philosophy, 48,
1951, p. 549.
19 Sartre, p. 6.
20 Ibid, p. 4.
21 George Berkeley, Principles of Knowledge and Three Dialogues Between Hylas and
Philonous, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996, pp. 173-174.
22 Sartre, pp. 9-10.
23 Ibid, p. 10.
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consciousness of itself24 (I will say more about self-consciousness in Chapter
Two). Sartre says that it is “the first necessity for…consciousness to be seen by
itself.”25 So, the ‘knowing subject’ seems after all to ‘appear’ along with whatever
it is conscious of. Although the way the conscious self appears is evidently
different from how anything else appears, so that it is self-conscious rather than
conscious of itself,26 it may be that Sartre has not in fact committed here to
something beyond appearances, or at least to anything beyond appearances and
the fact of their appearing.
One might of course object that Sartre’s consciousness of consciousness
of something need not be consciousness of the being to whom appearances
necessarily appear. Sartre’s consciousness of consciousness could simply be
awareness of a conscious act rather than awareness of a conscious self or
subject. Sartre’s own argument seemingly confirms this. He argues that
counting is obviously an instance of the appearance of objects with a certain
property or quantity, but that counting also involves “a non-thetic consciousness
of my adding activity.”27 Sartre then shows that this non-thetic consciousness is
consciousness’s awareness of itself, or consciousness of consciousness.28 Thus,
one might argue, the conscious being to whom appearances must appear does

24

Ibid, p. 11.
Ibid, p. 121.
26 Ibid, p. 14.
27 Ibid, p. 13.
28 Ibid.
25
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not necessarily appear itself, so that Sartre is asserting the existence of
something beyond appearances.
The problem for this suggestion is that Sartre does indeed seem to assert
the appearance of the being to whom appearances appear. He claims that
“(c)onsciousness…is the dimension of transphenomenal being in the subject.”29
This seems to make consciousness at least part of the very being of ‘the subject.’
That in turn would seem to mean that consciousness of consciousness is after all
consciousness of the subject itself, and not just of a conscious act on its part. It
would thus seem that the necessity of a being to whom appearances appear
need not take Sartre beyond the phenomenological level of attention to
appearances, since “(c)onsciousness has nothing substantial, it is pure
‘appearance’ in the sense that it exists only to the degree to which it appears.”30
Despite this seemingly exclusive regard for appearances, though, there
are numerous instances throughout Being and Nothingness where Sartre seems
to go beyond what appears in an attempt to explain what appears. The following
quotations are evidence of this:
From the moment the world appears qua world it gives itself as
being only that. The necessary counterpart of this apprehension
then is indeed the emergence of ‘human reality’ in nothingness.31
…we have just discovered a swarm of ultra-mundane beings which
possess as much reality and efficacy as other beings, but which
enclose within themselves non-being. They require an explanation
which remains within the limits of the real….Nothingness can be
nihilated only on the foundation of being; if nothingness can be
29

Ibid, p. 10.
Ibid, p. 17.
31 Ibid, p. 52.
30
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given, it is neither before nor after being, nor in a general way
outside of being. Nothingness lies coiled in the heart of being-like a
worm.32
The being by which Nothingness comes to the world must be its
own Nothingness.33
…every question supposes that we realize a nihilating withdrawal in
relation to the given….It is essential therefore that the questioner
have the permanent possibility of dissociating himself from the
causal series which constitutes being and which can produce only
being.34
What we have been trying to define is the being of man in so far as
he conditions the appearance of nothingness, and this being has
appeared to us as freedom.35
…rejected possibilities in turn have no other being than their
‘sustained being;’ it is I who sustain them in being….36
…the whole idea of foundation comes into the world through the
for-itself.37
Human reality by which lack appears in the world must be itself a
lack. For lack can come into being only through lack….38
But if it is true that the possible is-so to speak-an option on being,
and if it is true that the possible can come into the world only
through a being which is its own possibility, this implies for human
reality the necessity of being its being in the form of an option on its
being.39
It is through the for-itself that the past arrives in the world because
its ‘I am’ is in the form of an I am me.40

32

Ibid, p. 56.
Ibid, p. 59.
34 Ibid, p. 58.
35 Ibid, p. 60.
36 Ibid, p. 67.
37 Ibid, p. 130.
38 Ibid, p. 136.
39 Ibid, p. 151.
40 Ibid, p. 168.
33
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It is through human reality that multiplicity comes into the world; it
is the quasi-multiplicity at the heart of being-for-itself which causes
number to be revealed in the world.41
Totality can come to beings only by a being which has to be its own
totality in their presence. This is precisely the case with the foritself, a detotalized totality which temporalizes itself in a perpetual
incompleteness. It is the for-itself in its presence to being which
causes there to be an all of being.42
Space…depends on temporality and appears in temporality since it
can come into the world only through a being whose mode of being
is temporalization....43
…quantity…is the inapprehensible indifference of being-which can
appear only if there is being and which, although belonging to
being, can come to it only from a for-itself....44
Human-reality is the being which causes a place to come to
objects.45
All of these passages seem to express the notion that consciousness, or at least
conscious human beings, is a condition of possibility for various aspects of
appearances. Such a position would seem to be beyond confirmation by a mere
inspection of what appears, since even if consciousness always appears,
consciousness’s necessary role in appearances does not appear. As Kant
notes, “(e)xperience tells us, indeed, what is, but not that it must necessarily be
so, and not otherwise.”46
This willingness by Sartre to deviate from a purely phenomenological

41

Ibid, p. 196.
Ibid, p. 250.
43 Ibid, p. 255.
44 Ibid, p. 264.
45 Ibid, p. 370.
46 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1965, p. 42/A2.
42
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ontology would of course be expected by one who adheres to the previouslymentioned interpretation of him that treats consciousness as something other
than just an appearance or the fact of their being appearance, namely a correlate
of appearances by virtue of which they appear. And in fact one finds further
support for the correlational treatment of consciousness in Sartre’s claims about
how consciousness conditions appearances. In those claims, like the passages
just quoted, Sartre treats consciousness as somehow related to
appearances precisely as what enables there to be appearances, and indeed
particular sorts of appearances. As already noted, consciousness of anything is
necessarily consciousness of itself. This leads Sartre, as we shall see more
clearly later, to treat self-consciousness as presence to and thus as a certain sort
of separation from self.47 But Sartre offers an explanation, in turn, of this special
sort of self-separation. According to Sartre, this self-separation of consciousness,
or being-for-itself, originates from a failed attempt by non-conscious being, or
being-in-itself, to found or cause itself. This attempt is, of course, doomed to
failure, since something cannot both separate from itself in order to be the cause
of itself and remain the being that is caused. One might speculate that Sartre
offers this particular explanation of the self-separation of self-consciousness
because an attempt at self-causation suggests both a splitting from self in order
to be the separate cause of self as well as identity with the self that is split from in
order to also be the effect of this cause. Perhaps

47

Sartre, pp. 11, 121.
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some notion of a chronological order of a cause and its effect might suggest a
self-caused being having to return to being its effect after being its own separate
cause. A failure to be self-caused might then be treated as a failure to in some
sense make it all the way back to the self that initially split, so that there is the
immediate juxtaposition or presence of the self that is caused to that self that is
its cause. Facticity is the term Sartre uses for the non-conscious being that
attempts to cause itself. As we shall also see later, Sartre describes facticity as
in some sense the ‘body’ of the for-itself; I will say more about the body in
Chapter Four. In any case, the following quote illustrates Sartre’s account of the
origin of consciousness:
For us, on the other hand, the appearance of the for-itself or
absolute event refers indeed to the effort of an in-itself to found
itself; it corresponds to an attempt on the part of being to remove
contingency from its being. But this attempt results in the nihilation
of the in-itself, because the in-itself can not found itself without
introducing the self or a reflective, nihilating reference into the
absolute identity of its being and consequently degenerating into
for-itself. The for-itself corresponds then to an expanding destructuring of the in-itself, and the in-itself is nihilated and absorbed
in its attempt to found itself. Facticity…resides in the for-itself as a
memory of being…. Being-in-itself can found its nothingness but
not its being….the contingency which the for-itself has derived from
the in-itself remains out of reach. It is what remains of the in-itself
in the for-itself as facticity….48
All of this seems supportive of a correlational rather than a purely
phenomenological treatment of consciousness. To put it in Sartre’s own terms,
this is because these claims are not ontological, but “metaphysical”. According
to Sartre, metaphysics and ontology are not the same thing. Ontology (or at

48

Ibid, pp. 132-133.
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least Sartre’s phenomenological ontology) is the phenomenological description of
the structures of a being, while metaphysics is “the study of individual processes
which have given birth to this world as a concrete and particular totality.”49 It
would seem that for Sartre, “facticity” has two distinct sorts of significance.
Namely, it has some sort of significance on the purely phenomenological level of
ontology, and another on the metaphysical level.
On the phenomenological level of appearances, facticity is what the
objects of consciousness refer back to, as part of their very meaning, as what
consciousness in some sense ‘is,’50 despite its “nothingness.” On the
metaphysical level, though, facticity is the in-itself being that perennially fails to
cause itself, this failure in turn resulting in it being separated from and present to
itself as a for-itself being to which objects of consciousness appear in the first
place. Facticity as the non-conscious being that failed in this way is presumably
metaphysical, in Sartre’s sense, because it is part of the process whereby
consciousness occurs so that there could be any sort of appearances in the first
place. And it is not phenomenological because there is no appearance of the
very fact of a non-conscious in-itself being changing itself into self-present
consciousness as a result of an attempt at self-causation. Unfortunately (for
Sartre), the reason for the lack of such an appearance would seem to reveal the
very impossibility of the presumed metaphysical fact in question, namely, that
even “(i)n order to be a project of founding itself, the in-itself would of necessity
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have to be originally a presence to itself- i.e., it would have to be already
consciousness.”51 In any case, this passage shows how facticity in its
metaphysical sense is relevant to the correlational view of consciousness. For
here, consciousness is equated with facticity as the non-appearing in-itself being
that attempts to cause itself, and such a being turns out to be that which
appearances must appear to. Thus, as claimed by the correlational view of
consciousness, it seems that consciousness for Sartre is related to appearances
rather than being a mere appearance itself, or the mere fact of there being
appearances.
One might object here that whatever one might say in regard to their
apparent impossibility from the start, Sartre’s metaphysical claims about the
origin of consciousness and of appearances are not actual assertions about
anything beyond phenomenology but are rather, by his own admission, nothing
more than hypotheses that “will remain hypotheses since we can not expect
either further validation or invalidation.”52 After all, even if those claims could be
true, consciousness could not have been conscious before its origin in order to
have experienced it.53 Indeed, Sartre claims that “metaphysics is to ontology as
history is to sociology,”54 suggesting that ontology provides the
phenomenological data for metaphysics’ speculative hypotheses. A possible
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example of ontology’s provision of fodder for metaphysical speculation is the
following. According to Sartre, ontology teaches us at least two things about
non-conscious being-in-itself and consciousness.
(1) If the in-itself were to found itself, it could attempt to do so only
by making itself consciousness; that is, the concept of causa sui
includes within it that of presence to self- i.e., the nihilating
decompression of being; (2) Consciousness is in fact a project of
founding itself; that is, of attaining to the dignity of the in-itself-foritself or in-itself-as-self-cause.55
According to this passage, first, my consciousness of a table, for example, is
somehow an attempt to found itself, which is equivalent to an attempt at ‘attaining
to the dignity of the…in-itself-as-self-cause.’ And second, the only way that a
non-conscious thing can cause itself is by being present to itself like my
consciousness of a table. In any case, for Sartre, ontology’s claims about a selfcaused being as present to itself and of consciousness as a movement toward
self-causation produces a task for metaphysics, namely “of deciding (emphasis
added) whether the movement is or is not a first ‘attempt’ on the part of the initself to found itself.”56 Although one might of course wonder if Sartre is basing
these supposedly ontological claims on his metaphysical explanation, rather than
vice versa, phenomenological ontology, supposedly remaining on the
phenomenologically descriptive level, can only say that everything happens as if
the in-itself modified itself as consciousness as some sort of result of a failed
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attempt to cause or found itself.57 Thus Sartre’s metaphysical claims may not be
evidence of his willingness to go beyond the level of appearances in his
treatment of consciousness.
Although Sartre certainly makes claims at times about the hypothetical
nature of his metaphysical account of consciousness, there is on the other hand
no denying that he also at times treats that account as an assertion about what
actually is the case. The previously-cited passage about facticity’s attempt to
recover itself seems like such an assertion, with no qualification of that attempt
as a mere possibility. Further evidence of Sartre’s treatment of metaphysics as
more than a merely hypothetical endeavor is his insistence on providing certain
answers to two metaphysical questions. The first question is “Why does the foritself arise in terms of being?,”58 which amounts to asking why consciousness is
in some sense an in-itself being, and the second is “If the in-itself and the foritself are two modalities of being, is there not a hiatus at the very core of the idea
of being?,”59 which amounts to asking what if anything is in common between
conscious and non-conscious being. If metaphysics were truly nothing but
speculation and hypotheses, then one would not expect Sartre to answer these
two questions and thus go beyond appearances in his treatment of
consciousness.
Why does Sartre feel the need to answer these metaphysical questions,
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given that any answer to them is beyond confirmation by experience? Jeffrey
Wilson, in his article “Metaphysical Questions in Sartre’s Phenomenological
Ontology,” suggests that Sartre treats these two questions as he does because
only a particular answer to them can do justice to what Sartre claims
ontologically.60 I will argue in Chapter Five that Sartre’s metaphysical claims can
help account for what he notes on the level of phenomenological ontology about
the seeming independence of what appears to consciousness, but Wilson says
that both the freedom of consciousness and its ability to act, two other central
themes in Sartre’s ontological description of consciousness, require a particular
answer to each of the above metaphysical questions.
Regarding the first question, “Why does consciousness arise in terms of
being?,” one could seemingly eliminate the answer that being-in-itself causes
there to be consciousness by making itself present to itself. According to Wilson,
the reason one could eliminate it is that consciousness would thus be determined
by the in-itself and no longer free.61 This would be unacceptable to Sartre, since,
as one commentator notes, “Being and Nothingness may itself be considered a
long paean to Cartesian freedom.”62 An answer offered by Wilson that would be
seemingly compatible with the freedom of consciousness is an appeal to
teleology: being-in-itself does not cause consciousness but rather freely realizes
the purpose or goal of attaining consciousness by means of its modification of
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itself as present to itself.63 The difference between Wilson’s answer to this first
metaphysical question and the answer rejected by him allegedly explains Sartre’s
acceptance of this question’s legitimacy, since the former answer but not the
latter one allows for the freedom of consciousness.
Regardless of the problems with the answer that Wilson rejects, however,
his metaphysical claim is itself problematic. The fact that freedom is the setting
of ends or purposes would make his answer compatible with the existence of
freedom, but not with Sartre’s ascription of freedom. Such an answer would
seem to ascribe such freedom to the in-itself that consciousness “originated”
from in addition to consciousness itself. Indeed, such an ascription would
actually mean that the originating in-itself was not really in-itself in the first place,
but for-itself instead, since a goal or end is something that does not exist,64 and
“what is can in no way determine by itself what is not…(f)or an act is a projection
of the for-itself toward what is not.”65 Such an equation of the originating in-itself
with the for-itself would mean that consciousness does not arise at all, since the
notion of something arising or emerging seemingly requires the non-existence of
that something until its emergence. “Why does the for-itself arise in terms of
being?” thus assumes what Wilson’s teleology precludes, namely the emergence
of consciousness from non-conscious being, so that Wilson’s teleological
suggestion ultimately eliminates the question it was intended to answer.
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Another problem with Wilson’s teleology is its seeming incompatibility with
Sartre’s description of consciousness as the negation of the in-itself66 (I will say
more about that in the remaining chapters). As such a negation, consciousness
would seem to come after non-conscious being-in-itself, since negation always
presupposes and is subsequent to what it denies. As Sartre claims, “…negation
is a refusal of existence. By means of it a being…is posited, then thrown back to
nothingness.”67 The fact that negation comes after whatever it negates seems to
be further demonstrated when Sartre notes that nothingness, like negation, is the
denial of what was first posited, so that being, as that which nothingness denies,
is such that “we must be careful never to posit nothingness as an original abyss
from which being arose.”68 The point seems to be that, as a negation of beingin-itself, consciousness can not come before the in-itself that it negates, but
rather must come after it. But how can it come after it if the in-itself in question
already had a purpose? As such, must the in-itself not already be for-itself as
well? Wilson’s suggested answer to Sartre’s first metaphysical question thus
seems problematic, even if he is right about Sartre’s reason for answering that
question.
In any case, there is a further problem. Sartre seems to treat temporality
as inseparable from consciousness,69 so that there can not be anything existing
before consciousness. The reason Sartre treats temporality this way is that
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anything temporal is somehow separated from itself, and being-in-itself exists as
self-identical with no room for such distinction from itself.70

An example might

help support this point about the self-separation of temporality. I am now writing
this work on Sartre, but several hours ago I was not doing so but was reading
instead. The fact that I am now typing but I was reading apparently means that
some constant existent has endured throughout both activities, namely myself (I
will say more about Sartre’s treatment of an enduring self or subject later in this
chapter). In some way, then, I am the same being that was reading before but is
not doing so any longer. But this also seems to imply that, on the other hand, I
am not the reading being in question, but I was that being. Such temporal
distinction from oneself was described in an earlier quote as a “breakage of
identity” and “disruption by negation,”71 and being-in-itself does not include such
breakages or any negation. It simply is. Non-conscious being in-itself thus could
not exist before it modified itself as consciousness, as Wilson apparently
suggests, since it could not exist afterward as not being what it was.
Consciousness, on the other hand, exists as not being that which it is (for
reasons that will be explained in the next chapter), so that it exists as the very
separation from self that temporality involves.
Due to the importance of this point for Sartre’s position on the origin of
consciousness, certain objections to this understanding of temporality should be
addressed. One might object that Sartre need not resort to any notion of
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separation from self in order to account for temporality, since one could simply
appeal to a permanent self that endures while other factors do not. So, in the
example offered above, one need not say that my present typing self is somehow
distinct from my past reading self, but rather the self in both cases is one and the
same. What is different in the two cases is the activities engaged in by me, but I
am (or at least could be) identical throughout those activities. As such, I do not
have to not be something, specifically myself in the past, in order to exist both
before and after certain events (such as my typing and my reading, respectively).
So, it would also not seem that non-conscious being-in-itself would have to not
be what it was in the past in order to exist before something, namely
consciousness. The fact that it simply is without any of the negation allegedly
involved with anything that was does not seem to preclude it existing prior to
something else, so that Wilson could treat being-in-itself as existing prior to its
project of attaining consciousness.
Sartre’s response to this objection is that permanence presupposes time,
and as such it entails the negation required for temporality’s difference from
self.72 The reason he says this is that permanence is obviously not simply the
existence of something in the instantaneous now, but rather existence in the past
as well. In the above example, a permanent self would exist both in the past as I
was reading and in the present as I type. Without such temporal endurance,
permanence has no meaning. But what is past is different from what is present,
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even if it has endured throughout. To recognize a table, for example (an
example that will lead into another objection against Sartre’s treatment of
temporality), as having already been there, even if having been there without
undergoing any change, is to distinguish what it was from what it is.
One might say that such distinction is not a difference and thus a lack of
identity between the present and the past unchanging table, but rather a
difference between the properties of the past and of the present table. So, even
if the past and the present table were identical with no distinction between them
(indeed, there would then be no “them’ that could be distinct), the table could still
exist before and after things due to its differing properties. So, for instance, an
enduring table could exist both before and after one’s breakfast and yet be
numerically identical afterward with what it was before. The properties of the
table in the past may differ from the properties of the table in the present (for
instance, the color of parts of the table could be different from what it was before
because of spilt juice), but the table itself could be identical throughout.
Sartre’s previously-mentioned points about temporality, however, seem to
show that even unchanging things are not identical through time. In the example
from above, even if one were to focus on the table itself and not concern oneself
with its properties, there is still a difference and thus a lack of identity between
the table in the past and the table in the present, no matter how unchanging the
table may be. That difference is evident in the fact that the table was in the past
but it is in the present. The fact that it has always occupied space, for instance,
means that it is extended in the present, but it cannot be the case that it is
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extended before. Rather, it was extended before. This shows that, in at least
one respect, everything with a past must not be what it was: namely, that it must
not be (now) anything at all then which it was then, but it must have been it.
Thus Sartre’s claim that being-in-itself, by virtue of the fact that it simply is
without not being anything, does not exist temporally. Consequently, it could not
exist before consciousness as Wilson seemingly suggests.
An obvious problem with all of this is that non-conscious things do seem to
exist temporally, as is evident from the above example of the table. While my
use of that example may have shown the unavoidable distinction between
something in the past and that same thing in the present, it seems to show that
such distinction is possible for non-conscious being-in-itself. Since it is true that
tables and any number of non-conscious things are such that they were even
though they now are, why is it not possible that non-conscious being-in-itself
existed before consciousness, thus allowing Wilson, for instance, to say that
being-in-itself was non-conscious before it modified itself as consciousness?
Sartre’s answer is that non-conscious beings exist in time due to
consciousness. Any object of consciousness, such as a table, appears as
having a past and a future because “it is revealed to a revelation of which the
very being is temporalization.”73 So, it is because I as a conscious being exist
temporally in the sense that I was before but am now that a table can appear to
me as having already been in the past and as being now. Somehow the
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temporality of consciousness is transferred to non-conscious being-in-itself, with
the result that being-in-itself “reflects time.”74 According to Sartre, without
consciousness there would be no before nor after for non-conscious beings. The
self-separation of consciousness is necessarily involved with the self-separation
of temporality.
Perhaps, though, one could save Wilson’s teleological answer to Sartre’s
metaphysical question by going backward from consciousness to non-conscious
being-in-itself instead of forward from the latter to the former. Consciousness is
capable of not being what it was, so one might say that consciousness is not the
non-conscious being-in-itself that it was. A possible problem with this is that one
can not say, for instance, that consciousness was non-conscious being-in-itself
but now is consciousness in the same way that I have in mind in saying that, e.g.,
I was reading but am now typing. The reason for this is that I was conscious
both when I was reading and as I am typing, so that both myself as reading and
myself as typing could be each other while still not being each other. For Sartre,
this is how one can no longer be what one was.75 As mentioned above, this is
the way of being and not being something that is involved with temporality. But it
does not seem possible that consciousness was non-conscious being-in-itself,
since the latter is incapable of not being or of being different from consciousness
the way I as reading in the past am able to be different from or not be I as typing
in the present. The inability of non-conscious being-in-itself to not be something
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would seem to make it just as impossible for consciousness to exist after nonconscious being as it is for being-in-itself to have existed before consciousness.
This possible response on behalf of Sartre seems to miss the point. While
it may be true that if non-conscious being-in-itself could not be different from
something due to the fact that it could not not be something, then non-conscious
being-in-itself could not have existed before consciousness (or anything else) as
something that it was, the example of the table (or of any number of nonconscious objects) seems to show that non-conscious beings are capable of not
being something. Even though Sartre describes being-in-itself as “not a
connection with itself….because it is glued to itself,”76 it could be that Sartre
simply mistakenly equates all lack of self-identity with the difference from self that
is the self-presence of consciousness, instead of allowing for a distinction
between such lack for temporality and such lack for self-presence. In that case,
he has not ruled out that non-conscious being could exist before consciousness
or any alleged attempt by the in-itself to achieve consciousness,
thus allowing Wilson to maintain the emergence of consciousness after its nonexistence. Sartre has not ruled out that it might have at least that much lack of
self-identity.
One might reconcile the seemingly temporal nature of non-conscious
things with Sartre’s claims about temporality by simply treating those claims as
purely phenomenological pronouncements. By that it is meant that Sartre could
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be simply considering reality only as it is for consciousness, and that reality
appears to consciousness as temporally structured. Indeed, Sartre’s previouslycited quote that “(m)odern thought has realized considerable progress by
reducing the existent to the series of appearances which manifest it”77 seems to
suggest that Sartre simply finds useful an approach to things as they appear to
consciousness, leaving open the question of how things are outside of that
perspective. As one commentator notes, one can possibly limit Sartre to “the
more minimal claim that experienced temporal features derive primarily from the
inherent temporality of the For-itself…; that is, temporal experience is…built-in to
the being of consciousness itself.”78 Consequently, a phenomenological
understanding of Sartre’s claims about temporality would eliminate any conflict
between those claims and the earlier suggestion about the in-itself’s attempt at
consciousness coming after the in-itself’s existence without such an attempt.
One could simply argue that the possibility of temporal existence for nonconscious things is beyond the scope of Sartre’s purely phenomenological
description of temporality. It should be noted, though, that his earlier claim about
objects of experience owing their temporal nature to consciousness goes beyond
a purely phenomenological perspective. As previously stated, one can not
experience the necessity of certain conditions for appearances.
Wilson’s consideration of Sartre’s treatment of birth actually suggests a
purely phenomenological approach by Sartre. In that treatment, Sartre seems to
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assert the existence of consciousness after its existence as non-conscious being.
According to Sartre, consciousness always has a past.79 One understanding of
that claim is that consciousness always has the structure of having surpassed
something that already existed and that it in some sense is, like my
consciousness of a table, for instance, involving some sort of reference to my
body that was already there and that it in some sense is (I will say more about
the body in Chapter Four). The problem with this claim is how the original
instance of consciousness, perhaps occurring at one’s birth, can refer back to
something it is when there is nothing preceding it that is consciousness.

In

order for the first act of consciousness to refer back to what it in some sense is, it
would seem that consciousness would have to precede itself, which sounds like
the same impossibility found with the already-mentioned project of being selfcaused. Sartre tries to avoid this problem by saying that the original act of
consciousness does not refer to a previous instance of consciousness, which
would obviously make the referring act non-original, but rather the original act
refers to an in-itself being that it was.
This might seem to forget Sartre’s point about the existence of temporality
due to consciousness, as evident in Sartre’s claim that “(t)he In-itself is what the
For-itself was before.”80 Wilson, in any case, defends Sartre as not guilty of
making a problematic claim here. Wilson suggests that consciousness simply
confers this prior existence upon the in-itself “by its own immediate self-given
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structure of pastness.”81 But this is not clearly relevant to Sartre’s first
metaphysical question, since Sartre need not then be saying that the in-itself
really existed before consciousness, but rather that consciousness simply
appears to itself as having already been an in-itself being. Thus one’s
awareness at one’s birth, if one could remember it (and if it plausibly had any
clear structure), would refer to a past as some in-itself being that one was
(presumably, I will argue later, one’s body) before one’s consciousness existed,
but no commitment need be made about the actual pre-existence of that in-itself
being to one’s consciousness. Wilson’s point in all of this would then seem really
to be that Sartre’s treatment of birth need not be seen as a venture into
metaphysics after all, but rather that treatment could be understood as an
instance of phenomenological description of the structures of consciousness.
One might also approach Wilson in a different way. Even if one could
reconcile Sartre’s claims about temporality with the possibility of consciousness
existing after there was no consciousness, Wilson’s teleological answer to
Sartre’s first metaphysical question may not depend upon that possibility at all.
One might take Wilson as simply saying, instead, that consciousness just is the
in-itself attempting to found or cause itself, and being-in-itself has always been
attempting to cause itself and has thus always been “turning itself into”
consciousness. This calls to mind the notion of God as always creating matter
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rather than creating it after existing without matter, and it eliminates any
debate about the existence of something before consciousness.
Even if non-conscious being has not existed in a time before any and all
conscious beings, though, Wilson’s teleology still seems problematic. It would
still require that each particular conscious being exist after it was a particular
non-conscious being that had the project of becoming that conscious being, but
his teleology does not allow for non-conscious beings’ existence prior to their
consciousness. As the project or goal of a non-conscious being, consciousness
can not yet exist, but having a project means that an in-itself being is already
conscious. My body, for instance, can not have the project of being my
consciousness without thereby being conscious already, but conscious existence
by my body means that such existence is not the upshot of its project. Nor would
it seem that Wilson could defend his teleology by saying that consciousness has
the project of its future conscious existence, which obviously has not yet
occurred, since his teleology is not an explanation of the for-itself arising from the
for-itself, but rather of Sartre’s claim about the for-itself arising from the in-itself82
(or at least of the in-itself as the consciousness it makes itself be arising from the
in-itself as making itself consciousness). Besides, any projection of
consciousness toward its future is certainly not beyond experience and is thus
seemingly subject to description by Sartre’s phenomenological ontology, whereas
Sartre’s first metaphysical question about the for-itself arising in terms
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of being is such that “ontology can not reply, for the problem here is to explain an
event, not to describe the structures of a being.”83 The problems for Wilson’s
teleological answer to Sartre’s first metaphysical question thus go beyond any
questionable assertions by Sartre about the connection between consciousness
and time.
It should be noted that Sartre might seem to share some of these
problems in his previously-mentioned treatment of facticity’s role in the origin of
consciousness, but he actually does not have such difficulties. As already noted,
Sartre treats consciousness as the failed attempt by in-itself facticity to found or
cause itself.84 Here we see Sartre seemingly embracing the very option which he
rules out when saying that “(i)n order to be a project of founding itself, the in-itself
would of necessity have to be originally a presence to itself- i.e. it would have to
be already consciousness.”85 It would seem, though, that Sartre does not have
the same problems as Wilson does. As already noted, one might accept the
equation of some in-itself being with consciousness by simply saying that
consciousness just is the in-itself attempting to cause itself. The problem for
Wilson is that the originating in-itself being can not be consciousness since it has
the goal or project of achieving consciousness. Sartre, though, does not treat the
in-itself as having consciousness as its goal, but rather the in-itself has the goal
of self-causation.86 As already noted, this goal is unrealizable, but unlike Wilson,
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Sartre does not equate the in-itself’s goal with what the projecting in-itself already
is by virtue of its projecting.
Of course, the reason that Wilson thinks consciousness must be the initself’s goal is the need to avoid consciousness having the in-itself as its cause,
but Sartre might not need to avoid that in order to preserve the freedom of
consciousness. As just suggested, in fact, instead of conceiving of the cause of
consciousness as a separate being from consciousness, Sartre could instead
treat such a cause as not distinct from consciousness. As such, the in-itself
might perhaps be more like the material cause of consciousness rather than its
efficient cause. In fact, this may be what Sartre has in mind in saying that the initself facticity “remains at the heart of the for-itself”87 and that consciousness just
is such an in-itself being attempting to found itself. This would mean that the initself is the stuff that makes up consciousness in the same way that the material
cause of a statue, for instance, is the stuff that makes it up (although
consciousness is not a thing but rather, as I will argue in Chapter Five, an event).
As noted in the Introduction, treating consciousness as an event would mean that
it is something beyond its ingredients although it is just those ingredients as
incorporated into an event. Such an understanding of consciousness and the initself facticity that in some sense constitutes it could perhaps make facticity a
“cause” that does not pose any necessary threat to the freedom of
consciousness. Although Wilson may be right that Sartre meant to preserve the
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freedom of consciousness by answering the question “Why does the for-itself
arise in terms of being?,” it does not seem that such an answer must altogether
eliminate a cause of consciousness.
As mentioned earlier, Sartre also treats another metaphysical question as
legitimate and worth answering, namely “If the in-itself and the for-itself are two
modalities of being, is there not a hiatus at the very core of the idea of being?”88
As previously noted, this question is asking what if anything there is in common
between consciousness and non-conscious being. Wilson claims that, just as
with the first question, Sartre treats this question as worthy of legitimate
consideration because only a particular answer to it is compatible with a central
feature of Sartre’s ontology of consciousness. As already noted, the first
question merits a certain answer, according to Wilson, in order to maintain the
freedom of consciousness. In a similar vein, Wilson claims that the second
question must be answered in such a way as to preserve the ability of
consciousness to act. Unsurprisingly, Wilson treats consciousness’s ability to act
as inextricably connected to consciousness’s freedom, since “freedom is power…a power over things in the world that would assure that free choices are
efficacious in the sense that they make some real modification in being.”89 So,
according to Wilson, the freedom of consciousness is again at stake with the
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explanation of whether or not the being of consciousness and of non-conscious
things is dual or unitary, and thus Sartre is warranted in going beyond the level of
appearances here.
Unlike the first question concerning the “origin” of consciousness, this
second metaphysical question seems to anticipate the possible answers to it.
Instead of simply asking why, the second question asks which of two possibilities
is actually the case. Those possibilities are (1) the being of consciousness and
the being of non-conscious things are distinct and dual with nothing shared
between the two, and (2) there is something in common between these two
modes of being. Wilson seems to think that Sartre embraces (2),90 and it
certainly appears that (2) is the answer compatible with consciousness’s ability to
act on the world, while (1) is not. Sartre seems to recognize this when noting
that action is such that “it involves a project which has an immanent origin and
which determines a modification in the being of the transcendent.”91 So, for
instance, when I act so as to prepare dinner, I have a conception of a nonexistent meal which functions as part of an act that determines a modification of
the world and leads to the existence of that meal. The fact that action seemingly
encompasses both consciousness (the immanent) and non-conscious being-initself (the transcendent) apparently invites an understanding of the two realms of
being as united in some fashion. As one commentator notes, even though one’s
ability to freely act is in some sense a matter involving oneself, “it must not be
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forgotten that, in the concrete, freedom, for Sartre, is the very intentionality that
makes us a being in the world.”92 If consciousness and being-in-itself existed as
a radical duality, the chasm that would separate the two might indeed seem
incompatible with Sartre’s ascription of free action, or, for that matter, any action
at all, to consciousness.
An example from modern philosophy might help to make this point.
According to Descartes, the mind and the body are radically distinct beings. The
mind’s essence is thinking, whereas the body’s essence is extension.93
According to Descartes, whenever one performs an action, one first decides
mentally what one will do and then that mental decision somehow causes one’s
body to move in a certain way. The problem with this is how the mind, being in
essence thought and not being extended, can cause the extended body to do
something. One usually thinks of extended bodies as affected by other things
through surface contact, such as a billiard ball moving after being hit by another
ball. Energy’s effects on bodies, such as a magnetic field moving an object,
occur by such a field pervading a body and thus being located where that body is.
Such surface contacts and locating, though, must occur at some place, some
point in space, since the contacted surface and pervaded body exist in space.
Thought, however, is not extended like the body, so thought does not occupy any
point in space. How, then, can a mental, non-extended thought contact an
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extended body’s surface or be located where a body is? Without such
contact or location, no effect upon the extended body seems possible. This
problem also exists for the body’s ability to affect the mind, since extended
bodies seem to produce effects by the same means by which they are affected,
namely surface contact. If, as Descartes claims, certain activities or motions in
one’s eyes, for
instance, cause one to have a visual sensation, then one’s physically extended
sense organs have caused the mind to have the mental sensation. This
seemingly requires the sense organs or their components to contact the mind,
but no such contact is possible without an extended surface of the mind to
contact. This problem with causal interaction between the mind and the body,
the interaction that occurs in Descartes’ treatment of action, seems to make
action an impossibility. The source of this problem seems to be Descartes’
treatment of the mind and the body as radically distinct types of being.
One might simply dismiss this as a problem specific to the distinction
made by Descartes and not see any necessary difficulty caused by any and all
radical dualisms between consciousness and non-conscious things. It should be
noted, though, that Sartre seemed concerned with avoiding Descartes’ problem
of connecting the mind with the world, a problem Sartre traces to the fact that “it
is not profitable first to separate the two terms of a relation in order to try to join
them together again later.”94 Thus one commentator notes that “just as (with)
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the incoherence of the Cartesian dualism…so in the present instance
would it seem that the dichotomy of for-itself and in-itself must give way to a unity
of in-itself-for-itself if the requirement of coherence is to be satisfied.”95 This is a
condemnation of a dualism of consciousness and non-conscious reality, and it is
an endorsement of a unified sense of being shared by the for-itself and the initself. Given the noted context of that condemnation and endorsement, it would
seem that Wilson is right about what motivates Sartre’s apparent answer to the
metaphysical question about the unity of conscious and non-conscious beings.
Action for Sartre requires a connection between the conscious and the nonconscious, and an affirmation of a basic unity of the two might seem necessary
for that connection. Since Sartre ascribes free action to consciousness, he must
also ascribe unity to the for-itself and the in-itself.
Why, though, is this a metaphysical matter? It might not seem promising
to delve into the processes that have led to the differences between the for-itself
and the in-itself, as metaphysics does, rather than to describe the different
structures of the two types of being, as phenomenological ontology does, since
even a shared origin for the two types of being would not guarantee any
connection between them. After all, Descartes treats the mental and the physical
as both created by God, but that shared source does not suppress the
previously-mentioned difficulties with uniting the two types of being. Perhaps,
though, metaphysics can show how the two are united by showing, once again,

95

Robert C. Whittemore, “Metaphysical Foundations of Sartre’s Ontology,” Tulane Studies in
Philosophy, 8, 1959, p. 120.

41

that the for-itself’s origin makes it really nothing more than the in-itself. As
already noted, the for-itself originates from in-itself facticity attempting to found or
cause itself (or at least one might so describe it, as if this is the case), and
facticity remains at the heart of the for-itself as what the for-itself in some sense
is. The in-itself, one might say, is certainly changed by its failed attempt and
subsequent separation from itself, but the in-itself is still the basic ‘matter’ that
makes up consciousness, or at least “out of” which consciousness is composed.
As Sartre notes, “(b)eing-for-itself must be wholly body and it must be wholly
consciousness….”96
By showing that consciousness is really just the in-itself (at least as
regardable in a certain way) doing something, Sartre’s metaphysical claims
demonstrate the unity of the being of the in-itself and of the for-itself. As already
noted by Wilson, such unity then allows Sartre to affirm the ability of
consciousness to act. As also already noted, Sartre’s metaphysical claims might
additionally support another feature of Sartre’s phenomenological ontology,
namely the independent nature of appearing phenomena. As I will argue in
Chapter Five, the fact that the for-itself’s facticity is just the in-itself doing
something enables facticity to be of such a nature as to contribute to that
appearance of independence.
As previously stated, in any case, Sartre’s willingness to answer these two
metaphysical questions suggests his willingness to go beyond appearances in
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his treatment of consciousness, and his possible answers to them certainly seem
to make consciousness something more than what appears. Those answers
treat consciousness as an in-itself facticity (at least regardable as something)
that attempts to found itself, and such facticity would not seem capable of
appearance, since an in-itself being can not make such an attempt. Despite the
impossibility of Sartre’s answers to his two metaphysical questions, all of this
suggests the previously-mentioned correlational treatment of consciousness
rather than the purely phenomenological one, since consciousness would not
merely be an appearance or appearances of some sort, nor the mere fact of
there being appearances, as the latter treatment claims, but would rather be, as
the former treatment claims, something beyond appearances that makes
appearances possible in the first place.
Still, though, Sartre’s forays beyond phenomenology and into metaphysics
might actually support the purely phenomenological treatment of consciousness.
Sartre claims that the attempted self-recovery of the in-itself would not only show
the unity of the in-itself and the for-itself (as already noted), but it would also lead
to the rejection of the very distinction between consciousness and the rest of
being.97

In its place would be “a being which we shall call the phenomen(on)

and which will be provided with two dimensions of being, the dimension in-itself
and the dimension for-itself.”98 This indeed calls to mind the proposal that
consciousness for Sartre just is the fact that phenomena appear and indicate
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other phenomena in various ways, rather than consciousness being something
more that correlates with such appearance. Sartre might then be seen as
treating the “unity” of the in-itself and the for-itself as incompatible with anything
like the sort of duality that a correlational approach to consciousness would
seem to endorse, and such a reduction of reality to phenomena would obviously
preclude any treatment of consciousness as something beyond the
phenomenological level.
This apparent rejection of such duality may seem especially evident in
Sartre’s seeming rejection of a ‘subject’ that experiences the world. Although the
focus of this work is Being and Nothingness, Sartre gives an extended treatment
of the notion of an experiencing ego in The Transcendence of the Ego99
(hereafter referred to as TOE). Although one can question whether or not the
ego is the same as the subject, Sartre’s claims about the ego would certainly
seem relevant to the general issue regarding an experiencing being such as the
subject is supposed to be, and, I will show, his claims about an experiencing
being in TOE seem to be generally accepted in Being and Nothingness.100 The
following, then, is a brief presentation of his claims about the ego in TOE.
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In TOE, Sartre claims that the ego is not an inhabitant of consciousness,
but is rather “outside, in the world.”101 Sartre does not think that every instance of
consciousness is such that there is always an ‘I’ that appears, but rather an ‘I’
appears only upon reflection.102 So, for instance, my awareness of a table is not
such that I am aware of me as being aware of that table, but rather I am simply
aware of the table without any awareness of some object that is myself. Only by
reflecting upon my awareness of the table does there appear an ‘I’ that was
aware of it. Sartre supports this by appealing to experience,103 and he also notes
that the notion of an ego that inhabits consciousness is contradictory. The
reason for this is that such an ego would be both an object and a free creator of
consciousness’s states and actions, but an object cannot be truly free. As Sartre
notes, “Genuine spontaneity must be perfectly clear: it is what it produces and
nothing else,”104 so that an ‘I’ that is something and is thus not something else
would somehow be limited by what it is in what it can do. Such limitation would
not be compatible with the spontaneity of a free consciousness. So, instead of
consciousness always being aware of some object that it is, it is rather
awareness of something other than itself and of itself as such awareness, without
it being an object.105 There thus seems to be no opposition of an experiencing
being, or ‘subject,’ and the world it experiences, an opposition seemingly present
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in a correlational treatment of consciousness and absent from the purely
phenomenological understanding of Sartre.
It should be noted that Sartre sees this position on the ego as radically
opposed to Husserl’s treatment of consciousness.106 Sartre claims that for
Husserl, a “transcendental I…would be, so to speak, behind each consciousness,
a necessary structure of consciousness whose rays…would light upon each
phenomenon presenting itself in the field of attention.”107 And this is in fact
Husserl’s position in Ideas.108 Husserl arrives at this position by performing what
he calls the phenomenological reduction, a process whereby one no longer treats
what appears to one as something existing independently of one. As Husserl
states, the phenomenological reduction “completely bars me from using any
judgment that concerns spatio-temporal existence….109 By eliminating such
judgment, one can focus on what exactly appears to consciousness so that one
can find what is certain in experience. Such focus, according to Husserl,
reveals two alleged facts to which Sartre objects. First, it reveals that there is a
self-identical ego belonging to each and every experience, and that “no reduction
can get any grip on it.”110 Second, it also reveals that the ego always intends or
is of something by means of some sort of ‘taking up’ of (in the case of sensory
awareness) sensible elements, so that “out of the sensile-element…the concrete
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intentional experience takes form and shape.”111 (One might take this in turn to
mean that the ego combines and forms sensory material into its very object, or
else that the ego somehow surpasses such material, in its “forming” of it, toward
its object, possibly like consciousness for Sartre surpasses its facticity.) Husserl
gives the term ‘hyle’ to these basic components of experience, and he gives the
term ‘noesis’ to the bestowal of meaning upon experience, by way of “formative”
acts.112 Whatever appears to consciousness is then called the ‘noema,’113 and
Husserl claims that the appearing noema need not be treated as a real element
of experience while both the ego’s apprehension of what appears, and the hyletic
materials therein, are treated as real. The reason for this is that the
phenomenological reduction shows that an appearance still remains even after
one stops judging it as an independent existent. If one performs the reduction
while looking at a tree, for instance, one finds that it “has not forfeited the least
shade of content from all the phases, qualities, characters with which it appeared
in this perception.”114 What appeared, then, may not be an aspect of
independent reality. The ego, though, is always there, so that there is always

111

Ibid, p. 227.
Ibid, p. 228.
113 There is some debate over exactly what the noema is. Some have argued that it is similar to
what Frege termed ‘Sense,’ with the spatio-temporal object it is an appearance of being the
‘reference.’ For a discussion of this, see Aquila, “On Intensionalizing Husserl’s Intentions,’ Nous,
16, 1982, pp. 209-226. Others have argued that it is the object of experience, while still others
have argued that it is the content of experience. For a discussion of this, see Ronald McIntyre
and David Woodruff Smith, “Theory of Intentionality,” in Husserl’s Phenomenology: A Textbook,
ed. by J.N. Mohanty and William R. McKenna, University Press of America, Washington, D.C.,
1989, pp. 147-179.
114 Husserl, p. 240.
112

47

“the directing of the glance of the pure Ego upon the object ‘intended’ by it….”115
Unlike TOE, then, Husserl treats the ego as ever-present and fundamental in all
experience. There is no appearance of something without an ego that plays a
role in such appearance, and this opposition of an experiencing being to an
experienced being seems similar to the correlational interpretation of Sartre with
its treatment of consciousness as a being beyond appearances.
All of this is relevant to Sartre’s treatment of the subject in Being and
Nothingness because Sartre echoes there his rejection of Husserl found in TOE,
albeit for different reasons. In Being and Nothingness, Sartre finds fault with
Husserl’s treatment of the appearing noema as unreal in contrast to the real
noesis. The reason for this is that “Husserl defines consciousness as a
transcendence…But from the moment that he makes of the noema an unreal, a
correlate of the noesis, a noema whose esse is percipi, he is totally unfaithful to
his principle.”116 Sartre sees the transcending of consciousness to what it is of
as implying the independent existence of what it is of, but Husserl does not
seemingly recognize such independence in his treatment of the noema.
One might defend Husserl by noting that all of his conclusions about the
noesis and noema followed from his performance of the previously-mentioned
phenomenological reduction, so that it is only when one performs this operation
that the noema appears as unreal. After all, Husserl recognizes that without this
reduction, in what he calls the ‘natural attitude,’ one does treat the things that
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appear as having independent existence.117 As one commentator notes,
“Husserl…speaks of the reduction, and of the epoche specifically, as an
epistemological reduction….He makes no ontological claims whatever in this
sketch of phenomenology and phenomenological methodology.”118 Still, though,
it is not as if Husserl is simply treating his conclusions as mere consequences of
a decision to not view the objects of one’s experience as independently real, a
decision one can obviously refuse. Rather, Husserl performs the reduction in
order to find what is certain in experience, to discover the truth about
consciousness.119 So, his treatment of the noesis and of the ego as real in
contrast to what one is conscious of is arguably a rejection of the transcendence
of consciousness to an independently existing being. Sartre sees that rejection
as incompatible with Husserl’s recognition of the intentional nature of
consciousness, and he claims that Husserl “has shut himself up inside the
cogito…,”120 and that “(c)onsciousness, as Husserl conceived it, can not in reality
transcend itself… toward the world….”121
Sartre thus sees Husserl’s correlational treatment of consciousness as
leading to a rejection of the world. This is in stark contrast to Sartre’s claim in
Being and Nothingness that “…knowledge is the world…and outside of that-
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nothing.”122 This certainly sounds like TOE’s similar rejection of an experiencing
being. We thus seem left, after all, with Sartre’s previously-mentioned notion of
the phenomenon, with its combination of the for-itself and the in-itself, rather than
with an opposition of consciousness and the world. Although Sartre based that
combination earlier on his metaphysical claim about the attempted self-causation
of the in-itself, we can see that his criticism of an ego-inhabited consciousness
and of a Husserlian primacy of the ego gives other reasons for rejecting any sort
of divide between what is experienced and what experiences. It should be noted,
however, that one need not in fact correlate what is experienced with an ego, as
Husserl does, but could rather correlate appearances with an event such as a
sort of ‘taking up’ activity like Husserl’s noesis. Still, any such correlation would
presumably have to cohere with Sartre’s apparent rejection of anything beyond
the world that appears.
Despite that rejection, though, there is still reason to believe that a subject
exists for Sartre. Indeed, his unifying notion of the phenomenon, rather than
eliminating the subject, might seem unintelligible without a subject. Since the
phenomenon is that which appears, it would seem to require a witness in order
for it to be an appearance. As previously noted, Sartre recognizes this in his
Introduction when he claims that “(r)elative the phenomenon remains, for ‘to
appear’ supposes in essence somebody to whom to appear.”123 Hence his claim
in the Conclusion that “(t)he phenomenon of in-itself is an abstraction without
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consciousness….”124 As one commentator says about Sartre, “(t)he subject may
be deferred, dissolved, and deconstructed, but it is not relinquished,”125 and
another notes how “Sartre…refrains from…effacing the subject completely.”126
These comments seem verified by Sartre’s earlier claim that “the law of being in
the knowing subject is to-be-conscious.”127 Indeed, this assertion of a subject
would seemingly mean that there is more than just a noetic act correlated with
what appears, and it might suggest a treatment of consciousness as more than
just the appearance of phenomena or the fact of such appearance.
Even if Sartre does retain something that experiences over against what is
experienced, though, it should be noted that he certainly rejects Husserl’s
treatment of the appearing as possibly unreal in contrast to the real status of the
being things appear to. Although there are no appearances without
consciousness, the being of what appears, being-in-itself, is not dependent upon
consciousness, whereas consciousness is dependent upon being-in-itself.128
The reason for the independence of the in-itself is the earlier-mentioned
transcendence of consciousness to what it is of, a transcendence that requires
something other than consciousness for it to transcend toward, while the
dependence of consciousness is due to its nature as presence to what it is of (I
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will say more about that in Chapter Three). So, regardless of Sartre’s position on
the subject, he does not accept Husserl’s primacy of the experiencing being over
what is experienced. I will argue in Chapter Five, though, that a correlational
treatment of consciousness can accommodate Sartre’s claims about the
independent nature of what is experienced by consciousness, even if Husserl
can not.
Still, Sartre not only claims the dependence of the experiencing being
upon the experienced, he seemingly rejects the very existence of such a being in
his earlier claim that “…knowledge is the world…and outside of that-nothing.”129
How this claim can cohere with his position that there must be somebody for
phenomena to appear to is problematic, but it seems that Sartre’s unclear stance
on the existence of the subject is matched by his unclear stance on the nature of
consciousness. Just as he vacillates between there not being and being an
experiencing subject, he also shifts from consciousness being nothing but the
appearance of phenomena to consciousness being other than and related to
such appearance. This chapter has shown how both readings of Sartre have
some support, but I will argue in the following chapters that Sartre should
ultimately embrace the position that consciousness is more than just the fact that
phenomena appear and indicate other phenomena in various ways. Still, though,
any understanding of that position must recognize his seeming resistance to
consciousness being anything more than that fact.
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CHAPTER TWO:
CONSCIOUSNESS AS NOT ITSELF
Keeping in mind Sartre’s vacillation between a purely phenomenological
and a correlational understanding of consciousness, let us return to the claim that
consciousness is nothingness. As noted in the Introduction, I believe the best
place to start in order to understand what this means is Sartre’s claim that
consciousness is not itself. One of the arguments Sartre gives for that claim is
based on the self-consciousness of consciousness. He gives that argument
without reference to what exactly consciousness is, but rather focusses on its
relationship to whatever it is. I will say more about what consciousness is for
Sartre in the following chapters, but for now I will address this argument for its
non-identity with itself.
In the Introduction to Being and Nothingness, Sartre seems to present the
notion of consciousness not being itself on the basis of the claim that
consciousness must be conscious of itself, and this without any specific mention
of the previously-noted things that consciousness is not (namely, its object and
its past) while perhaps also in some sense being them . Here is Sartre’s
argument for the claim that consciousness is necessarily conscious of itself:
...the necessary and sufficient condition for a knowing
consciousness to be knowledge of its object, is that it be
consciousness of itself as being that knowledge. This is a
necessary condition, for if my consciousness were not
consciousness of being consciousness of that table, it would then
be consciousness of that table without consciousness of being so.
In other words, it would be a consciousness ignorant of itself, an
unconscious-which is absurd. This is a sufficient condition, for my
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being conscious of being conscious of that table suffices in fact for
me to be conscious of it.130
As significant as I take the self-consciousness of consciousness to be in Sartre's
overall position, it should be noted that the argument he presents here is
problematic. According to Sartre, a consciousness without self-consciousness,
which in the above passage he seems to equate with a conscious act without
self-consciousness, would be absurd since it would then be a seemingly
contradictory unconscious consciousness. As one commentator notes, though, a
flaw in Sartre’s reasoning is “the move from ‘consciousness ignorant of itself’ to
‘unconscious,’ when the strongest conclusion the premises warrant would be
‘unselfconscious.’”131 Another commentator claims that since Sartre is really
referring to two different things, namely “…(1) the first-order world-directed
consciousness…and (2) the self-consciousness (of) the first-order
consciousness…” then it follows that “Sartre needs to show that (1) cannot occur
without (2) and his main argument does not really do so, since an unconscious
(2) does not contradict having a conscious (1).”132 Another way of seeing this
problem is to recognize that there are surely all kinds of things that any given
consciousness is unconscious of, without that fact seeming to lead to any
absurdities. For instance, surely Sartre would grant that there are some objects
of one consciousness that are not and will not be objects for a second
consciousness. Specific experiences from my childhood, for instance, may be
objects of my awareness but may never be the objects of another's awareness.
Does this lack of consciousness of such things render the other consciousness
unconscious? If so, then every consciousness would be absurdly unconscious,
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since there are obviously objects for every consciousness that are not so for
either any or all other consciousnesses. Sartre clearly does not think that this
obvious fact leads to such absurdity, so why would a lack of consciousness of
itself make a consciousness unconscious? All consciousnesses lack
consciousness of something, so it may seem unreasonable to hold that they can
not be unconscious of themselves.
One might claim that the reason for the need for the special sort of selfconsciousness that is supposed to be in question is the avoidance of an infinite
regress. Sartre says as much in the following passage:
The reduction of consciousness to knowledge in fact involves our
introducing into consciousness the subject-object dualism which is
typical of knowledge. But if we accept the law of the knower-known
dyad, then a third term will be necessary in order for the knower to
become known in turn, and we will be faced with this dilemma:
Either we stop at any one term of the series-the known, the knower
known, the knower known by the knower, etc. In this case the
totality of the phenomena falls into the unknown: that is, we always
bump up against a non-self-conscious reflection and a final term.
Or else we affirm the necessity of an infinite regress (idea ideae
ideae, etc.), which is absurd...Consciousness of self is not dual. If
we wish to avoid an infinite regress, there must be an immediate,
non-cognitive relation of the self to itself.133
This absurd infinite regress is, according to one commentator, that “one knows
only in consequence of an antecedent activity of knowing.”134 One knows that a
table is in front of one, for instance, because one already knows that one knows
this, and one knows that one knows this because one already knows that one
knows that one knows this, and so on. If this were the case, then one would
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never seem capable of arriving at knowledge of anything, since there must first
be an infinite sequence of knowing certain things.
The problem for Sartre, though, is that it is only if the 'totality of the
phenomena,' namely, the knower and the known which are distinct according to
the ‘law of the knower-known dyad,’ must be known that an infinite regress
follows from a lack of self-consciousness. But that is precisely what is being
questioned, namely, why consciousness must be conscious of itself (or, to be
true to Sartre's position, conscious (of) itself). As already stated, consciousness
is surely not consciousness of everything (specifically, not every object of every
other consciousness), so why must it be conscious of itself? With no satisfying
answer to this, there seems no reason for the 'immediate, non-cognitive relation
of the self to itself’ that is self-consciousness, and there seems no danger of an
infinite regress without such self-awareness.
One might object that this criticism of Sartre fails to account for his
contrast between consciousness and its opaque objects. In his discussion of the
self-transcending activity of consciousness, Sartre distinguishes consciousness
from its objects in the following manner:
All consciousness, as Husserl has shown, is consciousness of
something. This means that there is no consciousness which is not
a positing of a transcendent object, or if you prefer, that
consciousness has no 'content.' We must renounce those neutral
'givens' which, according to the system of reference chosen, find
their place either 'in the world' or 'in the psyche.' A table is not in
consciousness-not even in the capacity of a representation. A table
is in space, beside the window, etc. The existence of the table in
fact is a center of opacity for consciousness; it would require an
infinite process to inventory the total contents of a thing. To
introduce this opacity into consciousness would be to refer to
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infinity the inventory it can make of itself, to make consciousness a
thing, and to deny the cogito.135
One might try to use this point to argue that to deny the necessary selfawareness of consciousness is to reduce it to something unknown in the same
manner in which the totality of an object is unknown. Just as consciousness can
never be aware of every content of its infinitely dense objects, similarly
consciousness would be unaware of itself, making it also an infinitely dense
being. Such infinite density would preclude consciousness 'exhausting' itself in
its transcendence to its object,136 which would constitute a denial of Husserl's
central insight into consciousness.
This attempt to appeal to the difference between consciousness and its
objects in defense of Sartre’s claim about the necessary self-consciousness of
consciousness still misses the mark. A lack of self-consciousness by
consciousness need not be due to it possessing an infinite number of contents
which could not be canvassed. It could simply be due to consciousness not
being aware of itself at all, the way it is not aware of certain objects of another
consciousness. The lack of awareness of the infinite contents of an object is not
a complete lack of awareness of that object, but rather an awareness of only part
of what that object is. But the objection to Sartre is not that he has failed to rule
out such a 'partial' awareness of consciousness by itself, but rather that he has
failed to rule out a complete lack of self-awareness. Even if consciousness is
such that it does not have a density that can never be fully known, it still seems
that one need not be aware of consciousness. Self-awareness may be an all or
nothing proposition. Sartre has not shown that it is not completely absent from at
least some acts of consciousness.
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Another way of seeing this point is by realizing that just as there seems no
reason for Sartre to claim that every 'opaque' object of other consciousnesses
are available to consciousness, similarly there seems no reason for him to claim
that consciousness is aware of all other consciousnesses. Whatever one makes
of Sartre's account of the encounter with the Other as subject, or as
consciousness (an encounter that occurs with 'the Look'), it does not seem that
Sartre is asserting that one encounters or has some sort of awareness of all
other consciousnesses. This is especially so if one takes his account to be of the
generalized Other, or no particular other consciousness at all. The point is that
Sartre himself seems to accept a lack of awareness of certain translucencies,
specifically of at least some other consciousnesses, so a lack of self-awareness
seems capable of being just another example of such a lack of awareness, with
no need for accepting the opacity of consciousness as a consequence of its
possible absence of self-awareness.
Perhaps the most adequate defense of Sartre’s claim about the necessity
for consciousness to be self-conscious is provided by Stephen A. Dinan. In his
article “Intentionality in the Introduction to Being and Nothingness,” Dinan
connects Sartre’s acceptance of Husserl’s claim that consciousness must be
consciousness of something with Sartre’s insistence on the necessity of selfconsciousness for consciousness. As was shown in the last quote from Sartre,
he treats consciousness as always consciousness of something, a fact about
consciousness that means “there is no consciousness which is not a positing of a
transcendent object....”137 Dinan claims that any such positing by consciousness
can only occur if consciousness is aware of itself. The reason for this is that
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if it [consciousness] were not [self-conscious], consciousness would
be conscious of its object without being conscious that it was
so. This would seem to mean that consciousness, no longer
conscious of itself, could not distinguish its object as object, that is,
as other than itself, or transcendent, in the manner in which it is
experienced (italics mine).”138
A key point here is that an object of consciousness does not simply happen to
have the property of transcendence to consciousness, a property which
consciousness need not be aware of (the way it is not aware of many ‘noninventoried’ contents of its infinitely dense objects). Rather, consciousness treats
an object as transcendent by the very act of positing it. That is the very manner
in which it is aware of objects. To take away the transcendence of an object of
consciousness is to take the object itself away, and without an object there is no
consciousness (since it is always of something). And the only way an object
appears as transcendent of consciousness is by appearing as other than it, and
this otherness requires an awareness of what the object is being contrasted with,
namely, consciousness. Hence the necessity of the self-consciousness of
consciousness. This analysis by Dinan is impressive since it explains why a lack
of self-consciousness is not a mere limitation of consciousness by placing
something outside of its ken (namely, itself), but is rather the elimination of
consciousness by removing a necessary condition for consciousness to be what
Sartre has already established it to be (namely awareness of something). As
already stated, there seems to be no problem with consciousness simply lacking
awareness of something (which it obviously does since it lacks omniscience), but
clearly there is a problem for consciousness if a lack of self-awareness means a
lack of awareness of any and all transcendent objects. Perhaps one could
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challenge either Dinan’s assertion that “ofness” for an object means it is present
as transcendent or his notion that such presentation requires the presentation of
consciousness, but he at least shows a way for Sartre to connect consciousness
with self-consciousness.
We may now consider the possible reasoning toward a further conclusion
on Sartre’s part. Since consciousness is necessarily self-conscious, it stands in
"an immediate, non-cognitive relation...to itself."139 Because of this selfconsciousness, consciousness is present to itself. The reason this follows is
Sartre's claim that consciousness of something is the confrontation of
consciousness by 'a concrete and full presence,'140 so that self-consciousness is
the presence of consciousness to itself. This leads to consciousness not being
itself. This consequence of presence to self is demonstrated in the following:
...presence to always implies duality, at least a virtual separation.
The presence of being to itself implies a detachment on the part of
being in relation to itself...Presence to self...supposes that an
impalpable fissure has slipped into being. If being is present to
itself, it is because it is not wholly itself. Presence is an immediate
deterioration of coincidence, for it supposes separation. But if we
ask ourselves at this point what it is which separates the subject
from himself, we are forced to admit that it is nothing...nothing can
separate the consciousness (of) belief from belief, since belief is
nothing other than the consciousness (of) belief...The being of
consciousness qua consciousness is to exist at a distance from
itself as a presence to itself, and this empty distance which being
carries in its being is Nothingness.141
Since consciousness is separated from itself, it is other than itself, and,
consequently, not itself. This means that the principle of identity, which states
that everything is such that it is itself, “limits it scope to a region of definite
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being,”142 the region of being-in-itself. One could then argue that not being itself
makes consciousness nothingness. After all, whatever something it could
possibly be would not be it, because it is not itself. There is thus ample evidence
for the position that consciousness is nothingness for Sartre because selfconsciousness requires it to not be itself.
One might object at this point that Sartre has merely asserted that the
presence of consciousness to itself means it is separated from itself and that he
has not shown why this is so. Indeed, why could it not be that an instance of
consciousness is simply directed to a transcendent object as well as to itself?
Why would such self-direction by consciousness necessitate any sort of
separation of consciousness from itself? And why must consciousness’s
presence to itself be anything more than such a ‘self-contained’ act of selfdirection?
In order to see why self-presence means separation from self for Sartre,
one must look to Sartre’s account of presence in general. One can see this
account in the following:
Presence to --- indicates existence outside oneself near to ---....I
can be present to this chair only if I am united to it in an ontological
relation of synthesis, only if I am there in the being of the chair as
not being the chair.143
It follows from this that since consciousness is present to itself it exists in the
manner of not being itself, just as presence to anything means existing in the
manner of not being whatever one is present to. But, again, one can still ask why
Sartre treats presence in this manner. It seems clear that Sartre treats presence
as a type of relationship, and he does not think any type of relationship with
142
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oneself can be had by a being which simply is what it is in self-identity. As noted
in Chapter One, being-in-itself is such a type of self-identical being, and Sartre
sees such being as “at rest ‘in-itself;’...it simply is.”144 Its identity with itself is not
seen as any type of relationship with itself, but rather identity is taken to be the
absence of relationship with whatever something is identical with.145 Identity and
relationship with the same thing are incompatible since identity is the complete
cohesion of being with itself, its absolute fullness of itself, a total plenitude. Such
density is the complete absence of diversity,146 with no place for
distinguishability, so what place could there be for any type of relationship with
oneself? Although being related to oneself allows that one is oneself, it does
mean that one is not oneself as well. In fact, one could say that a necessary
feature of all relationships is some distinction between what is being related. So,
how could that which is identical with itself be related to itself since the
distinguishability required for such a relationship is missing? This is not simply a
matter of self-identity being different from self-presence, with no reason
precluding that which is the former from also being the latter. Presence to self is
a relationship of the self to itself, and whatever is identical with itself is not
distinguishable from itself as something related to itself must be. Thus, the selfidentity of what is present to itself, namely, consciousness, seems precluded.
Self-identity and self-presence are thus not descriptions which are different yet
compatible (like ‘round’ and ‘green,’ for instance), but rather they are descriptions
which are incompatible as well as different (like ‘round’ and ‘square’).
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Consciousness is not identical with itself, then, and thus other than and
separated from itself.
But perhaps things are not so easy. In the above passage concerning the
necessity that presence involve the existence of something as what it is not, the
example given by Sartre to make this point was of presence to an object
(specifically, a chair).

But has not Sartre made it clear that self-awareness and

object-awareness are two very different things? As already noted, awareness of
an object is arguably always of something transcendent to consciousness,
making such objects other than consciousness. Such otherness seems to clearly
make object-awareness an example of the ‘knower-known’ dyad found with
cases of knowledge. Sartre, though, clearly distinguishes the sort of relation
between the knower and known and the non-cognitive relation of the self to itself.
Indeed, one might claim that what makes self-awareness non-cognitive is exactly
the lack of separation between the self that is aware and the self that it is aware
of (or, again, aware (of)). Presence to self is that non-cognitive relation of the
self to itself, so perhaps the example of object-awareness with its obvious
distinction between the object and consciousness is inapplicable to the case of
presence to self. Sartre’s previously mentioned point about the non-being
required for presence might just be a point about presence to objects and not a
point about presence to self.
Kathleen Wider makes a similar criticism of the supposed self-separation
of self-presence in her article “Through the Looking Glass: Sartre on Knowledge
and the Pre-Reflective Cogito.”147 According to that article, Sartre inconsistently
attempts to apply the subject-object duality found with knowledge to the case of
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self-awareness (the pre-reflective cogito) in order to maintain his central
distinction between the type of being of consciousness and the type of being of
its objects. That distinction, as mentioned above, rests on the fact that being-initself (the type of being of non-conscious things) involves identity with itself, while
being-for-itself (the type of being of consciousness) entails non-identity with itself.
To avoid the self-identity of consciousness, Sartre separates it from itself by
making it present to itself in the same manner, Wider suggests, that it is present
to objects. But this is inconsistent on his part, since such a separation of
consciousness from itself is an introduction of the subject-object dyad he
explicitly distinguishes from self-awareness. Wider then makes the following
point:
Unless Sartre maintains that belief is consciousness (of) belief, for
example, the possibility arises that there could be something in
consciousness of which consciousness is unaware; that is, an
unconscious act of consciousness. To avoid this possibility, Sartre
holds to his earlier claim that there is no distinction between an act
of consciousness and consciousness of that act. To maintain this
unity and duality presence to oneself entails, Sartre argues that
what separates consciousness from itself at the pre-reflective level
is nothing. But he can’t have it both ways. If we take his claim
seriously that nothing separates an act of consciousness from
consciousness of that act, then the distance and separation
involved with the notion of presence developed in the section on
knowledge does not apply. The unity remains undivided.148
I do not think that Sartre is guilty of such inconsistency. While it is true
that his example of the non-being required for “presence to ---” was an example
of presence to an object, his point was still about the nature of presence in
general, not simply presence to objects. The fact that his example was of one
type of presence and not of another should not obscure that point. More
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significantly, Wider’s point that the separation of consciousness from itself by
nothing is equivalent to it not being separated from itself at all is incorrect. In
Sartre’s description of the ‘fullness’ and ‘density’ of the in-itself, he notes that
“there is not the slightest emptiness in being, not the tiniest crack through which
nothingness might slip in.”149 It is the fact that nothingness is not found in the initself that makes it identical with itself. Wider’s point seems to be that simply
dividing something by nothing is not to divide it at all, to not distinguish the things
that are divided by nothing. But this lack of distinction of the for-itself from itself
would not be equivalent to identity with itself. The in-itself’s identity with itself is
not a case of nothingness dividing it from itself. As just noted, nothingness is not
found in the in-itself at all, so it could not divide it from itself. So, the fact that
consciousness is divided from itself by nothing (whatever that eventually turns
out to mean) does not make it identical with itself. And that is enough for Sartre
to distinguish consciousness from being-in-itself, enough for Sartre to claim that
consciousness is not itself. The fact that consciousness (of) belief is not identical
with consciousness (of) belief means that it is not itself, so Wider’s point that
Sartre’s description of self-awareness does not introduce any sort of duality or
distinguishability into consciousness does not seem correct. While it is certainly
true that Sartre argues for the unity of consciousness with the self it is aware of
at the pre-reflective level, that difference from object-awareness does not amount
to consciousness being identical with itself. Only nothingness separates
consciousness from itself in the self-awareness of the pre-reflective cogito, but
that still keeps consciousness separate from itself. Presence to self may then,
for all Wider shows, produce separation from self, even if it is not awareness of
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an ‘othered,’ transcendent object, and, again, separation from self leads to not
being oneself so that consciousness is nothingness.
This contrast between object-awareness and self-awareness brings up a
further significant point. Although the separation of consciousness from itself is
different from its separation from its object, one might argue that consciousness
just is its object. Indeed, as noted in Chapter One, the purely phenomenological
interpretation of Sartre states that consciousness for Sartre is nothing more than
the fact that phenomena appear (and, as we shall see more clearly later, are
surpassed as well as indicate other phenomena that have been surpassed or are
potentially surpassed). These appearing phenomena are the presentation in
profile of objects, in the world, for consciousness, so it might seem that this
interpretation of Sartre would not differentiate awareness of such objects from
self-awareness since it claims that there is nothing more to consciousness than
the appearance of such objects. If consciousness is nothing more than the
appearance of objects, then awareness of its objects would seem to be
awareness of consciousness.
Although the current discussion of self-awareness is meant to be
understood in abstraction from any specific position about what the self in
consciousness’s self-awareness is, I will simply note here that although part of
what the purely phenomenological position on Sartre takes consciousness to be
is the fact that objects appear, that is not all of what it takes consciousness to be.
As just stated, it is also the fact that these appearing objects are surpassed and
indicate other phenomena that have been surpassed or possibly will be
surpassed. So it is not the case that this position would take consciousness’s
awareness of objects to just be its awareness of itself, but it would rather take the
former awareness as part of what the latter awareness is. Thus the distinction
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between object-awareness and self-awareness, a distinction crucial to
establishing both consciousness’ unity with and separation from itself, does not
collapse with the purely phenomenological interpretation of Sartre’s treatment of
consciousness as some kind of nothingness.
It might be objected at this point that my description of object-awareness
is problematic. I have discussed Sartre’s treatment of the presence of objects,
not to mention of self-presence, as a confrontation of consciousness by whatever
it is that consciousness is “present to.” Perhaps a better suggestion would be to
treat object-awareness, for instance, as simply the presence of objects rather
than the presence of consciousness to certain objects. The latter position treats
consciousness as something that stands in a relationship with objects, whereas
the former suggests that all that there are are objects without any existent thing
called consciousness standing in some sort of relationship with them. This
suggestion, which I will call the ‘presence of’ position, has the virtue of giving a
clear sense to how consciousness is nothingness, and it reminds one of Sartre’s
quote from the previous chapter that “…knowledge is the world…and outside of
that- nothing.”150 The ‘presence of ‘ position avoids any need that phenomena
may have of appearing to something, because what is present for this position
are objects rather than appearances. One could say that this position is much
like the result of Occam’s Razor, with no need to multiply any entities beyond the
bare objects. This position would be problematic for my treatment of the
separation of consciousness from itself, since this position would mean that
presence does not require the relationship and thus the distinguishability found
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with self-presence. Instead of presence involving both that which is present and
that which it is present to, presence need only involve the former.
Of course, if the view to be attributed to Sartre is that consciousness is its
objects in the sense of being nothing other than the fact of the appearance of its
objects, then there would seem to be an easy response to the charge that Sartre
fails to distinguish consciousness of itself from consciousness of objects.
Consciousness of itself would be consciousness of a certain fact regarding the
objects in question. Here, however, we encounter an issue relating to what I
called the fourth aspect of Sartre’s view of the nothingness of consciousness.
On that view, consciousness is indeed a certain sort of fact (or event or state of
affairs), but that fact is at the same time said to be nothing more than whatever it
is a fact regarding, or whatever are the “ingredients” of that fact. I will have more
to say about this later.
In any case, I do not think that the ‘presence of’ position accurately
reflects Sartre’s claims. The reason for this is that the in-itself, the type of being
of objects, is “at rest ‘in-itself,’”151and can not be present to anything, not even to
other objects that are also in-itself. As Sartre notes, presence to anything is not
“a matter of a simple external relation of contiguity,”152 but is rather a synthesis
with what something is present to. The fact that one object is co-present with
any other is due to a synthesis with both objects, a unification with both objects
not being either object, so that presence is inexplicable if only in-itself objects
existed. But that is exactly the problem with the previously mentioned ‘presence
of’ position: it attempts to explain presence by appeal to nothing but in-itself
objects. The presence of an object requires that it be in some sort of relationship
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with something else, since being present means to be located in some fashion.
But any such locating of anything in relationship with anything else requires that it
not be what it is related to, and the in-itself simply is.153 Thus one can not explain
presence as simply being the presence of something without it being presence to
something it is not, and non-conscious being-in-itself is not such that it is not
something. In turn, then, presence to self must mean some sort of separation of
the consciousness that is present from the consciousness that it is present to.
Of course, the same objection from Chapter One regarding Sartre’s
treatment of temporality could be made against his treatment of presence. Just
as one could say that non-conscious objects seem to be capable of existing
temporally by not being what they were, so one could say that such objects seem
capable of being present to other things by not being other things. As noted in
Chapter One, Sartre’s claim that consciousness is necessary for not being
something may just seem like an assertion without convincing support. For that
reason, one might instead want to read Sartre as simply considering the world as
it exists for consciousness, rather than making claims about reality in and of
itself. Even so, the ‘presence of’ position may still seem problematic as an
account of the awareness of objects, as opposed to just the existence of objects,
since awareness seemingly requires something more than just the objects that
there is awareness of. If not, there would seem to be no distinction between an
instance of awareness of certain objects and an instance when such objects
existed without there being any awareness of them. Consequently, the
‘presence of’ position does not seem a satisfying account of object-awareness,
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and thus does not threaten the notion that presence to something requires
distinguishability from that something.
Returning to the issue of self-presence, there still seems to be a general
problem with the whole notion of consciousness not being itself. If there is
something that consciousness is (namely, itself), what sense does it make to
then say that it is also not that very thing it is? Wider applies this general point to
the claim that consciousness is not itself, or, more specifically, to Sartre’s claim
that consciousness (of) belief is not consciousness (of) belief, in the following:
...pre-reflective consciousness must somehow exist as a witness to
itself as well and ‘thus by the sole fact that my belief is
apprehended as belief, it is no longer only belief; that is, it is
already no longer belief, it is troubled belief’ (Being and
Nothingness, p.121). For Sartre, consciousness (of) belief
irreparably alters belief. But that is impossible on Sartre’s view.
Consciousness even at the pre-reflective level must be selfconscious. Belief is not belief; it is consciousness (of) belief.
Although he acknowledges that since it is part of the very being of
belief that it be self-conscious, that it ‘can exist only as troubled,’ he
still concludes that it ‘exists from the start as escaping itself’ (Being
and Nothingness, p. 122). But if from the start what it is is selfconscious, then how does it escape what it is by the results of its
self-consciousness?154
One could argue that Sartre is simply meaning to contrast the type of
being of consciousness with the type of being of non-conscious reality. Just prior
to the passages from Sartre quoted by Wider, Sartre discusses the fullness and
self-identity of being-in-itself. He there notes that being-in-itself simply is. He
then states that the being of consciousness (being-for-itself) can not be
described as one would describe being-in-itself, so that one can not say of belief
that it is belief as one can say of a table that it is a table.155 It might seem
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plausible then to read Sartre as saying that belief’s escape from itself is its not
being itself the way that an object such as a table is itself, rather than reading
Sartre as saying that belief’s escape from itself is its not being itself the way
belief is itself. The latter reading of Sartre would seem to make him guilty of
inconsistency, since he would be first granting self-identity to belief and then
denying it by saying belief escapes such identity. But it need not be the case
that, as Wider claims, Sartre first describes belief as escaping from itself and
then says that it escapes from, or is not, such an escape. It seems equally
plausible, and certainly more charitable, to say that Sartre is first considering the
position that belief is self-identical and then showing how belief escapes from and
is not such a manner of being. Indeed, other passages in which Sartre describes
the for-itself as the failed attempt of being-in-itself to be itself while also being
other than itself as its own cause156 supports this more charitable interpretation,
since it shows consciousness as an escape from self-identity. However
problematic the notion of such an attempt by the in-itself may be (as noted in the
previous chapter), it does not thus seem that Sartre is guilty of inconsistently
saying belief, or any instance of consciousness, escapes from and alters what it
is by being present to itself. Whatever it is supposed to amount to, belief, like
any other instance of consciousness, is presence to itself.
Wider raises yet another problem with Sartre’s treatment of presence to
self, however, specifically with his treatment of such presence in the case of prereflective consciousness. In her article “The Failure of Self-Consciousness in
Sartre’s Being and Nothingness,”157 Wider argues that Sartre fails to distinguish
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pre-reflective consciousness from pure reflection. Pre-reflective consciousness
for Sartre is a kind of self-consciousness. It is the ‘immediate, non-cognitive
relation of the self to itself’ previously mentioned in Sartre’s denial that presence
to self is an example of knowledge, with its dyad of knower-known.158 Pure
reflection is also a kind of self-consciousness. Specifically, it is the presence of
consciousness to itself not as an object but as consciousness, “the appearance
of the for-itself for the for-itself.”159 Because pure reflection does not objectify
what it is present to (namely, itself), it does not involve the duality of the knowerknown dyad. It thus remains one with what it reflects upon, which, again, is itself.
As Sartre claims, “To know is to make oneself other. Now the reflective can not
make itself wholly other than the reflected-on since it is-in-order-to-be the
reflected-on.”160 For Wider, this description of pure reflection is indistinguishable
from Sartre’s description of pre-reflective consciousness. Both, after all, are
cases of remaining one with and of not objectifying what they are present to.
And since what consciousness is present to in both cases is consciousness itself,
why does Sartre put such emphasis on distinguishing between two seemingly
identical cases?
The reason Sartre treats pre-reflective consciousness as distinct from
pure reflection is not a difference in the relationship between consciousness and
what it is present to, but rather what it is that consciousness is present to in each
case. Before broaching the topic of reflection in general and pure reflection in
particular, Sartre characterizes consciousness as a failed attempt by being initself to cause itself, to be distinct from and then identical with itself, a failure that
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results in it being present to itself. As mentioned in Chapter One, the in-itself
would not seem capable of making such an attempt, but Sartre asserts such an
attempt in the following:
But while being-in-itself is contingent, it recovers itself by falling into
for-itself. It is, in order to lose itself in a for-itself. In a word, being
is and can only be. But the peculiar possibility of being-that which
is revealed in the nihilating act-is of being the foundation of itself as
consciousness through the sacrificial act which nihilates being. The
for-itself is the in-itself losing itself as in-itself in order to found itself
as consciousness.161
One sees here the self-identity of being without the attempt at self-foundation,
and one also sees that this self-identity is lost once the attempt at self-foundation
results in consciousness. This loss of self-identity is the self-presence of
consciousness, something shown by Sartre in the following:
The self therefore represents an ideal distance within the
immanence of the subject in relation to himself, a way of not being
his own coincidence, of escaping identity while positing it as unity-in
short, of being in a perpetually unstable equilibrium between
identity as absolute cohesion without a trace of diversity and unity
as a synthesis of multiplicity. This is what we shall call presence to
self. The law of being of the for-itself, as the ontological foundation
of consciousness, is to be itself in the form of presence to itself.162
The consciousness that results from the attempted self-foundation is a failure
since the being that is present to itself has not succeeded in causing itself. As
noted in Chapter One, the reason for this failure by being-in-itself to cause itself
is the impossibility of being both distinct from something as its cause and
identical with that same thing as well. As previously stated, presence to self puts
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one at a distance from oneself, makes one separate from oneself, so that selfpresent consciousness is not identical with itself as an impossibly self-caused
being would be. As Sartre notes, “the turning back of being on itself can only
cause the appearance of a distance between what turns back and that on which
it turns.”163
This discussion by Sartre of this failed attempt by the in-itself is filled
throughout with mention of pre-reflective consciousness,164 but, as already noted,
this discussion precedes his analysis of reflection, and thus of pure reflection.
When Sartre does turn to the topic of reflection, however, he describes reflective
consciousness not as the attempt by the in-itself to found and recover itself, but
rather as the attempt by the for-itself to do so. According to Sartre, “reflection or
the attempt to recover the for-itself by a turning back on itself results in the
appearance of the for-itself for the for-itself.”165 The for-itself is, of course,
consciousness, and Sartre had already described it as the in-itself’s failed
attempt to found and recover itself. This thus means that reflection in general
and pure reflection in particular is presence to a transcending of the in-itself (the
failed attempt by the in-itself to found itself), a transcending that is the
for-itself, while pre-reflective consciousness is awareness of an in-itself that has
been transcended. Both are united with what they are present to, since both are
an attempt by different “things” to found themselves. Both thus are (though also
in some way are not) what they are present to, which amounts to saying they are
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both instances of presence to self. But pre-reflective consciousness and pure
reflection are not present to the same thing. Sartre’s distinction between the two
thus does not seem susceptible to Wider’s attempt to collapse it, so that Sartre’s
discussion of self-consciousness and of its role in making consciousness
nothingness does not seem mired in inconsistency.
This way of responding to Wider has a potential problem. As already
noted, in his Introduction, Sartre claims that consciousness’ awareness of
something is always also an awareness of itself being aware of something.
Sartre then argues that this fact about consciousness requires the existence of
pre-reflective consciousness.166 The problem this poses for my above response
to Wider is that this seems to show pre-reflective consciousness, and not just
pure reflective consciousness, involving an awareness of and thus presence to
the for-itself. After all, pre-reflective consciousness is aware of itself as
consciousness, and since the for-itself is consciousness, then pre-reflective
consciousness is present to the for-itself. How can this be reconciled with my
above attempt to distinguish these two types of consciousness by means of what

each was present to?
Such a reconciliation can occur by recognizing Sartre’s distinction
between metaphysics and ontology and by realizing that, at least as presented
so far, the above distinction between these two types of consciousness depends
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upon certain metaphysical claims. As noted in Chapter One, metaphysics for
Sartre is “the study of individual processes which have given birth to this world as
a concrete and particular totality,”167 while ontology is the (phenomenological)
description of the structures of being.168 Sartre’s talk of consciousness as the initself’s attempt at self-foundation is an example of metaphysics, since it is an
attempted explanation of how the structures of consciousness came to be, not a
phenomenological description of those structures. Since one can not directly
observe the in-itself’s project of founding itself (such observation, as noted in
Chapter One, would require consciousness to impossibly be both a self-identical
in-itself being and a self-present for-itself being), one can only offer it as an
explanation of what one can observe. All of this is relevant to my response to
Wider because my distinction between pre-reflective and pure reflective
consciousness is based on this metaphysical explanation. Specifically, its above
claims about the difference between pre-reflective and pure consciousness have
been put wholly in terms of the different processes that Sartre claims give rise to
these two distinct types of consciousness, namely, processes involving two
different things attempting to found themselves. Although both processes can be
called an attempt by consciousness to found itself, pre-reflective
consciousness is an attempt at self-foundation by consciousness as an in-itself
being that is transcending itself while pure reflection is such an attempt by
consciousness as the transcendence of an in-itself being. As noted in Chapter
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One, metaphysics shows Sartre that consciousness just is the in-itself doing
something (attempting self-causation), so pre-reflective consciousness is present
to what is doing this while pure reflection is present to what is being done. On
the other hand, since there are no further entities involved in pure reflection than
in pre-reflective consciousness, one might also describe them as presence to the
same thing after all, namely consciousness. So, again, there seems no
inconsistency in Sartre’s account of how the self-presence of consciousness
makes it nothingness.
Of course, not everything that exists as being-in-itself has attempted to
found itself. An inanimate object, for instance, exists in the manner of the initself, because it has not attempted to found itself only to end up present to itself.
But human beings are examples of things that existed in the manner of the initself and attempted self-foundation only to achieve self-presence. (It is unclear if
only humans have attempted self-foundation and not, for instance, animals, and
it is also unclear when humans first attempt this, such as at birth or some time
before or after that.) Both inanimate objects and humans co-exist as examples
of things with being, but the former are in-itself beings and thus self-identical
while the latter are in-itself beings that have eliminated self-identity through an
attempt at self-foundation. One can certainly wonder why all of being-in-itself did
not attempt to found itself, but Sartre’s explanation of pre-reflective
consciousness does not seem dependent upon explaining this.
Having dealt with these numerous objections against Sartre, let us review
his argument from self-consciousness for consciousness not being itself.
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According to him, in order to avoid the absurdity of an unconscious
consciousness, consciousness must be conscious of itself. One possible
defense of this point is the suggestion that consciousness of a transcendent
object that is not consciousness requires an awareness of consciousness in
order to distinguish such an object from consciousness. However compelling
that defense may or may not be, Sartre reasons that since consciousness of
something is presence to that thing, self-consciousness is presence to the self.
This means that consciousness is present to itself, and the relationship of
presence requires one not be whatever one is present to. Thus consciousness,
being self-conscious and consequently self-present, is not itself. One may take
consciousness not being the very thing that it is as Sartre’s meaning when
describing consciousness as nothingness.
Having now explained why Sartre says that consciousness is not itself, the
next step in understanding what he meant in treating consciousness as
nothingness is understanding what it is that consciousness is not. One possible
way to do that is to turn to Sartre’s claim that consciousness is not its object.
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CHAPTER THREE:
CONSCIOUSNESS AS NOT ITS OBJECT
As mentioned earlier, the claim that consciousness is not its object seems
like something most would accept, but the interest of the claim stems from Sartre
also claiming that consciousness is the very object it is not. If that were so, it
would explain why consciousness is nothingness, since it would not be the very
thing that would make it something, namely whatever it is. It would also provide
a necessary supplement to the position that consciousness is not itself, since it
would say more about what it is that consciousness is not, in not being itself.
Evidence of Sartre’s acceptance of consciousness both being and not
being its object is found in the following:
Knowing belongs to the for-itself alone, for the reason that only the
for-itself can appear to itself as not being what it knows. And as
here appearance and being are one-since the for-itself has to be its
appearance-we must conclude that the for-itself includes within its
being the being of the object which it is not inasmuch as the foritself puts its own being into question as not being the being of the
object.…(I)n the case of an internal negation…it is within and upon
the being which it is not that the for-itself appears as not being what
it is not…In the internal negation the for-itself collapses on what it
denies…the term of origin of the internal negation is the in-itself, the
thing which is there, and outside of it there is nothing except an
emptiness, a nothingness which is distinguished from the very thing
only by a pure negation for which this thing furnishes the very
content.169
This passage centers upon what Sartre terms an internal negation. An internal
negation is “such a relation between two beings that the one which is denied to
the other qualifies the other at the heart of its essence-by absence.” 170 An
example from Sartre of such a negation is the denial involved in a statement like
“I am not rich.”171 If one is affected in one’s very being by this fact (perhaps by
169
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feeling depressed or inferior), one is characterized by the lack of what is denied
(in this case, wealth). The other type of negation is an external negation, and
Sartre treats this as a denial of something that does not affect the very being of
what lacks that denied thing.172 An example of this would be one non-conscious
object not being another such object, such as a table not being a chair.

Sartre

claims that the for-itself is not only ‘in’ a relation of internal negation with its
object (‘the thing which is there’), but the for-itself is so dependent upon that
object that nothing other than the object exists ‘in’ that relation. Thus the for-itself
is not something other than its object, since all that there is in the case of the foritself’s knowing of anything is the known in-itself and “an emptiness.” But the foritself is still not its object as well, since it is the negation of its object. One sees
again the ambiguity of Sartre’s position on the subject, as he seemingly vacillates
between something other than what is experienced and nothing but the
experienced. Be that as it may, it seems that consciousness is, at least partly (I
will say more about that later), the very object it is not.
The reason that the for-itself ‘collapses’ on the object it knows has to do
with the nature of presence. Sartre’s claim, quoted above, about the for-itself’s
collapse on its object is part of a discussion of knowledge, but that discussion is
relevant to the nature of presence. Sartre claims that all knowledge is intuitive
knowledge, and such knowledge amounts to the presence of consciousness to
what is known.173 Knowledge for Sartre is thus like everything else for the foritself, since he claims that “(t)he For-itself is defined as presence to being.”174
Now Sartre had previously said, as we saw, that consciousness always being
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consciousness of something means that consciousness is always “confronted
with a concrete and full presence which is not consciousness.”175 Presence to
something requires one to be distinct from that something.

Thus our earlier

discussion of self-presence showed how consciousness must be related to and
separated from itself in order to be present to itself. In his further discussion of
consciousness’ presence to its objects, however, Sartre notes another aspect of
presence: some sort of ‘unity’ with whatever one is present to. Despite the
apparent lack of identity with its objects implied by its presence to them, Sartre
claims that the presence of consciousness to something means it somehow is
that something. Sartre explains why in the following passage:
Presence to-- is an internal relation between the being which is
present and the beings to which it is present. In any case it can not
be a matter of a simple external relation of contiguity. Presence to- indicates existence outside oneself near to--. Anything which can
be present to-- must be such in its being that there is in it a relation
of being with other beings. I can be present to this chair only if I
am united to it in an ontological relation of synthesis, only if I am
there in the being of the chair as not being the chair.176
Sartre seems to be suggesting something between presence as unity with
something and presence as being something (‘…I am there in the being of the
chair…’). Although the above quote seems to endorse the treatment of presence
to something as unity with it by saying that one can be present to something only
if one is united to it, the fact that the quote rejects the notion of presence as
simple contiguity with something also seems to oppose the view of presence as
unity, since unity seems to involve the distinctness of what is united. In any
case, the very fact that Sartre is ambiguous as to these different treatments of
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presence seems significant. After all, consciousness both not being and being its
object correlates well with presence being unity with and also actually being what
one is present to.
Of course, just as one could wonder why Sartre would treat presence as
requiring the separation of what is present from what it is present to (a point
addressed in the previous chapter), one could also wonder why Sartre treats
presence as requiring what is present to be (or to be ‘in the being of’) what it is
present to. Sartre’s reason seems to be that nothing that is completely distinct
from something else can ever be connected to that something else, and, as
shown in the previous quote, Sartre considers presence as a type of relationship,
a form of connection between what is present and what it is present to. Sartre
speaks to this in the following passages:
A being which is present to -- can not be at rest ‘in-itself’; the initself can not be present…177
I can not determine myself not to be an object which is originally
severed from all connection with me. I can not deny that I am a
particular being if I am at a distance from that being. If I conceive
of a being entirely closed in on itself, this being in-itself will be solely
that which it is, and due to this fact there will be no room in it for
either negation or knowledge.178
We have seen that (presence) can not be the pure co-existence of
two existents, conceived as a simple relation of exteriority….179
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A possible explanation of Sartre’s reasoning here could be that any two
completely distinct beings would require a third being to connect them, and if the
third being were distinct from the other two, then a fourth and fifth being would
be necessary to connect the third being with the first and the second being, etc.
One might object that it is only if one treats a connection between things as being
itself a thing of some sort that any possible need for additional connecting beings
emerges. It would not seem, though, that any third being not distinct from two
other things, so that it was in some sense connected to both of them, could be a
connection between those two things, since the two distinct beings would then be
connected to the third being instead of to each other. Consequently, the for-itself
can not be completely separated from the objects it is present to in order to be
connected to them by the relation of presence. It is, in some sense, ‘united’ with
them. But there is nothing other than the for-itself and its object that unites them.
Indeed, according to Sartre’s previous quote about the for-itself as the internal
negation of the in-itself, there is seemingly nothing other than the object of
consciousness at all. So the for-itself must be ‘united’ with its object in its very
being. But then we have Sartre’s conclusion: the very being of the for-itself is to
be found in its object. Although I do not think that the best way of understanding
Sartre, namely the correlational account of consciousness, treats consciousness
as being (as well as not being) its object, Sartre does equate consciousness with
its object here. Any defense of the correlational account will thus have to explain
such equation, and I will attempt to do so in Chapter Five.
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Despite the ultimate untenability of Sartre’s treatment of consciousness as
both being and not being its object, the position that all there is with
consciousness of an object is that object offers a possible explanation of why
self-consciousness is always consciousness of a transcendent object. Such an
explanation would remedy a problem with Sartre’s previously mentioned
metaphysical explanation of consciousness (Sartre’s claim that consciousness is
the failed attempt by the in-itself to found itself), that problem being a failure to
account for the necessity of consciousness’s presence to such an object. Sartre
needs to account for this given his agreement with Husserl’s insight that
consciousness is always consciousness of something, an insight he takes as
meaning that “there is no consciousness which is not a positing of a transcendent
object.”180 In Sartre’s metaphysical explanation, though, all that is involved is the
being that becomes present to itself in its failed attempt to found itself, and that
being is not other than self-present consciousness. There is thus no apparent
need for an object that is not consciousness. The following quotation seems to
demonstrate this lack of such an object in consciousness’s originating act of
failed self-foundation:
But while being in-itself is contingent, it recovers itself by falling into
for-itself. It is, in order to lose itself in a for-itself. In a word being is
and can only be. But the peculiar possibility of being-that which is
revealed in the nihilating act-is of being the foundation of itself as
consciousness through the sacrificial act which nihilates being.
The for-itself is the in-itself losing itself as in-itself in order to found
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itself as consciousness.181
A reconciliation of this explanation with the necessary presence of consciousness
to a transcendent object might be achieved, though, if one says that
consciousness just is (although it also is not) its object. Consciousness must
have an object, because consciousness just is its object (in addition to not being
it).

Being present to self makes consciousness present to an object since

consciousness is its object.
This reconciliation of Sartre’s metaphysical explanation with his ontological
description of consciousness as always being consciousness of a transcendent
object may, however, seem incoherent. Sartre must treat consciousness’ object
as not being consciousness in order to maintain his understanding of Husserl’s
phenomenological point, but he then must turn right around and treat such an
object as not being other than consciousness in his metaphysical account of
consciousness as a failure at “self-foundation.”

One seems faced with the

following dilemma: either Sartre maintains the otherness of the object but leaves
unexplained the necessity of consciousness transcending to such an object and
always being of something, or Sartre explains that necessity, in his metaphysical
account, by making such objects the very thing that their transcendence would
keep them from being-namely, consciousness itself. In order to maintain the
second alternative, then, one must explain how consciousness can both be and
not be its object. One might attempt to make sense of this by saying that Sartre
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treats consciousness as the fact that there are certain objects as opposed to
treating consciousness as the objects themselves, but I will explore that
possibility in Chapter Five. For now, though, one can see the work that might be
done for Sartre by consciousness both being and not being its object.
To be sure, Sartre does himself offer another and different explanation of
why self-conscious consciousness must be consciousness of a transcendent
object. It does not, however, seem to reconcile his phenomenological ontology
with his metaphysics. Sartre claims that the for-itself exists “in the form of the
phantom dyad-the reflection-reflecting….(with) the two terms outlined in the dyad
point(ing) to each other.” 182 This condition of reciprocal reference seems to
follow from consciousness being present to itself. The reason it follows is that
self-presence is a state of existing as seen by and as witness of oneself.183 The
one seen is thus the same as the one seeing, and the one witnessed is the same
as the one witnessing, meaning that what is seen or witnessed is itself seeing or
witnessing what makes it seen or witnessed. But, Sartre argues, consciousness
can not just be a reference of itself to itself, because then one would have “the
two terms of the quasi-dyad support their two nothingnesses on each other,
conjointly annihilating themselves.”184 Since “the reflecting exists only in order to
reflect the reflection, and the reflection is a reflection only in so far as it refers to
the reflecting,”185 one is thus referred from the one to the other, and vice versa,
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ad infinitum, without ever arriving at something that is more than a reference
back to that from which one was referred. Even two mirrors facing each other
and thus reflecting each other are more than just reflections of each other,
namely glass objects, and Sartre seems to think that the dependence of both
reflecting and reflected beings requires a being that exists independently of
reflection. Perhaps this is similar to Aquinas’s claim that contingent beings can
only exist if there is a necessary being. Regardless, in order for consciousness
to be, then, there must be reference to something that is not only a reflexive
reference back. This makes consciousness necessarily conscious of something
other than itself.

Hence, consciousness must be consciousness of a

transcendent object.186
As mentioned above, this explanation fails to reconcile Sartre’s
metaphysics with his phenomenological ontology.

Before one can see the

reason for this failure, though, one must see how the “reflection-reflecting”
explanation differs from the earlier explanation I derived from consciousness both
being and not being its object.

The former, unlike the latter, treats

consciousness’s object as merely related to consciousness, and not as being
consciousness. It claims that “the for-itself is...in the form of the phantom dyadthe reflection reflecting…(and) the reflection…makes itself qualified by something
other than itself or, if you prefer,…it is reflected as a relation to an outside which
it is not.”
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consciousness being related to what it is not (namely, its object), the reflectionreflecting explanation does not treat, or at least need not be taken as treating,
what consciousness is of, as of an object, as also being consciousness. In order
to see this, one must understand two points. First, in at least some of his claims,
Sartre treats the being that consciousness in some sense is as its facticity, the initself being that “becomes” consciousness in its failed attempt to found itself. The
following passages show this:
But the peculiar possibility of being-that which is revealed in the
nihilating act-is of being the foundation of itself as consciousness
through the sacrificial act which nihilates being. The for-itself is the
in-itself losing itself as in-itself in order to found itself as
consciousness.188
It follows that this in-itself, engulfed and nihilated in the absolute
event which is the appearance of the foundation or upsurge of the
for-itself, remains at the heart of the for-itself as its original
contingency.189
This perpetually evanescent contingency of the in-itself which,
without ever allowing itself to be apprehended, haunts the for-itself
and reattaches it to being-in-itself-this contingency is what we shall
call the facticity of the for-itself. It is this facticity which permits us
to say that the for-itself is, that it exists….190
Thus the attempt by the in-itself to found itself, an attempt that is the for-itself, is
an attempt by what thereby becomes the facticity of consciousness. And this
facticity, qua transcended, is what consciousness is then said to “be.” Now given
the reference to “haunting” in the passage just quoted, it seems reasonable to
suppose that Sartre’s description of the “dyad” in question in the reflection-
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reflecting argument as a “phantom” dyad is meant to refer to this particular
context of discussion. And so when Sartre argues that the phantom dyad that is
consciousness needs to be “related” to something transcendent in order to avoid
falling into nothingness, he presumably just means that consciousness, as some
sort of “phantom dyad” that is (and also is not) its facticity, needs to be so related
in order to avoid falling into nothingness. Consequently, second, this facticity
does not seem to be consciousness’s object in any clearly phenomenological
sense, possibly because it seems to be rather just the being that is surpassed
toward objects. Or at least, minimally put, what Sartre says doesn’t seem to say
any more than that. In any case, the following passages about the body seem to
support this:
The body is what I nihilate. It is the in-itself which is surpassed by
the nihilating for-itself and which reapprehends the for-itself in this
very surpassing.191
The body as a sensible center of reference is that beyond which
I am in so far as I am immediately present to the glass or to the
table or to the distant tree which I perceive.192
The body seems to be equated with facticity in the first passage (I will say more
on the body in the next chapter), and the body, and, consequently, facticity, is
then described as surpassed toward consciousness’s objects. So, in claiming
that consciousness must be of an object in order to avoid falling into nothingness,
Sartre is not necessarily claiming thereby that consciousness is its object (as
opposed to being, in some sense, what is surpassed toward its

191

Ibid, p. 409.

89

object). Thus his attempt to reconcile his phenomenological ontology with his
metaphysics differs from the alternative attempt which centers on consciousness
both being and not being its object. (It should be noted that, even though this
attempt also centers on consciousness both being and not being its facticitysince, as noted in Chapter Two, consciousness is not whatever it is-what remains
in question is how both consciousness’s object and its facticity are-and are notconsciousness, given that they are not the same thing.)
This demonstration of the difference between Sartre’s explanation in terms
of reflection requiring something more than just a reference to something else
and my alternative explanation shows the problem with the former’s attempt to
reconcile his phenomenological ontology with his metaphysics. The problem is
that in the metaphysical account, since consciousness is “already” something
independent of its “reference” to an object, namely an in-itself being that has
been transcended (which, as just noted, is the facticity of consciousness), then
consciousness does not seem to be necessarily dependent upon the
transcendent being of its object to prevent it from falling into nothingness. If, on
the other hand, consciousness just is its object, then its presence to self is
already a presence to a transcendent object. To be sure, our understanding of
how consciousness can be transcendent of and thus other than itself while also
still being itself needs elaboration, but treating consciousness as both being and
not being its object seems, for better or worse, the best way to reconcile Sartre’s
phenomenological ontology with his metaphysics.
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One might defend Sartre’s appeal to the notion of reflection-reflecting in
his attempted reconciliation of his phenomenological ontology with his
metaphysics by claiming that the self-transcendence of facticity means that one
could never grasp what consciousness is without “reference” to some
transcendent object, since one would be otherwise continually referred from that
facticity specifically as “reflecting” to that facticity as “reflected,” and vice versa.
But even if such attempted grasping would be like a dog futilely chasing its tail, it
does not follow that consciousness, as transcended facticity, would fall into
nothingness without reference to some transcendent object. Even if one could
not ever actually grasp some self-present facticity, that facticity still is, and it is
not clear why its being should depend upon a reference to consciousness’s
object in order to be. Facticity, even transcended facticity, does not need to refer
to an object in order to be. Thus my disagreement with this part of Sartre’s
reasoning.
By way of anticipation, we might in any case note a possible way of
connecting Sartre’s talk about consciousness “being” its facticity and his talk
about it “being” its object, or at least being nothing more than its object. As I
have already suggested, we may regard Sartrean facticity as in some way
necessarily indicated, or reflected, by consciousness’s object.

As already

mentioned, the purely phenomenological reading of Sartre in fact sees
consciousness as nothing more than the fact that phenomena both appear and in
various ways indicate other phenomena (or the possible appearance of other
phenomena) in various ways. This position might perhaps then be further
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elaborated to say that Sartre treats the facticity of consciousness just as being
what is in a certain way indicated or reflected by appearing phenomena. To this
extent, such a reading of Sartre could at least have him say that facticity is an
aspect of consciousness’s object.

I will explore this suggestion in the next

chapter. It should also be noted again that Sartre’s claims about consciousness
in some sense being its object may seem problematic for the correlational
treatment of consciousness since that treatment does indeed seem to make
consciousness something more than either appearing objects or the fact of their
appearing. As previously stated, I will address this problem in Chapter Five. For
now, though, we could at least also add that, in this very “indicating” of certain
sorts of things, in certain sorts of phenomenologically characterizable ways, it
might be held that the object of consciousness is thereby in some way also
indicating, or “reflecting,” what is metaphysically characterizable (if not directly
graspable) as the facticity of consciousness, transcended toward objects in its
“effort” to found itself.
One could object, however, that my emphasis upon consciousness being
its facticity is overly simplistic due to its applicability to pre-reflective
consciousness only and not to reflective consciousness. As noted in Chapter
Two, from the point of view of Sartre’s metaphysics, pre-reflective consciousness
is the presence of the in-itself to itself arising from its failure to found and recover
itself, whereas (pure) reflective consciousness, arising from a similar failure on
the part of the for-itself, has as its phenomenological upshot the presence of the
for-itself to itself as such. So, even if pre-reflective consciousness is present to
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itself as in-itself facticity, one might object that reflective consciousness is not
present to any sort of faciticity at all, and that it in no way “is” any such thing.
Although Sartre notes how (pure) reflection is the presence of a for-itself
being to that very same for-itself being, reflective consciousness nonetheless still
retains the in-itself facticity of consciousness. Sartre says (pure) reflection “is not
the appearance of a new consciousness directed on the for-itself but an intrastructural modification which the for-itself realizes in itself…” 193

With pure

reflection, the consciousness that was there before reflection, namely a prereflective consciousness that in some sense is its facticity, “makes itself exist in
the mode reflective-reflected-on…;”

thereby reflection allows pre-reflective

consciousness “to subsist as a primary inner structure”194 of the consciousness in
question. This means that the facticity that pre-reflective consciousness in some
sense is remains in reflective consciousness.

Granted, pre-reflective

consciousness is the self-presence (and thus the transcendence) of facticity,
while reflective consciousness is the self-presence (and thus transcendence) of
that transcended facticity. So what pre-reflective consciousness both is and is
present to is in some sense not the same thing that reflective consciousness is
and is present to.

In any case, the same facticity is found in both, even if

differently “reflected” phenomenologically. The relevance of all of this is that, at
least in terms of Sartre’s own attempted reconciliation of his phenomenology with
his metaphysics, it remains unclear why either reflective consciousness or pre-
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reflective consciousness has need of reference to the actual being of a
transcendent object of consciousness in order to avoid falling into nothingness.
Why is not the facticity in question sufficient in both cases?
It should be noted that a further problem exists for Sartre’s claims about
consciousness being nothing more than its object. That problem is how such
treatment could account for the unity of consciousness over time. If one were to
say “I see a table” and then say “I see a chair,’ there would seem to be
something constant (“I”) referred to in these two statements. But what could be
constant between consciousness of one object and that of another if there is
nothing more to consciousness than its object? One might say that a person is
constant in one’s awareness of different objects, but how can Sartre
accommodate that claim without something more to consciousness of an object
than its object? Although Sartre often seems unclear as to whether or not there
is a subject that makes something more of consciousness than just its object,
perhaps any constancy throughout different conscious acts requires that a
subject exist. Otherwise, once an object of consciousness has changed, what
remains the same?
It should be noted that Sartre in fact sounds at times as if there is not
anything that persists from consciousness of one object to that of another. He
claims that “(i)t is not in the future that I rediscover my presence since the future
releases the world to me as correlative with a consciousness to-come.”195 This
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certainly sounds as if a fundamental change is brought with every future change
in consciousness’s object. One way, however, that Sartre attempts to preserve
the unity of consciousness, in spite of this apparent multiplicity, is found in his
discussion of possibility. In that discussion, Sartre claims that the consciousness
of a particular object is in some way the consciousness of that object’s potential
changes. 196 Sartre’s reasoning starts from the idea that what an object for
consciousness is depends upon that object’s lack of some potential
development. For instance, Sartre notes how a crescent moon is what it is by
contrast to a full moon which it is not.197 Lacking what would make it a full moon
is just part of what a crescent moon is. Sartre treats this denial by an object of
another object as a kind of “return” by the denied object to the denying object, so
that it is in light of what an object is not that an object is what it is. What is
denied in these instances are potentialities of an object, and these potentialities
are at least partly constitutive of an object.
All of this is relevant to the issue of an enduring consciousness because
Sartre treats the lacked potentialities constitutive of an object as correlative to
lacked possibilities of consciousness of an object. Just as an object is

constituted by what it lacks, so consciousness of an object is constituted
by the possibilities it lacks. Sartre shows this in the following passage:
I am beyond the crescent moon as the possibility of a radical
negation of the moon as a full disc; and correlative with the return
196
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of my future negation toward my presence, the full moon comes
back toward the crescent in order to determine it in this as a
negation; the full moon is what the crescent lacks; it is the lack of
the full moon which makes the crescent a crescent….I attribute the
dimension of the future to the crescent as crescent…and I
constitute it as the crescent moon by the determining return toward
it of what it lacks.198
Since consciousness is (although it also is not) its object, one would expect this
sort of correspondence between what is the case for consciousness and what is
the case for its object.
Why, though, does Sartre think that the possible consciousness of an
object’s potentialities is the same as the consciousness of that object? The
reason seems to be that Sartre treats the potential actualization of the
consciousness of an object’s potentialities as that which the self-present
consciousness of that same object needs in order to be identical with itself, or
“complete.” As already noted in Chapter Two, Sartre treats consciousness as
being separated from itself by virtue of its self-presence.

Because of this

absence of itself from itself, Sartre treats consciousness as a lack of what would
make it complete.199 In his discussion of possibility, Sartre specifies what would
complete consciousness: “(t)his missing For-itself is the Possible.”200 The
Possible here is the consciousness of the potentialities of consciousness’s
object. This is shown by Sartre’s claim that “…as a correlate of this possible
non-thetic consciousness, the glass-drunk-from haunts the full glass as its
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possible and constitutes it as a glass to be drunk from.”

201

So, the

consciousness of an object endures through a change in that object because the
consciousness of any potential developments of that object is what the former
consciousness is in the first place, despite its also not being it due to the
separation from itself found with its presence-to-self. The original consciousness
of an object thus endures because it is replaced by itself, not by another
consciousness, when there is awareness of changes in an object of
consciousness.
At least two problems exist for this attempt to explain the endurance of
consciousness despite a change in what it is consciousness of. The first
problem has to do with the supposed “identity” of a present consciousness with a
possible consciousness. According to Sartre, the self-present consciousness of
an object is the self-present consciousness of that object’s potentialities, since
the latter is what the former lacks in order to be reunited with itself. But how
would that make the present consciousness of a crescent moon, for instance, the
same as the eventual consciousness of a full moon?

After all, even if the

crescent moon is what it is for Sartre due to its not being the full moon, just as
much as consciousness is what it is due to its not being itself, that does not imply
that a crescent moon is a full moon. Or at least, without the supposition of some
sort of an underlying identity (substance?), it does not. So does Sartre not also
need to appeal, in the case of consciousness, precisely to some sort of
underlying identity? (That identity would seem to have to lie in his notion of
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facticity, as giving some sort of “substance” to consciousness beyond what its
object is able to give. I will get to this point shortly.)
This problem of how consciousness can also “be” its possible
consciousness becomes even worse when one emphasizes that, whatever one
might choose to say about consciousness both being and being separated from
consciousness, self-present consciousness, at least on the pre-reflective level,
both is and is separated from an in-itself being, namely an in-itself facticity that
attempted to found itself. Again, pre-reflective consciousness is the in-itself qua
separated from itself. As previously noted, the in-itself attempted to found itself,
to be both its own foundation and identical with itself. It only succeeded in being
present to itself, however. So what results is an in-itself being that is separated
from itself. This in-itself being that lacks itself is consciousness for (at least the
metaphysical) Sartre. So what consciousness is missing in missing itself is a
certain sort of in-itself being. From this perspective, the being of consciousness
does not consist in a lack of a for-itself being such that, in pursuing it,
consciousness would be pursuing itself. It rather consists in a lack of being-initself such that, in pursuing it, consciousness as an in-itself being is in some way
pursuing both itself and an impossible being, namely a self-caused being, as its
own foundation.
Perhaps another way to understand the problem with Sartre’s reasoning is
to examine it in the form of the following argument:
1) Consciousness is present to itself.
2) Whatever is present to itself is separated from or lacks itself.
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3) Therefore, consciousness lacks itself.
Although this argument may seem to be valid, there is an equivocation of the
term ‘consciousness’ such that only one of two possible understandings of that
term could mean that consciousness of an object lacks the possible
consciousness of that object’s potentialities. As noted earlier in this chapter,
‘consciousness is present to itself’ can be understood as meaning either (a) an
in-itself being is present to itself or (b) a for-itself being, which is already an initself being present to itself, is present to itself. Given (2), (a) would mean that
consciousness lacks an in-itself being, the in-itself being that consciousness is;
(b) would mean that consciousness lacks a for-itself being, a self-present being,
since what is lacked is an in-itself being qua already present to itself. Sartre’s
discussion of consciousness in some sense being its possible consciousness
seems to turn on (b), since the possible consciousness is what consciousness is
said to lack in that discussion. But (b) seems more like a description of reflective
consciousness than of pre-reflective consciousness, and Sartre’s treatment of
the possibility of consciousness is supposed to be part of a discussion of prereflective consciousness.202 In any case, even if that treatment was part of a
discussion of reflective consciousness, there would still be no reason to think that
pre-reflective consciousness of an object lacked consciousness of such an
object’s potentialities, and thus there would be no explanation here of the unity of
pre-reflective consciousness.
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The question of the distinction between reflective and pre-reflective
consciousness may, however, relate to a possible objection to my distinction
between (a) and (b). That objection is that (a) and (b) are not really different at
all, but are rather different ways of saying the same thing. Although (b) claims
that a self-present for-itself being is what consciousness lacks, the in-itself being
that (a) treats as lacked by consciousness is likewise a self-present for-itself
being. The reason for this is that the being that the lacking in-itself is present to
is itself, not some other in-itself being. Consequently, the lacked being in (a) is
separated from itself and thus seems to be a for-itself being just like the lacked
being in (b). How, then, is the being present to and lacked by consciousness in
(a) different from the being present to and lacked by consciousness in (b)?
Perhaps one can even see (a) and (b) as instances of the two different ways for
Sartre of looking at consciousness:
Thus we are obliged to admit that the consciousness (of) belief is
belief. At its origin we have apprehended this double game of
reference:
consciousness (of) belief is belief and belief is
consciousness (of) belief….Each of the terms refers to the other
and passes into the other, and yet each term is different from the
other….Thus consciousness (of) belief and belief are one and the
same being, the characteristic of which is absolute immanence.
But as soon as we wish to grasp this being, it slips between our
fingers, and we find ourselves faced with a pattern of duality, with a
game of reflections….In fact if we seek to lay hold on the total
phenomena (i.e., the unity of this duality or consciousness (of)
belief), we are referred immediately to one of the terms, and this
term in turn refers us to the unitary organization of immanence.203
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It might seem that (a) is simply focusing on the duality of consciousness, with its
description of the lacked as in-itself just being a matter of emphasis upon the
lacked not being self-present consciousness. And (b) would be focusing upon
the unity of consciousness, with its description of the lacked as a for-itself that is
ecstatically being the lacking consciousness204 just being a matter of emphasis
on that which is lacked being self-present consciousness. Hence (a) and (b)
might not be incompatible options, with one having to choose either one or the
other. Perhaps one could embrace both (a) and (b).
The problem with treating (a) and (b) as equivalent is that such treatment
makes pre-reflective and reflective consciousness equivalent. I have already
noted a problem with such equivalence in response to the earlier objection that
pre-reflective consciousness is present to itself as for-itself consciousness rather
than as in-itself facticity.

This problematic equivalence of pre-reflective and

reflective consciousness seems to follow from the equivalence of (a) and (b),
since (a) seems to be grounded in Sartre’s view of the very nature of prereflective consciousness, while (b) seems to speak more to the case of reflection.
Sartre, though, certainly does not think these two forms of consciousness are the
same thing, despite the similarities between the failed recovery of the in-itself in
the case of pre-reflective consciousness and the failed
recovery of the for-itself in the case of reflective consciousness.

Reflection for

Sartre is a “second effort”205 at a certain sort of self-founding, namely, an effort
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by consciousness (as opposed to the in-itself) to found itself: an “intra-structural
modification which the for-itself realizes in itself.”206 Without a distinction
between reflective and pre-reflective consciousness, nothing would distinguish
the first effort (on the part of the in-itself) at self-recovery from this second effort
(on the part of consciousness). Although it is true that Sartre does not think
anything new is added by reflection to pre-reflective consciousness207, the fact
that reflection “modifies” pre-reflective consciousness precludes any equation of
the two forms of consciousness.
Sartre claims that reflective consciousness is such that “the ‘reflectionreflecting’ which is reflected-on exists for a ‘reflection-reflecting’ which is
reflective.”208 This seems to involve the presence of the lacked being to itself in
addition to its presence to the lacking being which it is, and it also seems to
involve the presence of the lacking being to itself in addition to its presence to the
lacked being which it is.

Sartre distinguishes the case of pre-reflective

consciousness from this by claiming that it is simply the “reflection-reflecting,”
with no additional “reflection-reflecting” reflecting on it.209 As in (a), then, prereflective consciousness would involve the presence to consciousness of the
being which consciousness is, with no other self-presence on the part of
that being. And this is arguably just the presence to consciousness of the initself being which consciousness is. Consequently, just as real differences exist
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between pre-reflective and reflective consciousness, so also the distinction
between (a) and (b) seems more than simply two ways of describing the same
thing.
Regarding the distinction between (a) and (b) in this way, one may then
see how a substitute of (a) for (1) in the original argument does not after all
permit the conclusion that, at least on the pre-reflective level, consciousness is
lacking with regard to a possible consciousness which it (impossibly) would be.
The argument again:
1) Consciousness is present to itself.
2) Whatever is present to itself is separated from or lacks itself.
3) Therefore, consciousness lacks itself.
If substituting (a) for (1) yields “An in-itself being is present to itself,” we can see
the problem this generates. We could thus not read the conclusion (3) as saying
that consciousness lacks a for-itself being which it (impossibly) would be, for the
being that consciousness is said to be and to be present to in (1) is an in-itself
being. To read (1) as (a) and then accept consciousness in (3) as lacking with
respect to a for-itself being would be, again, to neglect the difference between
pre-reflective and reflective consciousness.
Only by reading (1) as (b), then, and not as (a), can one justify Sartre’s
conclusion about consciousness’s lack of its possible consciousness. This would
of course render the whole issue irrelevant to the case of the being of prereflective consciousness. But we need to remember that our original interest in
Sartre’s view regarding a “lack” of being with respect to consciousness was that-
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in the face of Sartre’s view of consciousness as nothing more than its (ever
changing) objects-it promised some sort of hope for making sense of the idea of
consciousness as nevertheless maintaining an identity over time. If the notion of
lack in question were applicable only to the case of reflective consciousness, it
could only explain the endurance of reflective, but not of pre-reflective,
consciousness. And this would in any case be in addition to the problem already
noted earlier, namely that, even if reflective consciousness is what it is due to its
lack of a possible consciousness that would make it the foundation of itself (just
as the crescent moon is what it is due to its lack of what would make it a full
moon), that does not seem reason to treat it as being that possible
consciousness.
A second problem with Sartre’s account of an object’s possibilities as an
explanation of the endurance and unity of consciousness is that it does not
account for all changes in what one is aware of. Even if the consciousness of an
object is in some way the same as the consciousness of that object’s
potentialities, that does not explain what could be constant throughout
consciousness of an object and the consciousness of something other than that
object’s potentialities. For instance, let us grant that the consciousness of dark
clouds may be in some sense the same as the consciousness that correlates
with the potential rain resulting from those clouds. The question remains: how
can the former consciousness be the same as the consciousness of an
unexpected happening, say, an unexpected surprise party later that day? Surely
one can be observing the clouds at one point and also be aware of the party at
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some later point, but Sartre’s treatment of possibility does not seem to offer an
explanation of how this can be so.

A surprise party does not seem like a

potentiality of dark clouds, so one can not say that, due to the potentiality of the
clouds that is the party, the consciousness of the party is the lacked possibility of
the consciousness of the clouds. What, then, enables there to be something
enduring throughout changes in objects of awareness?
In her article “Sartre on the Transcendence of the Ego,”210 Phyllis Sutton
Morris offers a way for Sartre to have an enduring being throughout
consciousness of different objects. In that article, Morris suggests that it is the
enduring body that accounts for the unity of consciousness for Sartre. 211
Although there can be consciousness of a wide array of objects, the fact that the
same body can be related to these differing objects explains what can be the
same in the awareness of all such things. One who is conscious of a chair, for
instance, can be the same as one who is conscious of a table if both
consciousnesses in some way involve the same body. The following passage
from Sartre suggests the reading offered by Morris:
In one sense the body is what I immediately am. In another sense I
am separated from it by the infinite density of the world; it is given
to me by a reflux of the world toward my facticity, and the condition
of this reflux of the world toward my facticity is a perpetual
surpassing….the body is perpetually the surpassed. The body as a
sensible center of reference is that beyond which I am in so far as I
am immediately present to the glass or to the table or to the distant
trees which I perceive….that in relation to which the perceived
object indicates its distance as an absolute property of its being is
210
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the body….This means that it is at once a point of view and a point
of departure- a point of view, a point of departure which I am and
which at the same time I surpass toward what I have to be.212
One can see here the omnipresence of the body for any awareness of
something, in such a way that one can say that a common feature unifying
different acts of consciousness is just a particular body “indicated” (or “reflected”)
by all objects of consciousness. What an awareness of a particular object has in
common with awareness of any other particular object need thus not be due to
any potentiality of the one object to become the other object. Rather, it is due to
the body “indicated” by both such objects.
Several questions arise concerning this reading of Sartre. For one, how
can the ever-changing physical body be a constant being throughout different
objects of consciousness? As Locke noted, a problem with treating the body as
the basis of identity throughout different acts of consciousness is its composition
of “constantly fleeting Particles of Matter…” 213

The body replaces its cells

continuously, so that no part of the body is the same throughout one’s lifetime.
Of course, such constant change does not seem to preclude one from treating a
body as in some sense the same thing over time, whether that body is one’s own
or someone else’s, just as one can treat other changing objects as in some
sense the same thing over time (a table, for instance, can surely be the same
thing even if one paints it a different color). Perhaps such treatment is due to
some overarching whole that is the body, independent of its replaced parts,
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something like Locke’s “one Common Life” 214 Could such a whole be what
Sartre might take as constant throughout consciousness of different objects? Or
could it be that it is simply the body indicated as the same by different objects of
consciousness that might yield for Sartre an enduring being throughout different
objects of consciousness? By this I mean that, even if the physical body that is
indicated by objects of consciousness is not the same due to its state of constant
change, all that matters is that it appears as if it is the same body indicated by all
the different objects of a consciousness. One might object to this explanation of
the unity of consciousness since it would merely appear that something is
constant throughout the awareness of various objects, and nothing would really
be constant throughout. Perhaps that might make the unity of consciousness
illusory.

A possible response by Sartre might be his claim that with

consciousness “appearance and being are one-since the for-itself has to be its
appearance….”215 So the fact that it appears as if the same body is indicated by
the various objects of consciousness means that the same body is being so
indicated.

This equation of appearance and reality might be explained by

recognizing a distinction between the body as lived and the body-for-others, with
Sartre saying that the former is the source of the unity of consciousness. This
distinction between these two senses of what the body is, as well as whether the
lived body is in some sense the body-for-others, will be dealt with next.
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For the time being, though, one can see a possible compatibility between
the unity of consciousness and consciousness being nothing more than its
object, especially if one recognizes the unifying body as simply that which objects
“indicate” rather than as being altogether distinct from consciousness’s objects.
In fact, the purely phenomenological reading of Sartre would have to treat the
body in such fashion, since that reading treats consciousness as nothing more
than the fact of the appearance of objects with their various indications.

A

problem for this position arises, though, from Sartre’s apparent treatment of
consciousness as both “nothing more” than its object and as also its selfrecovering facticity. Chapter Five will offer a possible solution to this problem, a
solution that ultimately rejects Sartre’s equation of consciousness with either its
objects or the fact of their appearance.
Although this chapter has shown problems with Sartre’s explanations of
both the necessity of self-consciousness being consciousness of a transcendent
object and of the endurance of consciousness by means of its possibilities, it has
also shown possible alternative explanations that seem compatible with his
general position. In any case, this might be regarded as conferring a reading of
Sartre’s view of consciousness as not being itself in terms of at least some
significant sense in which its very being is to be found in its object, despite the
fact that its object is also something that consciousness plainly is not.
CHAPTER FOUR:
CONSCIOUSNESS AS NOT ITS PAST
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The claim that consciousness is not its past, like the claim that
consciousness is not its object, is a claim that most would probably accept.
What, after all, is its past? The interest of the claim, though, stems from the fact
that, just as with consciousness’s object, consciousness is in some sense the
past it is not. So, since consciousness is not the very thing it is, the very thing
that would make it something, it is then nothingness. But what does it mean to
say consciousness both is and is not its past?
There are at least two ways of understanding how consciousness both is
and is not its past. The first way involves an understanding of the past in a fairly
straightforward sense, the sense one has when saying, for instance, that the past
was but is no longer, while the second involves an understanding of the past that
in some way equates the past with the body. Starting with the first understanding
of how consciousness both is and is not its past, Chapter One noted Sartre’s
position that although one is not whatever one was in the past, one also in some
sense is whatever one was in the past as well. An example from Chapter One
showed that even if I am the same person that was previously reading but am
now typing, I am not identical with myself as reading because although I am
typing, I was reading. This irremovable difference between what I was in the
past but am now in the present persists even if what was true of me previously
still is true, so that even if I am still reading as I was, say, an hour ago, that would
not change the fact that I am now reading but I was reading an hour ago. As
also noted in Chapter One, a permanent self that exists throughout one’s past
and present would not change things either, since such a self would still be such
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that, again, it was whatever it was in the past but it is whatever it is in the
present. Still, as previously stated, this difference between oneself and one’s
past does not eliminate the fact that one is in some sense what one was. After
all, one has to be the same one who was before in order for it to be true that one
was. As Sartre notes, “…the term ‘was’ is a mode of being. In this sense I am
my past, I do not have it; I am it.”216 Using Chapter One’s example to support
this point, I can surely now be the same one that was previously reading. This
identification with the past that one also is not is further demonstrated in the
following quote from Sartre:
A remark made by someone concerning an act which I performed
yesterday or a mood which I had does not leave me indifferent; I
am hurt or flattered, I protest or I let it pass; I am touched to the
quick. I do not dissociate myself from my past.217
According to this understanding of consciousness both being and not
being its past, then, consciousness exists as the separation from self involved
with temporality. As noted in Chapter One, Sartre does not think non-conscious
beings exist in this manner, but rather their temporal appearance is simply a
matter of their reflection of the temporality of consciousness. Being-in-itself
simply is without not being anything, so that non-conscious things allegedly owe
whatever negation is required for their seeming temporality to consciousness.
For Sartre, only consciousness can not be without such external support, so that
only consciousness can strictly speaking exist as not being the very past that it
is.
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This separation from its past is what constitutes the freedom of
consciousness. For Sartre, consciousness is free because it has “the permanent
possibility of effecting a rupture with its own past, of wrenching itself away from
its past….”218 It is as if the separation of consciousness from its past creates a
chasm that prevents the past from affecting consciousness as its cause. By not
being its past, consciousness has the power of withdrawing from all that has
occurred in order to posit a non-existent end. Such positing could not occur if
consciousness were incapable of withdrawing from being, since “what is can in
no way determine by itself what is not.”219 So, it is because I am not my past that
I can attempt to achieve things that do not exist, such as a meal for this evening.
As noted in Chapter One, Wilson claims that this freedom to act is what Sartre
means to preserve by answering certain metaphysical questions. As I will argue
in Chapter Five, treating consciousness as a certain state of affairs helps explain
how it can not be the past that it is, thus making it free, at least according to
Sartre.
The second understanding of how consciousness for Sartre can both be
and not be its past involves a connection between consciousness’s past and
consciousness’s body. As noted in Chapter One, Sartre claims that
consciousness just is its in-itself facticity attempting to cause itself, and Chapter
Two noted that consciousness, at least on the pre-reflective level, is present to
and thus separate from itself as its in-itself facticity. This is relevant to
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consciousness’s past because consciousness’s facticity is its past, due to the
fact that consciousness’s facticity is its body, and consciousness’s body is its
past. Sartre writes “…the body as facticity is the past….”220 So, by both being
and not being its facticity, consciousness is both being and not being its past.
This explanation of consciousness both being and not being its past
obviously requires answers to a couple of questions. For one thing, why does
Sartre think that the body is consciousness’s facticity, and what exactly does that
mean? Also, why does he think that the body is consciousness’s past, and what
does that mean? Hopefully, anwering these questions will explain how
consciousness’s facticity, the very thing that is consciousness, at least on the
pre-reflective level, is consciousness’s past.
In order to answer the first question, one must recall that, according to
Sartre’s metaphysical explanation, the facticity of consciousness is the in-itself
being that attempted to found itself. This attempt failed and resulted in the
presence of facticity to itself. Since this explanation is meant to account for what
appears when one examines consciousness, one may wonder what aspect of the
appearance of consciousness invites this explanation. Here is where the
body enters in. As already mentioned in the previous chapter, objects for Sartre
always appear to consciousness with some reference to a body that has been
surpassed. Part of the presentation of an object is its location in relationship to
one’s body. So, a chair, for instance, always appears as being a certain distance
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and direction from one’s body. To say, for instance, that a chair is to the right of
a table is to locate the chair in relationship to something else (since the chair may
be to the left of the table for one located elsewhere), and that something else is
one’s body. Indeed, without the location of objects in relation to each other, a
location made possible by the body as a reference point, there would be no
objects. The following passage illustrates this:
It is not even conceivable that a consciousness could survey the
world in such a way that the glass should be simultaneously given
to it at the right and at the left of the decanter, in front of it and
behind it….this fusion of right and left, of before and behind, would
result in the total disappearance of “thises” at the heart of a
primitive indistinction.221
So the body is always indicated by an object of consciousness, and Sartre, as
noted above, equates that indicated body with transcended facticity.
But why does he make that equation? What is the connection between
transcended facticity and indicated body? Perhaps Sartre is noting the fact that
the indicated body is always indicated as ‘already there,’ as something that
existed prior to its indication. For instance, when a chair indicates my body in
some position relative to it, it always indicates something that was there before
there was any awareness of the chair. This might make the body like
transcended facticity, because facticity seems at least capable of existing before
any transcendence of it toward something else. The problem with this
explanation is that it does not distinguish the body from numerous other things
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indicated by an object. Objects do not simply indicate the body, but they also
indicate, among other things, other possible objects of consciousness. Many of
these possible objects of consciousness are, like the body, indicated as already
being there, as illustrated in Sartre’s example of presence to a cup which
indicates presence to the bottom of the cup.222 Surely this indication of the
bottom of the cup is of something that was already there before its indication, not
of something that just came into existence at the time of its indication. So the
simple indication of the body as ‘already there’ does not seem uniquely to identify
it as transcended facticity.
Perhaps the unique feature of the indicated body is that objects indicate it
as surpassed. In fact, Sartre says as much in the following:
…the body is perpetually the surpassed. The body as a sensible
center of reference is that beyond which I am in so far as I am
immediately present to the glass or to the table or to the distant tree
which I perceive.223
Unlike the body, then, other objects that are indicated by consciousness are not
indicated as something surpassed in order to arrive at the indicating object of
consciousness. But what does it mean to say that the body is indicated as
surpassed? Since, as noted above, being surpassed could involve being
previous to whatever something is surpassed toward, the body’s indication as
surpassed could be taken as literally meaning that the body is a previous object
of awareness before awareness of any and all other objects of awareness the
body is surpassed toward This suggestion, though, seems contrary to
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experience, since one seems frequently to go from one object of consciousness
to another without the body being an object of awareness prior to those other
objects. It is not as if awareness of a chair and then of a table is first awareness
of the body, second awareness of a chair, third awareness of the body again,
and fourth awareness of a table. This succession of events certainly can
happen, but Sartre’s claim that the body is always indicated as surpassed by
objects of consciousness surely does not mean that such a succession always
happens whenever one is conscious of different objects in succession.
Perhaps, though, one can uniquely identify the body as surpassed in
awareness of objects by means of the body being indicated as ‘already there’ by
each and every object of consciousness. I have already noted that simply being
indicated as ‘already there’ by an object does not distinguish the body from
various other objects indicated by objects of consciousness. But such indicated
objects are not so indicated by every object of consciousness, while the previous
quote from Sartre shows that the body is. So, unlike the bottom of a cup that is
indicated as ‘already there’ by another part of that cup, the body is indicated as
‘already there’ by the cup, the chair, the table, the glass, the tree, etc. Each and
every object of consciousness thus appears as beyond the surpassed body
because each and every object of consciousness, in order to be such an object,
indicates the body as ‘already there.’ Indeed, this indication of something that is
‘already there’ seems almost like a return to or looking back upon what is
indicated, given the previous nature of something indicated as ‘already there.’
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Perhaps this helps motivate Sartre’s metaphysical account of a failed attempt to
recover the facticity that consciousness is, given the similarity between ‘looking
back upon’ the body and the attempt to recover facticity. One also finds here a
reason that the indicated body seems like a good candidate for being, like
facticity, what consciousness is. Since each and every object for consciousness
shares in common its indication of the body, the body seems like the only
enduring feature of the varied objects of consciousness. It thus seems fitting to
treat it as what consciousness is throughout awareness of different objects, thus
equating the body with the facticity that the consciousness of all objects is. This
account of what it means for the body to be indicated as surpassed might thus
explain the equation of the body with facticity.
This explanation is not completely clear, though. The reason for this lack
of clarity is Sartre’s treatment of the body as more than one thing. As mentioned
in the previous chapter, Sartre distinguishes between the body-for-itself and the
body-for-others. The body-for-itself, at least in one sense, is “never a given
which I can know. It is there everywhere as the surpassed….”224 It is thus the
phenomenological upshot of metaphysical facticity, that which is indicated as
surpassed by the objects of consciousness. In another sense, though, the bodyfor-itself is not a center of reference for objects of consciousness, but rather it is
the arrangement of objects of consciousness that is surpassed toward another,
non-existent, future arrangement of objects.225 The body-for-itself in the former
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sense, as center of reference, or a “point of view,”226 is indicated but does not
appear, but in the latter sense, as a “point of departure,”227 it does appear.
Although my above equation of the body with facticity only made reference to the
body-for-itself in the former sense, the two senses of the body-for-itself agree in
the body being transcended toward something else. They differ in what the body
is in each case and in what each is transcended toward.
The body-for-others, on the other hand, is an object in the world,
something that appears and thus involves the transcendence of the body-foritself in that appearance. It is apprehended as a “wholly constituted object…a
this among other thises.”228 It would thus be the body as what one sees when
one looks in the mirror, for instance, an appearing thing that appears to others as
well. The body in this sense, then, does not seem to be what Sartre equates with
the facticity of consciousness, since this object, like any other object, indicates
the body-for-itself as a being surpassed toward it, and, unlike the body-for-itself,
not every object indicates the body-for-others as a being surpassed toward it.
This distinction between the body-for-itself and the body-for-others raises
a problem. Despite the fact that Sartre treats these two aspects of the body as
“different and incommunicable levels of being,…(that) can not be reduced to one
another,”229 the fact remains that these are two aspects of the same thing. How
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can the body be both for-itself as well as the in-itself object that is the body-forothers? One might claim that making the body for-itself makes it not in-itself,
and vice versa, thus leading one commentator to claim that “the…body…can be
identified neither with the ontological status of an absolute for-itself nor with the
ontological status of an in-itself.”230 This is not the problem from Chapter One of
how to relate for-itself consciousness to in-itself non-conscious beings. As noted
then, Sartre connects the two types of being by making metaphysical claims
about the origin of consciousness from the in-itself’s failed attempt at selfcausation, thus claims to the effect that the for-itself just is the in-itself doing
something. The problem is rather how the body-for-itself, which consciousness
in some sense is, can be an in-itself object once it has already separated from
itself by its attempted self-founding. As an in-itself object, the body-for-others is
not losing its self-identity by the failed act of self-foundation that makes
something self-present consciousness. Sartre’s insistence on the radically
distinct types of being for consciousness and non-conscious objects might seem
to preclude anything being both types, regardless of how intrinsically related they
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may be.
Of course, one might wonder whether this problem applies to the claim in
the previous chapter that consciousness is in some sense its object. Is that not
treating something (namely consciousness’s object) as being both
consciousness and a non-conscious object? If the nature of presence is such
that consciousness of a table, for instance, requires that consciousness in some
sense be that table, what more difficulty is involved in saying that the body-foritself is consciousness and the body-for-others is that same thing as a nonconscious object? If an ordinary object like a table can be both a non-conscious
object and the consciousness that is present to it, why is it problematic to say
that the body is both, as well?
It should be noted that consciousness being an object it is present to does
not mean it is that same object when it is not present to it, but Sartre seems to
say that consciousness is always the body-for-others even when it is not an
object of consciousness. When one is present to a table, for instance, it may be
necessary to in some sense be that table, but it is not necessary to still be that
table when consciousness is then present to another object such as a chair. By
saying that consciousness is the body due to the body being consciousness’s
facticity, it would seem that consciousness for Sartre is always the body-forothers that is equated with the body-for-itself, even when the former is not an
object of consciousness. Still, though, this difference does not show how treating
the body as both in-itself and for-itself is any more problematic than the previous
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chapter’s treatment of consciousness’s in-itself objects as in some sense being
consciousness.
In fact, it seems one could have a similar understanding of how both an
object and the body can be for-itself consciousness and in-itself object. I will
argue in the next chapter that the best way to understand consciousness as both
being and not being either its object or its body is to treat consciousness as a
particular sort of state of affairs (or a fact or event), a state of affairs that is not an
additional particular thing other than its constituents but that is still not the same
thing as those constituents. So, by treating consciousness as in some sense
being its object, Sartre could be taken as meaning that consciousness is just the
state of affairs of the appearance of objects along with their various indications.
As already noted, this is how the purely phenomenological position understands
Sartre. Similarly, by treating consciousness as being its body, Sartre could mean
that it is just the state of affairs of consciousness’s facticity being transcended
toward its correlative objects. This would be the previously-mentioned
correlational position on Sartre.

As constituents of a state of affairs,

consciousness’s objects or its body would in some sense be other than yet the
same as the state of affairs that includes each. All of this requires and will
receive further consideration, but it shows that although the two positions differ
on what state of affairs is consciousness, they offer similar accounts of how
something can be both in-itself object and for-itself consciousness.
Despite this similarity in how consciousness’s objects and its body can be
both for-itself and in-itself, Sartre treats the body as different from any other
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object of consciousness. The body-for-others is consciousness that is captured
by another consciousness’s awareness of it, a capture that occurs by the other’s
awareness of one’s body as an object. Sartre notes this in the following account
of one’s awareness of the other, an awareness like the other’s awareness of
one’s own consciousness:
…the Other’s body is his facticity…as it is revealed to my
facticity….This facticity is precisely what the Other exists-in and
through his for-itself; it is what the Other perpetually lives in
nausea as a non-positional apprehension of a contingency which
he is, as a pure apprehension of self as a factual existence….The
Other’s for-itself wrenches itself away from this contingency and
perpetually surpasses it. But in so far as I transcend the Other’s
transcendence, I fix it….This body of the Other is given to me as
the pure in-itself of his being-an in-itself among in-itselfs, and one
which I surpass toward my possibilities….The Other is…given to
me as a body in situation.231
Since the body-for-others is one’s body in so far as it is an object of awareness
for consciousness, it would seem that Sartre’s claims here about the Other’s
body and one’s awareness of it would equally apply to the body-for-others. What
one sees here is that even though the body-for-others is an object among other
objects, it is an object ‘in situation.’ This seems to show that the body-for-others
is a special kind of object. Indeed, Sartre explicitly states that the body-for-others
is a conscious object. Note the following:
Being-for-itself must be wholly body and it must be wholly
consciousness; it can not be united with a body. Similarly beingfor-others is wholly body; there are no ‘psychic phenomena’ there
to be united with the body. There is nothing behind the body. But
the body is wholly ‘psychic.’232
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The body-for-others thus seems different from an ordinary object of
consciousness like a table, for instance. For whatever Sartre means by saying
that the body-for-others is ‘psychic,’ one would surely not say that about
something like a table.
Does this offer another explanation of how the body can be both
consciousness and in-itself object? For starters, it should be noted that any
significant distinction between the body-for-others and other objects seems
challenged by Sartre’s insistence that the body-for-others is in some respect just
another object. He notes for the body that “(e)ither it is a thing among other
things, or else it is that by which things are revealed to me. But it can not be both
at the same time.”233 The body as that by which things are revealed to me is the
body-for-itself, so the body-for-others seems to be the body as a thing among
other things. This does not suggest some special feature of the body-for-others
that would make it different from a non-conscious object.
But we have already seen that Sartre does treat the body-for-others as a
special kind of object. So what makes the body-for-others so special? As seen
above, the body-for-others, unlike other objects, is indicated by other objects as a
facticity.234 This means that the body-for-others is indicated as being surpassed
toward other objects. The body-for-others is the same type of thing as another
consciousness’s body in its appearance to me,235 and the other’s
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body is indicated by objects as another center of reference other than the bodyfor-itself. This awareness of the other’s body is thus “a certain arrangement of
the instrumental things of my world inasmuch as they indicate in addition a
secondary center of reference which is in the midst of the world and which is not
me.”236 So, objects not only indicate my body as that which they are beyond, but
they also indicate another object, the other’s body, as something they are
beyond.
Before examining whether this point explains how the body can be both
for-itself and in-itself, it should be noted that this treatment of the body-for-others
seems potentially problematic for Sartre’s account of the body-for-itself. As I
noted above, one way to understand how the body-for-itself is different from
other indicated things is that the body-for-itself is indicated by each and every
object of consciousness as having been ‘already there.’ Sartre, though, seems
to say that the other’s body is also indicated by each and every object of
consciousness, and surely such a body is also indicated as ‘already there.’ Thus
Sartre’s claim that “it is the Other-as-body whom things indicate by their lateral
and secondary arrangements. The fact is that I actually do not know instruments
which do not refer secondarily to the Other’s body.”237
Sartre here distinguishes the body-for-itself from the other’s body by
means of the other’s body being indicated by each and every instrument (I will
examine shortly whether this is a difference from each and every object) in a
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secondary way, whereas the body-for-itself is presumably indicated by each and
every object in some primary way. But what is the difference between the other’s
body being indicated secondarily and the body-for-itself being indicated
primarily? One difference offered by Sartre is that the indications of the body-foritself are indications which are “constitutive of the indicating thing,” whereas the
indications of the other’s body are only “lateral properties of the object.”238 This
seems to be a reference to the previously-mentioned point that an object is
necessarily located in some position relative to the body-for-itself. Thus the fact
that a glass, for instance, must appear either to the right or to the left of a
decanter. But why is the glass being to the right of the decanter in relation to the
body-for-itself, for instance, constitutive of the glass, whereas the glass being to
the left of the decanter in relation to the other’s body is only a ‘lateral property’ of
it? His reason cannot be that only some objects, at least instruments, indicate
the other’s body, in contrast to all objects, or at least instruments, indicating the
body-for-itself. Recall his earlier claim that all instruments indicate the other’s
body. Indeed, this indication of the other’s body might seem as much a part of
an object as does its indication of the body-for-itself. If all instruments indicate
the other’s body as well as the body-for-itself, then a glass being to the right of
the decanter for the body-for-itself might seem no more essential to it than its
being to the left of the decanter for the other’s body.
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Furthermore, it does not seem that the other’s body is only indicated by all
instruments as opposed to all objects. The reason for this is that all objects of
consciousness are also instruments:
…the body….is the immediate presence to the For-itself of
“sensible” things in so far as this presence indicates a center of
reference and is already surpassed either toward the appearance
of a new this or toward a new combination of instrumental-things.239
Thus an object of consciousness not only indicates a surpassed point of view, or
‘center of reference,’ but it also indicates something else that such an object
would be surpassed toward. A glass of water, for instance, not only indicates
one’s body in front of it, but it also indicates itself in the future as having been
drunk from as well. Since an instrument is the means by which one achieves
some end or goal, or what Sartre describes as something “’able to be surpassed
toward--,’”240 then all objects being surpassed toward some other object or
objects seems to make instruments out of them. So one cannot distinguish the
other’s body from the body-for-itself by saying that all instruments, but not all
objects, indicate the former while all instruments and objects indicate the latter. It
seems that all instruments and thus all objects indicate both the body-for-itself as
well as the other’s body.
It should be noted that even if some objects did not indicate the other’s
body, that would still not differentiate the other’s body from both forms of the
body-for-itself. As mentioned above, the body-for-itself is both a point of view
and a point of departure. As a point of view, the body-for-itself does not appear
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but is indicated by each and every object of consciousness. As a point of
departure, though, the body-for-itself does appear as an object or arrangement of
objects that one surpasses toward another object or arrangement of objects.
Since one’s point of departure is an appearing “object,” this means that it is an
object rather than what is indicated by that object. After all, it would seem odd to
say that an object is indicated by itself. The body as point of departure, then, is
not indicated by each and every object, so that the body-for-itself, at least as
point of departure, can not be distinguished from the other’s body by means of
every object being constituted, at least in part, by its indication of the body as
point of departure but not of the other’s body. Explaining how indication of the
body-for-itself as point of view is constitutive of objects would, at least so far, not
explain how the body-for-itself as point of departure differs from the other’s body.
Still, perhaps one could distinguish the body-for-itself as point of view from
the other’s body by means of the fact that the indications of the body as point of
view occur in some sense prior to the indications of the other’s body. I have
already noted that both of these forms of the body are indicated by all objects of
consciousness, but perhaps a prior indication of the body as point of view would
make it fundamental to what an object is in a way that indication of the other’s
body is not. Perhaps an object’s indication of the body as point of view somehow
establishes what an object is and thus enables it to then indicate other things like
the other’s body. If so, that would make sense of Sartre’s claim that the
indications of the body-for-itself are constitutive of an object while the indications
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of the other’s body are merely “lateral properties” of it. This would be contrary to
the previous claim that both indications might seem equally essential to objects.
Indeed, Sartre seems to demonstrate this priority of indications in his
description of “the Look.” “The Look” is the transformation of consciousness into
an in-itself object in the midst of the world, a transformation brought about by
another consciousness becoming aware of one.241 The earlier quoted claim
about one ‘fixing’ another consciousness as an object is an example of one
subjecting another consciousness to “the Look.” In an example of one being
subjected to “the Look,” Sartre imagines one getting caught while eavesdropping.
At first, one is totally engrossed in what one is doing. While looking through a
keyhole, one’s consciousness is “a pure process of relating the instrument (the
keyhole) to the end to be attained (the spectacle to be seen), a pure mode of
losing myself in the world….”242 But suddenly, one hears footsteps from behind
and realizes that another person is looking at one. This realization brings on a
particular sort of self-awareness, and this self-awareness involves a
consciousness of myself as existing on the level of objects in the world. This
encounter with what Sartre calls the “other as subject” precedes one’s encounter
with the other as object, or the other’s body, meaning that “the Other exists for
me first and I apprehend him in his body subsequently. The Other’s body is for
me a secondary structure.”243 As already noted, the latter encounter with the
other’s body also entails the indication of the other’s body by objects of
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consciousness. This means that one’s awareness of objects prior to one’s
encounter with the other as subject in “the Look,” an encounter that occurs prior
to one’s encounter with the other’s body and the consequent indications of that
body, is an awareness of objects prior to those objects’ indications of the other’s
body. Such a prior awareness of objects, however, no matter how pure and
involved, must still include the indication of the body-for-itself as point of view by
those objects.
As already noted, Sartre claims that objects must be located in some
fashion in relation to one’s body, that “(i)n each project of the For-itself, in each
perception the body is there.”244 In Sartre’s eavesdropping example, then, no
matter how absorbed one may be in looking through it, the keyhole in some
sense appears as in front of one’s body, thus indicating it. The absence of such
locating of objects “would result in the total disappearance of ‘thises’ at the heart
of a primitive indistinction.”245 These ‘thises,’ then, that subsequently indicate the
other’s body, seem to be what they are due to their indications of the body-foritself as point of view, indications that are prior to and thus without their
indications of the other’s body. Hence Sartre’s claim that objects’ indications of
the body-for-itself are constitutive of the object while their indications of the
other’s body are merely “lateral properties” of them. Even though all objects
indicate both the body-for-itself as point of view and the other’s body, the priority
of indication distinguishes the indications of the former from the indications of the
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latter. In fact, such priority might explain Sartre’s claim that the other does not
appear out of ontological necessity but is rather “impossible to deduce from the
ontological structures of the for-itself.”246
Let us now return to the question that led to this discussion of the
difference between these two types of indications. Does Sartre’s treatment of the
body-for-others as a facticity provide an explanation of how the body can be both
for-itself consciousness and in-itself object? Although consciousness originates
as a particular sort of “effort” on the part of an in-itself being in Sartre’s
metaphysical explanation, that explanation does not lead Sartre to the
conclusion that, as a conscious being, one simply is (in the mode of being-initself) an in-itself being. We may see this reflected in his discussion of
consciousness of the other’s body. One’s awareness of the other’s body as
being in situation, as being surpassed toward other objects, recognizes that the
in-itself being of the other’s body has in some sense transcended itself. As
Sartre notes, in one’s awareness of the other “I apprehend this transcendence in
the world.”247 Sartre’s treatment of the body-for-others as consciousness thus
does not make the obvious mistake of failing to recognize the occurrence of such
self-transcendence. It does, however, make a transcending for-itself being into
an in-itself being, and it does so while simultaneously treating it as still being foritself consciousness. Sartre notes this when saying that “…the Other…appears
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to me as a transcendence-transcended.”248 So the problem is not simply how an
in-itself being could first become a for-itself being and then become an in-itself
being again. Indeed, such a sequence of transformations is how Sartre
describes the movement from birth to death.249 That sequence, however, does
not necessitate any treatment of the for-itself as also being an in-itself object over
the same span of time. Sartre’s claims about the body-for-others, though, seem
like such a treatment.
We cannot solve this problem simply by claiming that the body-for-others
is the facticity of one’s consciousness, so that treating the body-for-others as initself object is simply treating one’s facticity as an in-itself being. Although (in the
metaphysical context) one’s facticity was originally an in-itself being, it is
transcended in the failed attempt of consciousness at self-foundation. In one
sense then it is an in-itself being, namely, in the sense of it being an in-itself
being that has become a for-itself being. But that just shows that consciousness
is a modification of an in-itself being, not that consciousness is still what it would
be, namely self-identical, without that modification. As such a modification, it
does not seem that consciousness can also be a being without that modification.
In any case, as one should remember, the notion of “facticity” in the specific
sense of the body-for-itself is introduced by Sartre solely in phenomenological
terms, not in terms of the metaphysical account that allowed him to speak of
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facticity as the in-itself being remaining “at the heart of” the for-itself as an upshot
of the failed attempt in question.
Perhaps, though, Sartre’s treatment of the body-for-others as an object of
another consciousness shows that one cannot simply equate objects with in-itself
beings. I suggested earlier that Sartre treats the body-for-others as a conscious
object, and perhaps any difficulty we have with that treatment is simply due to the
assumption that an object just is an in-itself being. Typical examples of objects,
such as tables, chairs, glasses, decanters, trees, etc., are obviously self-identical
in-itself beings, but that does not mean that all objects are such. Is there any
reason not to treat the body-for-others as both an object and a for-itself being?
Indeed, one might say that being an object simply means being that which
appears to consciousness with a certain level of distinction or separation from
consciousness, rather than meaning that which is an instance of the in-itself.
Consciousness is only non-positionally aware of itself, whereas it is positionally
aware of objects. This seems to correspond with the body-for-itself being
indicated without ever appearing while the body-for-others does appear to
(another) consciousness.

So indication without appearance seems to involve

some sort of distinction or separation of consciousness from itself, but less
separation from consciousness than does its appearance to itself as an object.
So perhaps one can say that this makes the appearing body-for-others an object
but not an in-itself being.
Wider seems to support this suggestion in her article “Hell and the Private
Language Argument: Sartre and Wittgenstein on Self-Consciousness, the Body,
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and Others.”250 Wider there claims that for Sartre another consciousness is
necessary for one to achieve full self-consciousness, since one can never
sufficiently detach oneself from oneself in order to fully view oneself. So, she
states, “(i)t is necessary for me to be body for the Other to be able to look at me
and thus to establish my objectivity. Without this experience of my objectivity, I
could never learn to ‘look at myself’ from the outside so to speak, as if I were
another.”251 This seems to treat something’s status as an object as a function of
its mode of appearance, since one’s objectivity is a consequence of the Other
being able to look at one. Indeed, one might expect Sartre to determine
something’s mode of being by its mode of appearance, given his praise of
modern thought for “reducing the existent to the series of appearances which
manifest it.”252 If this line of thought is correct, then, the body-for-others is an
object due to its appearance and it is a for-itself being due to its transcendence of
its in-itself being.
Before moving on, a brief summary of what has been established so far in
this discussion is in order. This second understanding of consciousness both
being and not being its past seems to follow from consciousness’s past
somehow being part of what its faciticity is, given that consciousness both is and
is not its facticity (as discussed in Chapter One and Chapter Two).
Consciousness’s past can be seen as its facticity if one in some sense equates
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the past with the body and then equates the body with facticity. Consciousness’s
facticity can be seen as the body if one sees that the indication of the surpassed
body seems to be necessary for something to be an object for consciousness.
The body indicated by objects of consciousness is both what consciousness is as
well as an object for another consciousness. Being such an object does not
make the body a self-identical in-itself being, it simply means that the body
appears as sufficiently distinct from another consciousness, thus enabling an
access to the body only available to another consciousness.
With these conclusions about the body and its connection to
consciousness’s object in hand, let us see if they can help solve a potential
problem with the last chapter’s claim that consciousness is in some sense
nothing more than its object. Such an understanding of consciousness would
seem to lend itself to what one may call the ‘no content’ view of consciousness.
This view states that consciousness does not contain anything like private
experiences or appearances, since consciousness is not simply always the
consciousness of something, but it also exhausts itself in its transcendence to its
object. Sartre expressly endorses the ‘no content’ view when he states that
“consciousness has no ‘content.’ We must renounce those neutral ‘givens’
which…find their place either ‘in the world’ or ‘in the psyche.’ A table is not in
consciousness-not even in the capacity of a representation.”253 This would be
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exactly what one would expect if consciousness is (and is not) its object, with
nothing to have or contain some representation or appearance of the object.
A problem with this view, however, is that Sartre seems to accept the
notion of private appearances in the following:
The grass is something qualified; it is this green grass which exists
for the Other; in this sense the very quality of the object, its deep,
raw green is in direct relation to this man. This green turns toward
the Other a face which escapes me. I apprehend the relation of the
green to the Other as an objective relation, but I cannot apprehend
the green as it appears to the Other.254
This acceptance of private appearances seems to mean that there is something
more to consciousness of an object than just that object, since one can
experience the object of the other’s consciousness (in the above quote, the
grass), but not that object’s appearance to the other (the grass as it appears to
the other). The object and its appearance to the other thus seem distinct. It
stands to reason then that the object of one’s own consciousness and the
appearance of that object are distinct as well. But how then is consciousness of
an object nothing more than that object? Moreover, how can Sartre claim that
consciousness has no contents?
Adrian Mirvish offers an account of Sartre that explains how there can be
private appearances despite Sartre’s claim about consciousness having no
content. In his article “Sartre and the Gestaltists: Demystifying (Part of) Being
and Nothingness,”
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Mirvish argues that Sartre was objecting to the
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Introspectionist school of psychology when he denied that consciousness has
any ‘givens’ in it that would constitute its contents. According to that school, what
one experiences are not actual objects in an external world, but rather distinct,
atomic sensations in the mind. These sensations are caused by the smallest
perceptible stimulations of one’s sense organs.

Objects are nothing but

combinations of these sensations, so that one never actually experiences
anything in the external world, but rather only encounters the private contents of
one’s mind.256
The problem for Sartre with this account of our experience of objects is
that it relies upon us being able to experience objective, external reality in order
to arrive at its notion of private sensations.

Introspectionists rely upon

experiments with physical sense organs, like the eyes, to see how their
composition can explain our experience of the external world. Such experiments
suggest that the eye is like a camera, producing images based upon its
stimulation by external matters. These images are thus not anything external to
one, but are rather simply one’s own private experience. But the experimenter
must assume that what she is observing in her experiment about the sense
organs is more than just her private sensations, but rather are actual sense
organs in the external world with their stimulation by external matters. The
psychologist thus inconsistently assumes our access to objective, external reality
in order to establish our experience of nothing but purely private sensations. Her
conclusions undermine the basis for those conclusions.

256

Ibid, pp. 210-211.

135

As Sartre states,

“(s)ensation supposes that man is already in the world since he is provided with
sense organs, and it appears to him as the pure cessation of his relations with
the world.” 257

Mirvish claims that Sartre was rejecting the position that

consciousness contains such sensations when Sartre described consciousness
as having no contents.
This claim is significant since it allows for something else besides
sensations as a content of consciousness. This something else for Mirvish are
appearances that necessarily involve reference to an external world and external
objects in that world. Mirvish notes how the Gestalt school of psychology offers
an account of experience that involves such a reference to external reality, and
he further notes how that school mirrors Sartre’s objections to the notion of
private, atomic sensations. Both Sartre and Gestalt psychology do not think that
one’s actual experience of objects can be constructed out of the combination of
supposedly more basic sensations, and they both claim that one experiences
objects as synthetic totalities with an essential reference to the external world.258
Mirvish offers the following quotes as evidence of Sartre’s agreement with the
Gestalt school on the nature of experience:
…we do not encounter anywhere anything which is given as purely
felt, as experienced for me without objectivation. Here as always I
am conscious of the world, and on the ground of the world I am
conscious of certain transcendent objects.259
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…in no case do we get out of an existing world….we might show
that what is called…the specificity of the senses is referred back to
pure determinations of objects as such.260
…an object must always appear to me all at once…, but…this
appearance always takes place in a particular perspective which
expresses its relations to the ground of the world….261
These passages, along with Sartre’s earlier quoted claim about appearances of
objects to the other (“This green turns toward the Other a face which escapes
me.”) suggest for Mirvish appearances of objects to consciousness, appearances
which are distinct from although necessarily indicative of transcendent objects in
an external world.

Mirvish thus would not agree with an account of

consciousness as nothing but its object.
One problem for Mirvish’s account of Sartre is that it posits an
intermediary between consciousness and its objects, a positing which Sartre
clearly rejects. As already noted in Chapter Three, Sartre treats the presence of
consciousness to what it is consciousness of as an internal negation of
consciousness’s object, a relationship between consciousness and what it is of
that involves consciousness in some sense being that which it is of. This means
that consciousness, although not identical with its object, is not some separate
being other than its object. Thus Sartre’s claim:
…the term of origin of the internal negation is the in-itself, the thing
which is there, and outside of it there is nothing except an
emptiness, a nothingness which is distinguished from the thing
only by a pure negation for which this thing furnishes the very
content.262
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Since all that exists with consciousness of an object is that object and
nothingness, it would not seem that an appearance of an object, being distinct
from an object and being a something contained by consciousness, is included in
Sartre’s ontology. Also, aside from any notion of consciousness in some sense
being its object, Sartre’s claim that consciousness has no content would not
seemingly allow for Mirvish’s appearances.
But what about Sartre’s point about grass appearing to another
consciousness in a way that it does not appear to one’s own consciousness?
Sartre may deny in certain passages that anything other than an object exists in
consciousness of that object and renounce any content for consciousness, but
Mirvish’s point seems to be that this does not cohere with Sartre’s treatment of
the grass’s appearance to the other. Hence Mirvish’s attempt to reconcile these
seemingly incompatible aspects of Sartre by suggesting that Sartre was merely
rejecting sensations as contents of consciousness, not all possible contents of
consciousness. As just noted, though, Sartre seems to clearly reject anything as
a content of consciousness. How can one reconcile that with his talk of
appearances of objects to another consciousness?
The first step in such a reconciliation is realizing that objects of
consciousness for Sartre are really the “synthetic unity” of their appearances.263
By this he means that “(t)he phenomenal being…is nothing but the well-
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connected series of its manifestations,” 264 and each appearance of an object
“refers to the total series of appearances.”265 These appearances, though, are
not contents of the mind, but are rather transcendent of consciousness.

As

already noted, Sartre claims that all consciousness is consciousness of
something, and whatever it is conscious of is transcendent of consciousness.266
So, in claiming that grass, for example, appears differently to another than it does
to me, such difference could just be due to one of the appearances that
constitutes the object that is grass appearing to the other while another such
appearance appears to me. Thus the grass can appear larger, for instance, to
one examining it closely than it does to one looking at it from a distance. Such
different appearances, though, do not necessitate any private appearances,
since all appearances are transcendent of consciousness, nor is anything other
than an object required to explain such difference, since the object that is the
grass is simply the synthetic totality of its appearances. There is thus nothing
needed other than the object of consciousness, nor is there any need for any
contents of consciousness.
But this appeal to transcendent objects’ identity with their appearances
does not solve the problem of one not having access to what appears to the
other. Sartre’s quote about the appearance of the grass to the other states that
one cannot apprehend the grass as it appears to another. How can this be if
what appears to consciousness are transcendent appearances that constitute
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objects? If appearances are transcendent of consciousness, it would seem that
any consciousness could be aware of what appears to any other consciousness.
Perhaps an explanation of this is possible by means of this chapter’s appeal to
facticity, and thus the body, as constitutive of what an object is. As noted earlier,
Sartre treats an object for consciousness as indicating or reflecting the facticity of
consciousness, and one can see such reflected facticity as an aspect of
consciousness’s object. Perhaps, then, an object appears differently to another
than it does to me because that object indicates the other’s facticity, or body, to
the other, and that indication is constitutive of what that object is. An object for
my consciousness is constituted by its indication of my facticity instead.

By

indicating different facticities, or bodies, to different consciousnesses, objects can
appear differently to different consciousnesses without having to resort to
appearances of objects as entities that somehow occupy consciousness.
Contrary to Mirvish, then, one can thus maintain that consciousness is not a
container of appearances of its object.
This appeal to an object’s indication of the body as somehow constitutive
of that object might, however, pose a problem. If an object appears differently to
different consciousnesses because it indicates different bodies, and if such
indications are constitutive of that object, then it seems that two consciousnesses
would never encounter the same object. If an object is what it is due to its
indication of a particular facticity, then its indication of two different facticities
would make it two different things. Perhaps one could avoid this difficulty by
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claiming an essential element common to the object in all of its indications of
different bodies, thus making indications of the body a necessary but not entirely
determinative condition of an object.

Indeed, Sartre’s previously mentioned

example of a glass appearing in some position relative to his body (right, left, in
front of, behind) seems to assume such an essential core, since he speaks of the
same glass being in some different position relative to another’s body. Thus the
necessity of an object’s different locations in relation to different bodies does not
seem to preclude there being the same object for different consciousnesses.
One can thus make sense of consciousness being nothing more than its object
even though one can not be aware of certain appearances to the other. Aside
from reconciling such inaccessible appearances with Sartre’s equation of
consciousness with its object, though, (an equation which I will ultimately reject in
Chapter Five), the constitution of objects by their indication of the body can
reconcile such private appearance with consciousness having no contents.
With this difficulty addressed, let us return to consciousness both being
and not being its past. Having already shown how consciousness’s facticity is its
body, the next step in understanding this interpretation of consciousness both
being and not being its past is explaining how the body is the past. As already
noted, the body is what consciousness surpasses in its awareness of objects.
So, objects not only indicate the body as a means of location, but they also
indicated the body as what was in some sense there before their appearance.
Since the indication of the body makes an object what it is, the surpassed body is
always there as what was before whatever one is aware of. It would thus seem
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that the body would always be indicated as what is past, thus possibly explaining
Sartre’s equation of the body with the past.
So, to return to the distinction drawn at the beginning of this chapter, there
are at least two ways of understanding how consciousness can both be and not
be its past for Sartre. The first way appeals to the nature of temporality and the
self-separation that it requires, while the second way appeals to the body as
surpassed toward consciousness’s objects. It is interesting to note that the first
way does not treat the past as what is transcended toward consciousness’s
objects, while the second way does. This might make the first way seemingly
unsuitable for the correlational treatment of consciousness, since that treatment
regards consciousness, and thus the past that it in some sense is, as related to
appearances by its self-transcendence toward appearances. I will address this
matter in Chapter Five. In any case, consciousness not being its past could once
again be treated as making it nothing, since it is not the very thing (its past) that it
is, the very thing that would make it something. Although anything would be
nothing by not being what it is, Sartre claims that only consciousness, and not initself objects, does not require some sort of external support in order to not be
the past that it is.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
CONSCIOUSNESS AS A STATE OF AFFAIRS
The fact that consciousness for Sartre both is and is not its objects as well
as its past and its body indicated by its objects may be taken to lead to the
conclusion that consciousness is a state of affairs (or an event or occurrence)
involving its objects and all that they indicate, but having no other constituents
besides. To begin with, at least, as noted in Richard Aquila’s article “Two
Problems of Being and Nonbeing in Sartre’s Being and Nothingness,”267 an event
or state of affairs in some way both is and is not the things constituting it. An
example illustrates this point about states of affairs. The state of affairs
consisting of my presence in a room involves certain particulars, namely, myself
and my room, as well as, perhaps, the relationship of being-present-in. These
particulars and that relationship, though, are not identical with the state of affairs
that is my presence in the room, even if one takes the particulars and the
relationship all together. The reason for this is that the particulars and the
relationship have to be in a certain order, namely of myself being present in the
room rather than the room being present in me. This ordering of the particulars
and the relationship is what the state of affairs is, so that the state of affairs is not
the same thing as the things it involves. It also, though, is not anything else
besides those things it involves, since the order of the particulars and the
relationship is just those things existing in a particular way. A state of affairs thus
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is and is not its constituents since it is nothing more than yet still is not the same
thing as its constituents, and this might then at least be taken as a start toward
the previous chapters’ claims that consciousness is in some sense the objects
and the past that it is not.
One might object that a state of affairs is dependent upon its constituents
but is still something additional to its constituents. A lightning bolt, for instance,
would be nothing without a certain set of conditions existing in the sky, such as
the charge of the particles in the air, since the lightning bolt would not occur
without such conditions. But that certainly does not show that a lightning bolt is
nothing other than those conditions. Indeed, a lightning bolt is a sudden addition
to any such conditions. Similarly, one might say that a state of affairs such as my
presence in a room would not exist without its constituents, but the state of affairs
could still be an additional, albeit dependent, thing with respect to its
constituents. Indeed, one could treat the constituents as the cause of the state of
affairs, much like the charge in the air is the cause of the lightning bolt. Such
treatment would certainly challenge any claim that a state of affairs is nothing
else besides its constituents, especially if one accepts Hume’s claim that “the
ideas of cause and effect are evidently distinct.”268
Although it is true that a state of affairs being nothing without its
constituents does not prove that it is nothing in addition to them, I do not think
that a state of affairs is merely a dependent yet distinct thing with regard to its
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constituents. Returning to the example of the state of affairs of my presence in a
room, that state of affairs is not simply an ordering of its constituents that is
brought into existence by those constituents, as an effect is brought about by its
cause, but rather that state of affairs is those constituents as ordered in a
particular way. Unlike an effect and its cause, there is no way to describe the
state of affairs that is my presence in a room without referring to the constituents
of that state of affairs. A state of affairs is just a way that its constituents exist, if
one will, and as such there is no additional entity in question beyond those
constituents. Consequently, a state of affairs is not something in addition to its
constituents, which, again, seems to make it similar to consciousness not being
something in addition to its objects and past.
One problem with this understanding of consciousness as a state of affairs
is how consciousness differs from other states of affairs that are not instances of
consciousness. Surely one can think of any number of states of affairs that
would not seem to be such instances, such as the state of affairs of a tree being
in a meadow, for example. Of course, an awareness or experience of such a
state of affairs would surely be an instance of consciousness, but such a state of
affairs without any awareness of it would not seem to be. Like consciousness,
such states of affairs do not seem to be the same thing as their constituents,
since they are not simply their constituents taken all together without regard for
any particular ordering of those constituents, but they do not seem to be anything
more than their constituents, since they are just their constituents ordered in a
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particular way. Consciousness must have something else to it, then, in order to
distinguish it from any and all other states of affairs.
One possible way of distinguishing consciousness from other states of
affairs is the suggestion that consciousness is not just a state of affairs but is also
a condition of possibility for all other states of affairs. Such a suggestion would
simply extend what Sartre claims about the role of consciousness in what he
calls “negatites,” or negative states of affairs, so that consciousness played such
a role with all states of affairs. According to Sartre, the reason that
consciousness is a condition of possibility for negatites is that such states of
affars, such as someone’s absence from a certain place or the distance between
two points,269 are “little pools of non-being”270 that require the existence of
nothingness at the heart of being. Being-in-itself, though, “does not contain
Nothingness as one of its structures,”271 so that there must be something besides
being-in-itself that “supports it (nothingness) in its being (parenthesis mine).”272
The reason for this is that, as already noted, Sartre claims that the in-itself simply
is and thus is not such that it is not something.273 In order to account for the
nothingness in negative states of affairs, then, Sartre has to appeal to something
as the support and source of this non-being. That something is consciousness.
The reason that nothingness requires a source according to Sartre is that
nothingness can not exist apart from being, but is rather dependent on being.
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According to Sartre, “nothingness is logically subsequent to (being) since it
opposes being in order to deny it (parenthesis mine).”274 In order for there to be
nothingness, there must be nothing of something. As Sartre notes, our everyday
sense of nothing always assumes a prior specification of being.275 For instance,
when one says that there is nothing in the refrigerator, one is meaning that there
is not anything desirable to eat there. That is, there is not a specific being or
beings there. The being that the nothingness “in” negative states of affairs
depends on, however, cannot be the beings-in-themselves that are the
constituents or ingredients of such states of affairs. For as just noted, what is initself simply is and is not such that it is not, so that the in-itself “does not contain
Nothingness as one of its structures.”276 So, whatever being conditions
nothingness by not being can not be the in-itself. In order for there to be
nothingness, then, “in” such states of affairs, it follows that “…there must exist a
Being… by which nothingness comes to things.”277 Nothingness must somehow
be a product of a very different sort of being from the in-itself, one which can in
its own right, by contrast, not be. In some sense, that being must obviously be,
since it is the being that this nothingness depends upon,278 but it must also
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somehow involve not being in its very being such that “it nihilates Nothingness in
its being in connection with its own being.279 For otherwise, just like the in-itself,
it could not be the source of the not being, or nothingness, “in” the negative
states of affairs that are encountered in the world. There must thus, Sartre
concludes, be a being which can both be and not be. Such a being “must be its
own Nothingness,”280 which seems to mean that it must be what it is not and thus
not be itself.
Sartre of course claims that the for-itself is the being which is not, and,
thus, not itself. In this respect, he particularly emphasizes the human behavior of
questioning. According to Sartre, questioning requires one to dissociate oneself
from being, to be outside the “causal series which constitutes being and which
can produce only being.”281 Whenever one questions, one realizes the possibility
of a negative reply. This possibility of negative reply, this possibility of the denial
of something, shows the existence of nothingness. The reason that the
questioner must have nothingness as part of her being, he argues, is that one
could not be in suspense, as it were, neither affirming nor denying the existence
of something, if one were simply part of the deterministic process of being-initself. The indeterminateness of the being questioned, its presentation as neither
being nor not being at the time of the question, requires the indeterminateness of
the questioner as neither affirming nor denying it. The
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questioner is thus the combination of being and nothingness that is
required for the existence of nothingness in the negative states of affairs that are
encountered in the world, since she must be in order to perform the act of
questioning with regard to the world, but she must also not be in order to avoid
being caused to either affirm or deny what is questioned. The for-itself is thus
that which both is and is not what it is; it is the being that is also a nothingness
as well as a source of nothingness (namely with respect to those negative states
of affairs that it encounters in the world).
Several problems exist with this reasoning by Sartre. For one thing, it
seems that simply abstaining from either affirming or denying whatever one is
questioning could just as easily be caused by the deterministic process of beingin-itself as could affirmation or negation. Using one of Sartre’s examples, if one
examines one’s carburetor with the question of what is wrong with it, one could
eventually discover that the answer is nothing,282 so one neither affirms nor
denies a problem with the part at the time of the question. It seems, though, that
the act of withholding judgment could be caused as easily as could the act of
judging that something is wrong with it. Even though, as noted in Chapter One
and Chapter Four, Sartre certainly affirms the freedom of consciousness and
wishes to avoid any deterministic cause for consciousness, there seems no
reason to conclude that the for-itself is exempt from the determinism of being-initself simply because of the suspension of judgment involved with questioning.
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Another problem has to do with the for-itself’s provision of the nothingness
found with negative states of affairs. Sartre concludes from the presence of
nothingness in the for-itself (established by, among other things, its ability to
question) and absence of nothingness from the in-itself that the nothingness
found in negative states of affairs must come from the for-itself. But how does
this nothingness get to states of affairs? One might answer this question by
reference to a point made in Chapter One’s discussion of temporality. According
to that discussion, Sartre claims that consciousness supplies the nothingness for
the temporality of objects by means of their reflection of the temporal nature of
consciousness. Could one then not also say that consciousness supplies the
nothingness for encountered negative states of affairs by their reflection of the
nothingness of consciousness as well? This notion of “reflection” might seem
more understandable if one recalls the suggestion from Chapter One that Sartre
is making purely phenomenological claims about things as they are experienced
by consciousness, rather than claims about things existing independently of
consciousness. This might suggest that experienced negatites are in some
sense dependent upon consciousness, and thus their ability to reflect the
nothingness of consciousness might make more sense.
However well the notion of reflection works as an explanation of how
consciousness provides nothingness for them, this appeal to Sartre’s
phenomenological focus as an explanation of consciousness’s provision of
nothingness for negative state of affairs seems problematic. In fact, the notion of
negative states of affairs as dependent on consciousness seems incompatible
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with Sartre’s phenomenological description of consciousness as consciousness
of something transcendent of it and “not supported by any existent different from
itself; it has its own being.”283 Even if one can show how this independence of
experienced negatites can fit with their being somehow dependent on
consciousness, simply noting Sartre’s phenomenological orientation does not
support such dependence on consciousness. It seems conceivable that one
could focus on how things appear to consciousness without having to conclude
that consciousness is the reason for how they appear, since consciousness
could encounter things that it has no role in constituting. In fact, Sartre seems to
embrace this view of consciousness when saying that “for consciousness there is
no being outside of that precise obligation to be a revealing intuition of
something….”284 So, Sartre’s phenomenological focus seemingly only shows
how consciousness reveals things rather than how it constitutes things. It would
not thus seem that such a focus would necessarily explain consciousness’s
provision of nothingness for negative states of affairs. Of course, one could just
take Sartre’s focus on how things appear to consciousness as simply meaning
that consciousness for him is somehow responsible for what it experiences, but
such treatment would be an unsupported position. It would also seem
incompatible with the fact that Sartre argues for consciousness’s provision of
nothingness for negative states of affairs based on the impossibility of the in-itself
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to make such a provision and the ability of conscious beings to perform the act of
questioning.
Returning to that argument, there is a further problem with it, beyond how
there is a ‘transferring’ of nothingness to negative states of affairs. As previously
noted, nothingness for Sartre is always the denial and non-existence of
something (as seen in the earlier example of there being nothing in the
refrigerator meaning there is not something, namely anything desirable to eat, in
the refrigerator). Consequently, he claims that nothingness requires support
from being. It would thus seem that the being that supports and is a condition of
possibility for nothingness is whatever nothingness is the non-existence of.
Since the for-itself is the supposed support of nothingness, nothingness would
then be the non-existence of the for-itself. But this does not explain the nonexistence of in-itself objects involved in negative states of affairs. (It should be
noted that my earlier example of there being nothing in the refrigerator is a
negative state of affair that involves the denial of in-itself objects.) What about
the non-existence of a chair, for instance, in the negative state of affairs that is
the chair not being the table? Must not the chair be the support of nothingness
since it is not being something? Although Sartre claims that negative states of
affairs originate from human acitivity and “indicate an aspect of being as it
appears to the human being who is engaged in the world,”285 in-itself objects are
often not something else in such states of affairs and thus seemingly support
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nothingness. This would exclude such objects from being-in-itself, though,
since they would no longer simply be but would then also be the nothingness that
they support. Sartre, though, certainly does not think that non-conscious objects
are nothing; only conscious beings are nothing. But there seems no reason
here why non-conscious objects would not be nothing, since nothingness is the
non-existence of something, and what is not something, in this case the objects
that are not other objects, is the support of nothingness. The fact that
nothingness is always the non-existence of something, rather than simply being
non-existence, is why Sartre claims that nothingness depends on being. It would
thus seem that non-conscious objects, not just consciousness, would be the
support of nothingness and thus, according to Sartre’s previously-mentioned
reasoning, would be nothingness.
One might suggest that Sartre simply meant that consciousness is its
object, so that non-conscious objects would be the support of nothingness since
they are nothingness-supporting consciousness. Identifying such “denied”
objects with consciousness would possibly make Sartre’s argument for the
latter’s provision of nothingness applicable to the former, as well. As I argued in
Chapter Three, Sartre does, after all, maintain that in some sense consciousness
is its object. So, if consciousness of a chair, for instance, is the same thing as a
chair, then consciousness being the support of nothingness means that the chair,
as consciousness, is such a support. As mentioned earlier, consciousness for
Sartre is nothingness since it supports nothingness, and nothingness is the
denial of something. So, perhaps one could say that this denial of something
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that constitutes the nothingness of consciousness just is the non-existence of the
chair by other objects not being the chair.
A possible problem with this suggestion is that no matter how closely one
wants to tie consciousness to its object(s), one can not identify consciousness
with its object(s). The reason for this is the already-mentioned separation
involved in the presence of consciousness to whatever it is consciousness of.
Presence to an object is a relationship with that object, so there must be a
distinction between what is present to an object and the object itself. Thus,
consciousness of a chair can never be a chair, meaning that one can not account
for a chair or any other object being the support of nothingness by appealing to
its identity with consciousness. One might respond, though, that
consciousness’s lack of identity with an object does not preclude it being its
object, since, as already noted, consciousness is what it is not. Consequently,
one might make sense of how something that is not consciousness (nonconscious objects which also are in some sense consciousness) could support
and thus be nothingness.
It would seem, though, that despite the non-existence of non-conscious
objects due to them not being other objects, such objects can not be the support
of nothingness. The reason for this is that, unlike consciousness, such objects
can not be the nothingness that they support. They are not their own
nothingness because they are not what they are not. A chair, for instance, is not
the table that it is not. By not being their own nothingness, they would have to
absurdly produce nothingness without actually being nothingness, an
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impossibility for Sartre since “(i)t would be inconceivable that a Being which is full
positivity should maintain and create outside itself a Nothingness….”286
Consciousness, on the other hand, is its own nothingness since, as noted in
Chapter Two, it is not itself by virtue of being present to and thus separate from
itself. It would thus seem that however much one ties consciousness to its
objects, there still remains a difference between the two. Unlike non-conscious
objects, then, consciousness is thus suited to be the condition of possibility for
nothingness.
One problem for all of this is that even if non-conscious objects are not
suited as the origin of nothingness, it would seem that any state of affairs, not
just those that are instances of consciousness, would be so suited. As
previously suggested, consciousness not being itself and thus being its own
nothingness could be due to it being a state of affairs that both is nothing more
than its constituents while still not being the same thing as its constituents. This
would seem to be the case for other states of affairs besides consciousness,
though, so they could seemingly originate nothingness, as well. If that is so, then
consciousness would not seem different from other states of affairs.
In any case, however problematic Sartre’s reasoning is, it should be noted
that it is a departure from a purely phenomenological approach to
consciousness. As stated in Chapter One, experience can not tell one that
consciousness, or anything else, must be a certain way in order for there to be
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something else, such as nothingness. But, according to Sartre, the
nothingness involved in negative states of affairs requires the existence of that
which is not itself, which is consciousness.
Furthermore, while the reasoning so far has only attempted to show
consciousness as a condition of possibility for negative states of affairs, Sartre’s
reasons for treating consciousness as necessary for negatites might actually
entail its necessity for any state of affairs. Aquila notes that Sartre “uses the
notion of a ‘negative’ state of affairs so broadly as to include virtually all states of
affairs.”287 For instance, Sartre claims that one’s apprehension of a line segment
from A to B involves an apprehension of nothingness if one distinguishes
between points A and B and views them in relation to one another.288 The
nothingness involved here is the fact that A is not B and vice versa, and the
apprehension of that fact differs from simply apprehending the line segment that
runs between those two points. The former apprehension seems to be of the
state of affairs that is A and B being distant from each other, while the latter
apprehension seems to be of an object, namely the line segment. As Aquila
states, the former is “seeing that A and B are distant from one another…,”289 and
such seeing involves presence to nothingness. Thus even the state of affairs of
A and B being distant from each other seems an example of “those little pools of
non-being”290 that are negative states of affairs, and this suggests that just about
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any state of affairs could be treated by Sartre as a negative one. After all, just
about any state of affairs involves constituents that are related to and thus
distinct from each other, and such distinction involves the non-being found in
negatites. Consequently, a treatment of consciousness as necessary for
negative states of affairs seems equivalent to simply treating it as necessary for
any state of affairs, at least for Sartre.
Although this attempt to distinguish consciousness from other states of
affairs that are not consciousness seemingly goes beyond the purely
phenomenological level, the treatment of consciousness as a state of affairs
might nevertheless in some ways seem a reduction of consciousness to the
phenomenological level of appearances. The reason for this is that Sartre’s
description of consciousness, noted in Chapter Three, as the internal negation of
an in-itself object or objects would seemingly suggest that consciousness is a
state of affairs involving such objects and nothing more. According to such a
suggestion, my consciousness of a table, for instance, would just be the fact that
the table appears and indicates various things like my body, my past, and other
phenomena that either already have or will appear. Consciousness would then
be only that which appears. One might object that if consciousness is the state
of affairs that involves appearing things, then it is something beyond that which
appears, but one must remember the earlier response to the objection that a
state of affairs might be a dependent yet still additional entity to its constituents.
As noted then, a state of affairs just is its constituents ordered in a certain way,
so that a treatment of consciousness as a state of affairs involving only its
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objects is not a treatment of it as anything additional to the appearing things
which constitute it.
All of this thus sounds like an embracing of Sartre’s previously-mentioned
option in Chapter One of just considering the phenomena and their combination
of the for-itself and the in-itself, as opposed to accepting “the ancient duality
‘consciousness-being.’”291 As noted in Chapter One, Sartre could possibly base
this combination of the two types of being on his metaphysical assertion that the
for-itself just is the in-itself attempting to found or cause itself, and possibly
based on this he thinks it is more profitable to reject the duality of the
experiencing and the experienced. As also noted in Chapter One, though, such
an attempt by the in-itself at self-foundation, or at anything else, would seem to
be an impossibility. On the other hand, the previous chapters seem to offer other
reasons for an exclusive regard for phenomena. While consciousness as selfconscious must be separated from itself, and so in some sense not be whatever
it is, presence to something also requires that what is present in some sense be
whatever it is present to. So consciousness must in some sense be the
indicating objects that it is present to. The fact that consciousness is both selfaware and present to something thus requires that it both not be and be
something, specifically its indicating objects. This seemingly leads to
consciousness being the state of affairs of objects appearing and indicating
various things that either have appeared (the past) or will appear, since such a
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state of affairs both is and is not the indicating appearances that constitute it.
Such a state of affairs thus is and is not consciousness’s objects, which makes it
consciousness.
Sartre’s seeming focus on the phenomenological and the treatment of
consciousness as a state of affairs involving the appearance of indicating
phenomena might thus seem like a rejection of any type of experiencing being
beyond the level of appearances. After all, if one reduces consciousness to the
phenomenological level of simply being the appearance of indicating objects,
what place is there for something beyond such appearances that is experiencing
those appearances? In fact, in many ways, Sartre’s treatment of consciousness
as nothing more than its objects might appear to be the equivalent of Hume’s
denial of any enduring, separate self or mind that perceives all of the contents of
such a mind.

According to Hume, “…(t)he mind is a kind of theatre, where

several perceptions successively make their appearance, pass, re-pass, glide
away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations.”292 Rather than
treating the mind as an additional entity to all of its perceptions, Hume says that
only perceptions exist. This certainly sounds similar to Sartre’s apparent denial
that consciousness is an additional entity to its appearing objects.
One possible difference between Sartre and Hume points out a potential
problem for a purely phenomenological reading of Sartre.

That difference is

Sartre’s claims, noted in the last chapter, that appearing phenomena always
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indicate the body and the past, both of which constitute the facticity that
consciousness is. One could perhaps see this claim by Sartre as nothing more
than an addition to Hume’s basic denial of the mind as something more than
what appears, an addition Sartre makes by simply noting a particular aspect of
appearances. Wider, though, treats Sartre’s difference from Hume as more than
that in the following quote from “A Nothing About Which Something Can Be Said:
Sartre and Wittgenstein on the Self:”
Although Sartre follows Hume in denying that there is a mental
subject of experience, a Cartesian ego, he does argue that the foritself while nothing still exists. It exists as something that does not
appear in the world. It is not therefore a nonworldly substance. But
it is something that cannot be apprehended in the world since it is
the necessary condition for the world’s existence, the center of the
world and its limit. This view of consciousness goes beyond a
simple Humean denial of a Cartesian self.293
I would suggest, based upon what has already been said in the previous chapter,
that this something that cannot be apprehended in the world is the body-for-itself
(specifically, as non-appearing point of view rather than as appearing point of
departure) and the past that consciousness is.

This indication by objects of

consciousness’s facticity poses a problem for any treatment of consciousness as
nothing more than its appearing objects, that problem being how consciousness
can just be its objects when it is also its body and its past. Despite Sartre’s
previously-cited claim in Chapter Three that consciousness of an object is an
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internal negation of an object that involves nothing more than that object, his
treatment of the indicated body and past seems in conflict with that.
One might further object that consciousness being its facticity not only
shows that consciousness is more than its object, but it also seems incompatible
with consciousness being any, or at least most, of its objects at all. Even if the
appearing object that is the body-for-others is the same thing as the nonappearing body-for-itself as point of view, every other object is certainly not the
same thing as the non-appearing body-for-itself. After all, the body-for-others is
just one object amongst many objects for consciousness. A table that is an
object of consciousness, for instance, hardly seems the same thing as the
indicated yet non-appearing body-for-itself. It might thus seem that
consciousness could at most be only one appearing object, the body-for-others,
and not any other object.
One might attempt to reconcile consciousness being nothing more than its
objects with it also being its facticity by treating consciousness as a state of
affairs distinct from the appearance of indicating objects, a state of affairs
involving its facticity. Perhaps, in particular, one could interpret Sartre as treating
consciousness as the state of affairs that is the self-transcendence of
consciousness’s facticity, so that consciousness would not then be anything
additional to its facticity even though it would also not be, as a state of affairs,
simply identical to the facticity that constitutes it. One could thus preserve the
notion that consciousness is nothingness due to its status as a state of affairs but
still maintain the position that consciousness is in some sense its facticity. Such
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an understanding of consciousness would seemingly be an example of the
previously-discussed correlational treatment of consciousness, since it equates
consciousness with something beyond appearances (the body-for-itself and the
past that comprise facticity), something that is somehow related to appearances,
the latter in turn “correlated” with the specific ways in which facticity is
transcended on any occasion.
There are several potential problems with this interpretation of Sartre.
First, the fact that consciousness as a state of affairs that is the transcendence of
facticity is arguably nothing more than its facticity does not seem to help us
explain how consciousness is also nothing more than its object, which of course
Sartre also seems to hold. The fact that consciousness for Sartre is an internal
negation of its object means that it is nothing more than its object, which
seemingly means that consciousness is in some sense its object. But how can
consciousness be its object if it is instead the state of affairs that is the
transcendence of facticity? As such a state of affairs, consciousness would
arguably be (and also not be) the facticity that constitutes (i.e., provides the sole
constituents of) that state of affairs. But how could it then be its object? Or, for
that matter, a state of affairs “constituted” (in the sense in question) by its object?
Another problem with the treatment of consciousness as the state of
affairs that is the transcendence of its facticity is Sartre’s previously-cited claim
that “it appears as the first necessity for…consciousness to be seen by itself.”294
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This is a problem since, as previously noted, the body-for-itself does not appear
but is rather indicated by what does appear. Since the body along with the past
are the facticity that consciousness is, it might seem that consciousness, as a
state of affairs constituted by its facticity, could not always appear and thus be
seen by itself. Although the appearing object that is the body-for-others is for
Sartre the same thing as the body-for-itself, the body-for-others is certainly not a
constantly appearing object. It is, instead, an occasional object of awareness.
Perhaps, though, one could say that consciousness being seen by itself
does not require the constant appearance of consciousness, just the constant
indication of consciousness as its facticity. As noted in the previous chapter,
Sartre claims such indication when noting how every object for consciousness is
somehow constituted by its reference to the body-for-itself. Indeed, one might
argue that the notion of a constantly appearing consciousness is untenable due
to the sort of reasons for Hume’s rejection of any idea of an enduring self. Those
reasons are found in the following passage:
But there is no impression constant and invariable. Pain and
pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed each
other, and never all exist at the same time. It cannot, therefore, be
from any of these impressions, or from any other, that the idea of
self is deriv’d; and consequently there is no such idea.295
Perhaps, then, Sartre’s fundamental claim that one is never merely conscious of
something, but rather one is always consciousness of being consciousness of
something,296 should be taken as meaning that consciousness of something is
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always consciousness of something that indicates consciousness’s facticity
(specifically, the body-for-itself as point of view and one’s past).

This

interpretation of Sartre’s claim has the additional benefit of offering a possible
explanation of the difference between self-awareness and object-awareness,
with self-awareness being the mere “indication” of and object-awareness being
the actual appearance of what one is aware of. In any case, regardless of that
explanation’s plausibility, it would seem that one could indeed treat the constant
indication of the body-for-itself and of one’s past as the necessary selfawareness of consciousness on which Sartre insists. And of course the equation
of consciousness with a state of affairs constituted by its facticity would seem
compatible with such insistence.
Still, any ability of consciousness as non-appearing (but always indicated)
facticity to witness itself does not eliminate the previously-mentioned problem of
consciousness being both its facticity as well as the internal negation of, and thus
nothing more than, its object. Perhaps, though, one can explain Sartre’s claims
that consciousness is (and is not) its objects simply by a desire on his part to
avoid problems he saw with a correlational treatment of consciousness, problems
that possibly motivated him to embrace a purely phenomenological
understanding of consciousness. As noted in Chapter One, Sartre rejects
Husserl’s notion that what one experiences and perceives, the noema, is simply
a correlate of conscious activity, or the noesis. According to Sartre, “Husserl
defines consciousness as a transcendence…But from the moment he makes of
the noema an unreal, a correlate of the noesis, a noema whose esse is percipi,
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he is totally unfaithful to his principle.”297 As one commentator notes, “…for
Sartre…Husserl’s suspending, or bracketing, of existence does indeed rob the
world of its richness.”298 So, Sartre sees Husserl as unfaithful to his principle
because Sartre treats consciousness’s transcendence to what it is of as implying
the independent existence of what it is of.
Sartre’s treatment of the phenomena that appear to consciousness
certainly seems to make them more than Husserl’s allegedly unreal noema. For
Sartre, the phenomena have a certain independence from consciousness.
Sartre shows this in the following passage from his Introduction:
…the being of the phenomenon, although coextensive with the
phenomenon, can not be subject to the phenomenal conditionwhich is to exist only in so far as it reveals itself- and…
consequently it surpasses the knowledge which we have of it and
provides the basis for such knowledge.299
The phenomena are thus not dependent upon consciousness the way a mere
correlate of consciousness would be. Still, as noted in Chapter One, Sartre
continues to maintain that “(r)elative the phenomenon remains, for ‘to appear’
supposes in essence somebody to whom to appear.”300 Can one simply take this
to mean that the relativity of the phenomena is just phenomena’s need for
consciousness in order to be appearances, not phenomena’s need for
consciousness in order to simply be? Sartre seems to say as much when he
notes that “the in-itself has no need of the for-itself in order to be; the ‘passion’ of
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the for-itself only causes there to be in-itself. The phenomenon of in-itself is an
abstraction without consciousness but its being is not an abstraction.”301 Since
being-in-itself is for Sartre the being of the phenomena,302 this passage shows
that the phenomena do not need consciousness in order to be. This may seem
odd since it would seem just as impossible for the phenomena to not appear as it
is for a bachelor to be married, so that the phenomena would not seem capable
of existing without appearing, thus needing to appear to consciousness in order
to be. Regardless of Sartre’s consistency regarding this matter, though, he
seemingly differs from Husserl on the dependency of what appears upon what it
appears to.
With this emphasis upon the phenomena’s independence in mind,
perhaps one can understand why Sartre seemingly embraces the purely
phenomenological position mentioned in Chapter One and throughout the
subsequent chapters. If the phenomena present themselves as robustly
independent, then they are not like Descartes’ experienced ideas, for instance,
which are in the mind and are nothing but certain modes of or manners of
existing for the mind.303 With Sartre’s phenomena having no seeming need of
anything else, then it might seem natural for him to describe consciousness of
objects (which are presented by means of a series of appearing phenomena304)
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as a state of affairs that is an internal negation of in-itself objects, consisting of
such objects and seemingly nothing more than them. As already quoted in
Chapter Three, Sartre’s description of consciousness as an internal negation of
an in-itself object involves a seemingly exclusive focus upon the appearing initself beings:
In short the term-of-origin of the internal negation is the in-itself, the
thing which is there, and outside of it there is nothing except an
emptiness, a nothingness which is distinguished from the thing only
by a pure negation for which this thing furnishes the very content.305
Given all of this, one could certainly be tempted to treat consciousness as
nothing but the fact that phenomena appear and indicate other phenomena in
various ways.
As already noted, though, Sartre also treats consciousness as its facticity.
So a purely phenomenological understanding of consciousness in terms of its
appearing objects would seem untenable. And have we not also seen that a
correlational treatment of consciousness-where the fact of phenomena appearing
is a mere “noematic” correlate of particular ways in which facticity is transcended
on any occasion-is likewise untenable, given Sartre’s claim that consciousness
as the internal negation of its objects is such objects and nothing more? But
perhaps more can be said in favor of the correlation treatment.
Perhaps it can at least do justice to Sartre’s claims about consciousness by
showing that facticity contributes precisely to the necessarily independent
appearance of appearing objects. As noted in Chapter One, Husserl treats
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consciousness as somehow transcending hyletic material in order to be
conscious of the appearing noema.

Sartre rejects Husserl’s notion of the hyle

because “we can not conceive how consciousness can transcend this subjective
toward objectivity.”306 Regardless of how problematic such a move from the
subjective to the objective may or may not be for Husserl, Sartre can in fact give
a role to facticity similar to what Husserl gives to his hyle. All he needs to deny is
that it involves any move from the subjective to the objective. The reason for this
is that facticity is not subjective for Sartre, but rather it is the in-itself being that
attempted to found itself and “is” thus consciousness.307 As noted in Chapter
One, one can treat Husserl’s hyle as either surpassed by consciousness to its
object or as in some sense even “constitutive” of its object. Similarly, Sartre
claims that consciousness transcends facticity (which amounts to it transcending
itself) in its awareness of its objects,308 and, as noted in Chapter Four, he also
treats facticity as in some sense constitutive of consciousness’s objects. But the
important thing to see is that this constitution of objects by in-itself faciticity could
then in turn help account for the necessarily independent nature of what appears
to consciousness, at least precisely as it appears to consciousness. So, for
instance, the fact that an object such as a table appears to the left of one’s initself body and as subsequent to other appearing objects, also located in relation
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to one’s body, would necessarily make such an object present itself as in some
sense having the very same sort of in-itself status as one’s in-itself body. (And
the same would of course go for the in-itself status of the past in general.) In
fact, Sartre’s venture beyond phenomenology when saying both that facticity
impossibly attempts to cause itself and that consciousness is (and is not) a past
that, unlike the body, is not indicated as surpassed by its objects (as mentioned
in Chapter Four), may be regarded as attempts on his part to treat facticity as
more than what simply appears in order for it to contribute to objects’ appearance
of independence.

Consequently, Sartre can make the following comments in

Nausea about the world one experiences:
It left me breathless. Never, until these last few days, had I
understood the meaning of “existence.” I was like the others, like
the ones walking along the seashore, all dressed in their spring
finery. I said, like them, “The ocean is green; that white speck up
there is a seagull”…When I believed I was thinking about it, I must
believe that I was thinking nothing, my head was empty, or there
was just one word in my head, the word “to be.” Or else I was
thinking…how can I explain it? I was thinking of belonging, I was
telling myself that the sea belonged to the class of green objects, or
that the green was a part of the quality of the sea…If anyone had
asked me what existence was, I would have answered, in good
faith, that it was nothing, simply an empty form which was added to
external things without changing anything in their nature. And then
all of a sudden, there it was, clear as day; existence had suddenly
unveiled itself. It had lost the harmless look of an abstract
category: it was the very paste of things, this root was kneaded
into existence….309
The point of this suggested reading of Sartre, then, is that perhaps his
apparently one-sided focus on what appears when describing consciousness as
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the internal negation of its object involves a failure to appreciate that
appearances can consistently be regarded as dependent upon something else,
compatibly both with a rejection of Husserlian “idealism” and also with adoption
of a “phenomenological” point of view in ontology. Namely, they can be regarded
as so dependent precisely for their necessary appearance of being something initself, independent of the consciousness of them. But of course, on the other
hand, this would make no sense apart from another point of view in ontology, or
at least in what Sartre chooses to call “metaphysics.” Sartre’s failure to be clear
about the exact ways in which he did not depart from Husserl may thus be seen
as having its own necessary correlate in the unclarities that we have encountered
throughout as to the relation between the “metaphysical” and “ontological” sides
of his analysis.
Sartre might only need the presentation of independence by appearances
in order to preserve his understanding of Husserl’s central insight that
consciousness is always consciousness of something. In fact, one might think
such means of preservation is most faithful to Husserl, as noted by one
commentator in the following quote:
…consciousness is always consciousness of something…ought
perhaps more properly to be regarded as either a definition or a
descriptive psychological fact. If regarded as a definition then
“consciousness of something” is only a synonym for
“consciousness.” If viewed as a psychological fact, intentionality is
an introspectively discoverable characteristic of our conscious lives.
To go beyond this and argue that the state of being conscious of
something logically implies the necessity of this “something’s”
external existence is to be misled verbally by the seeming
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implication of substantial being on the basis of the meaning of the
word “consciousness.”310
So, even though, as noted in Chapter Two, Sartre takes Husserl’s insight to
imply that “there is no consciousness that is not a positing of a transcendent
object,”311 perhaps such positing can occur even if the object only seems
transcendent. If so, then consciousness would not need to be merely the internal
negation of its object, since, as noted in Chapter Three, that need emerges from
the alleged impossibility of consciousness, like anything else, being connected to
that which it is not. If consciousness’s objects only seem independent while
really being dependent upon consciousness, then there is no reason to say that
consciousness must in some sense be nothing more than the objects to which it
is present.
Perhaps the earlier example of awarness of a table can demonstrate both
what the correlational reading of Sartre claims and how that reading differs from
other understandings of Sartre. According to the recommended correlational
position on Sartre, consciousness of a table is a fact about the body and the past
that the table necessarily indicates, namely the fact that they have been
transcended toward that table. The transcended body and past exist
independently of conscious experience, and the fact that their transcendence in
some sense constitutes the experienced table makes the table at least appear as
independent of experience as well. This position differs from Husserl in that it is
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subjective hyletic “stuff” that is transcended toward whatever is experienced, and
one can always choose to apprehend the experienced, such as the table, as not
having independent existence. The purely phenomenological reading of Sartre,
on the other hand, differs from the correlational reading by simply viewing
consciousness as the fact that the table appears and indicates a body and a
past. The body and past are thus not what consciousness is for that reading, but
rather are just what is indicated by appearing phenomena.
It would seem plausible to say in conclusion that while Sartre’s claim that
consciousness is nothingness apparently meant several different things to him, it
is best understood, on the most fundamental level, as meaning that
consciousness is the state of affairs of its facticity being transcended toward its
object. As already stated, as a state of affairs, it would in a way not be anything
more than its constituents (one’s body and past). But it would not be simply the
same as them either. Sartre’s claims about consciousness being nothing more
than its objects would then seem due to an unnecessary treatment of such
objects as really independent rather than as simply appearing that way. And the
connection between Sartre’s claims about consciousness being its facticity and
about it being nothing more than its objects would be, finally, that one could
explain objects’ appearance of independence by the role of facticity in the
consciousness by which such objects are apprehended.
This understanding of consciousness as the self-transcending facticity that
objects appear to would seem to be an affirmation by Sartre of a kind of
“experiencing subject.” Instead of consciousness simply being the purely
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phenomenological fact that objects appear, it instead seems to be a fact about
what such objects appear to. Specifically, it is the fact that consciousness’s
facticity transcends itself toward its objects. Furthermore, this treatment of
appearances as a correlate of consciousness certainly does not preclude the
latter “appearing” itself, as well, at least in an important phenomenological sense.
For as already noted, consciousness is in some sense the body (and past) that is
both necessarily “indicated” by what appears and also appears itself as the bodyfor-others. The fact that it appears, though, does not make consciousness just
an appearance.
Although it is true that some of Sartre’s claims about consciousness are
problematic, such as his claims about in-itself facticity somehow attempting to
found itself and about consciousness being nothing more than its object, it would
thus seem that one can glean a fairly plausible account from him of
consciousness and appearances as standing in some sort of relation of
correlation. That account treats consciousness as a body and past that are
transcended toward appearing objects and that such objects always indicate.
Whether or not such objects exist independently of such transcendence, they
necessarily appear that way. This account would then make him more similar to
Husserl than he professes to be. But it seems to make the most sense of all that
he says. Despite his efforts to distance himself from Husserl’s alleged failure to
recognize the independent nature of what one experiences, it would seem that at
least a central element in Husserl’s position can actually help explain, within the
confines of a “phenomenological ontology,” that very independence. Any
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understanding of Sartre would seemingly have to recognize this irony in the
relationship between the two thinkers. That the explanation in question is itself in
turn dependent on some sort of “ontology” of consciousness that is what Sartre
calls “metaphysical,” and that involves what seems to be the most striking
unclarities in his book, may make one marvel at the extent to which Sartre
himself may have gone to distance himself from Husserl.
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CONCLUSION
Sartre’s claim that consciousness is nothingness seems best understood
as meaning that consciousness is the state of affairs of its facticity being
transcended toward objects correlative with it, with facticity at the same time
being the only constituents of that state of affairs. I call such an understanding of
Sartre the correlational position. This does not imply that Sartre actually meant
this by treating consciousness as nothingness, but rather that such an
understanding of him makes the most sense out of all that he says. Although
Sartre says many things that sound as if consciousness for him is a different
state of affairs, namely, of the appearance of objects with their various
indications, an understanding of Sartre that I call the purely phenomenological
position, such an understanding of Sartre suffers from at least two problems.
First, it does not make sense of his claim that consciousness is its facticity, given
that none of its appearing objects are its facticity. It is arguable that perhaps the
body-for-others is. Even that object, however, is not strictly identifiable with
consciousness’s facticity, since facticity is consciousness’s past as well as its
body. Second, the correlational position seems to account for what arguably
motivated the purely phenomenological position, namely objects’ appearance of
independence from consciousness. It is this second problem that shows the
superiority of the correlational position, since that position shares the first
problem with the purely phenomenological position, given that Sartre also claims
that consciousness is something other than its self-transcending facticity, namely
its objects.
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Despite these problems, the purely phenomenological position seems
more able than the correlational position to reconcile certain features of Sartre’s
phenomenological ontology with his metaphysics. According to Sartre’s
phenomenological description of consciousness, consciousness is always of a
transcendent object, and according to his metaphysical explanation of
consciousness, consciousness originates from the in-itself’s failed attempt at selfcausation. Since this attempt at self-causation does not seemingly involve
anything other than the in-itself being that attempts self-causation, it would not
seem that consciousness would necessarily involve any transcendent objects
that it would be of. The purely phenomenological position can explain why this
failure at self-causation and resulting presence to self would require having a
transcendent object since it treats consciousness as in some sense being its
appearing objects in the first place.
There might seem to be another explanation of why the metaphysical
failure at self-causation necessitates consciousness having a transcendent
object, an explanation that is compatible with the correlational position. Selfconsciousness, the result of the failure of self-causation in question, is, at least
on the pre-reflective level, the indication of consciousness by transcendent
objects that is a phenomenological datum for Sartre. Without such indication,
there is no self-consciousness, so that consciousness needs transcendent
objects to indicate it in order for it to be self-conscious, and so be consciousness
in the first place. Since this explanation does not treat consciousness as being
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its objects, it seems compatible with the correlational position’s treatment of
consciousness.
This explanation might also seem to account for the very fact of Sartre’s
designation of consciousness as being its objects, since one can only
phenomenologically find consciousness by way of its objects. But however
plausible an explanation this may be for Sartre’s claim that consciousness is just
its objects, it simply ignores Sartre’s metaphysical explanation of consciousness.
For even if pre-reflective consciousness is only aware of itself by means of its
reflection by its transcendent objects, that simply does not speak to the question
why the act of attempted self-causation in question should be necessarily related
to a transcendent object. It would seem that such an attempt could only involve
itself, and thus it would seem that its resulting presence to itself might only
involve itself. The phenomenological description of consciousness as always of
a transcendent object is certainly not incompatible with the claim that
consciousness originates from a failure at self-causation, but the latter does not
explain nor entail the former, without the additional claim that consciousness in
some sense is its objects.
There might not seem to be any need to reconcile Sartre’s metaphysics
with his phenomenology. For the former’s claims seem to involve an
impossibility in Sartre’s own view. The claim that an in-itself being attempted to
do anything, whether what it attempts is possible or not, would seemingly assert
an impossibility since Sartre treats an attempt or project as something only found
with the for-itself. Given this, one might of course then wonder why Sartre made
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such claims at all. In fact, one might find it more charitable to simply ignore those
claims, made throughout Being and Nothingness, and only acknowledge his
statement, made toward the end of the book, that it simply seems as if
consciousness originated from such an impossible attempt.
It is, however, important that Sartre treats facticity’s attempt at selfcausation as an actual occurrence. By treating facticity as actually doing
something that does not appear phenomenologically, Sartre will then at least
have an explanation of the fact that phenomena necessarily appear as
independent of consciousness. In particular, one may hypothesize that facticity
helps to ‘constitute’ phenomena for Sartre in a way that is comparable to
Husserl’s view of “hyle” helping to constitute the “noema,” by getting
“transcended” in a noesis that incorporates it. As such, facticity’s existence
beyond its appearance can be reflected in the phenomena in a way comparable
to Husserl’s view of the hyle’s incorporation in the noema, but with a very
different upshot from Husserl’s view. In fact, the very impossibility of facticity’s
attempt at self-causation insures that such an attempt does not appear, meaning
that, precisely in its ‘constituting’ role, facticity exists beyond the
phenomenological level. One can thus not treat it as nothing more than what is
indicated by appearing objects, a treatment that would make it simply an aspect
or feature of such objects. This poses yet another problem for the purely
phenomenological position, since such treatment would seem to be the only one
it could give of facticity. Thus, however successful Sartre’s enterprise in fact
was, it would seem that we can at least understand what he was trying to do, and
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applaud it as an ingenious attempt to utilize some of Husserl’s insights about the
‘constitution’ of what one experiences precisely in support of a transcendental
realism in phenomenology, as opposed to Husserl’s transcendental idealism.
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